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ABSTRACT 
Techno-strategic integration is the process through which militaries integrate 
technological advances into a strategy that maximizes their advantages.  While sheer 
military might is a function of a variety of factors, technology has taken center stage in 
the past two centuries.  The industrial revolution changed the way war was fought; and 
the changes had wide ranging effects.  The calamity of the First World War was in some 
ways a failure to techno-strategically integrate industrial age technology.  The history of 
military technology and strategy illustrates many obstacles to the integration of the two.  
This thesis shows that successful techno-strategic integration is often highly correlated 
with effective execution of war and improvement of national security.  On the other hand, 
enduring organizational preferences, inter-service rivalry, and commercial self-interest 
have often undermined new techno-strategic possibilities.  However, with the growth and 
increasing capability of information age technology, this research shows growing 
indications that the techno-strategic paradigm of the industrial age is shifting.  The United 
States is positioned to capitalize on its lead in informational innovations, and integrating 
technologies into new concepts of operations.  If managed successfully, the United States 
might emerge with a leaner, more agile force that can keep its strategic competitors at 
bay. 
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The tools of war both fascinate and horrify with their elegance and killing 
prowess.  International power derives from a complex relationship between economic, 
diplomatic, informational, and military factors.  In the military arena, prowess is often 
equated to technological “superiority.”  Although states can rise and fall in relation to the 
power of their militaries, the relationship between military power and technology is 
sometimes hard to specify.  Clearly, examples such as Vietnam show that technological 
superiority is not sufficient to ensure victory; however, it is also true that failure to equip 
a military with technologically sophisticated weaponry can lead to defeat.  Furthermore, 
military technology, and the arms industry that supports it, can represent an almost 
limitless portion of a state’s expenditure.  Deciding on what technology to invest in, 
therefore, is a crucial element of strategy.   
In order to explore the interaction of strategy and technology, defining these key 
concepts of is in order. Strategy itself is hard to pin down.  Grand strategy, as conceived 
by Barry R. Posen and others is an overarching construct that looks holistically at how a 
state can secure itself and contains military, economic, and political means.1  Posen 
further stipulates that military doctrine, a subset of grand strategy, deals with answering 
questions regarding what means a military will use, and how they will use them.2  A 
similar characterization of strategy is offered by Arthur F. Lykke Jr., who in turn 
attributes it to remarks made at the U.S. Army War College by General Maxwell D. 
Taylor.  Lykke breaks strategy down in to three components: ends, ways, and means.3  
Whereas, strategy as defined by Joint Publication 1–02 (Department of Defense 
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms) as “A prudent idea or set of ideas for 
employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to 
                                                 
1 Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World 
Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 13. 
2 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars, 
13. 
3 Arthur F. Lykke, "Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy," in U.S. Army War College Guide 
to Strategy, eds. Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb, 2001), 179. 
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achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.”4  The main difference inherent 
in these three sources is the macro distinction between grand strategy, and strategy.  
Grand strategy occurs at the national level, and encompasses decisions made in both 
peacetime and while engaged in conflict that pertain to security.  Strategy, in terms of the 
conduct of a campaign, is narrower, and operates as a component of grand strategy.  
Strategy describes the local mixture of ends, ways, and means for victory.  Technological 
decisions, for the most part, fit into the arena of grand strategy.  As former Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld said, “you go to war with the Army you have.”5  Rumsfeld’s 
quote suggests the underlying importance of making the right technological choices while 
at peace, but technology can also be developed and adopted during war.  How do 
technological choices get made?  What influences affect adopting new, or maintaining 
old technological paradigms?   
A. THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
This study starts with the following question: what is the relationship between 
strategy and technology in military affairs?  The term Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA) has become so commonplace that it may have lost some of its meaning.  It is time 
to look more fully into the critical relationship between technology and strategy.   
Stephan Biddle highlights two macro positions that characterize how technology’s 
relationship to military power has been investigated.  First, there is systemic theory, 
which looks broadly at technological forms from a standpoint of their relationship to 
offensive and defensive employment, rather than from any specific technology’s 
superiority.6  Systemic theory is useful when it highlights how advances in one area lead 
to advances in another opposing area; a persistent feature of arms spirals and races.  
However, the systemic position is weakened, to some degree, by the multipurpose use 
much of today’s technology is capable of—the distinction between offense and defense, 
                                                 
4 Dept. of Defense, Joint Publication 1–02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated TermsDepartment of Defense, 2010), 323. 
5 William Kristol, "The Defense Secretary we have," Washington PostDecember 15, 2004. 
6 Stephen D. Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004), 15. 
  3
particularly in “irregular” warfare, is just not as clear as systemic theory requires.  The 
second view, dyadic theory, accounts for some of the problems identified with systemic 
theory.  Dyadic theory looks at the quality and quantity of technology, and explains 
victory in terms of technological superiority.7  Like the systemic position’s adherents, 
dyadic theorists have trouble incorporating accounts where technologically inferior foes 
have defeated their superior adversaries.  Biddle acknowledges that both the systemic and 
dyadic theories are insufficient based on their implicit technological determinism, which, 
among other things, masks the importance of force employment, troop morale, and will.8  
Force employment enriches the characterization of a military’s performance beyond 
technology into areas such as doctrine.  Furthermore, force employment includes a broad 
category of characteristics, such as, leadership, morale, training, and experience that 
influence military operations, but are separate from technology.9  Part of the reason 
Biddle gives for the general lack of attention to force employment, is the difficulty it 
poses to military modelers who primarily use equations derived from technological 
information in their simulations.10  Biddle acknowledges the difficulty of modeling force 
employment, but also indicates that military professionals have long included it in their 
assessments.   
The idea of force employment is critical to unlocking a fuller, less deterministic, 
account of the relationship between technology and strategy.  While both systemic and 
dyadic theory emphasize the importance of technology, the force employment position 
looks more deeply at both the technological and human factors that influence military 
effectiveness.  Biddle’s central thesis is that the modern system, which is characterized 
by combined arms formations and requires decentralization to lower echelons of 
command, was developed by WWI and has not been supplanted.11  Horowitz and Rosen 
challenge Biddle’s thesis on the grounds that the metrics that define the modern system, 
                                                 
7 Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle, 16. 
8 Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle, 19. 
9 Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle, 17. 
10 Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle, 18. 
11 Michael Horowitz and Stephen Rosen, "Evolution Or Revolution?" The Journal of Strategic Studies 
28, no. 3 (June, 2005), 440–441. 
  4
such as, dispersion, firepower, and maneuver are sufficiently present in all combat.  
Therefore, using them to evaluate the adoption of the modern system does not clarify 
what variables are really important.12  Horowitz and Rosen provide clarity by supplying a 
definition.  “An RMA is a combination of new military organizational goals and 
structures with new operational practices on the battlefield that are sometimes but not 
always driven by technologies.”13  This definition avoids the determinism inherent in the 
systemic and dyadic theories, and captures Biddle’s key insight of the importance of 
force employment while avoiding his limited metrics.   
Complicating the characterization of a time period as “revolutionary” are the 
inevitable disputes regarding the delineation of dates.  The demarcation critique is a 
persistent criticism echoing back to the first formulation of a military revolution by 
Michael Roberts in the 1950s.  However, the enduring elegance of Roberts’s initial 
formulation and its persistence both speak to the appeal of the idea.  Roberts’s developed 
the idea of a military revolution when he began studying the sweeping changes in 
Sweden from 1560–1660.  Geoffrey Parker succinctly summarizes Roberts’s thesis along 
four themes: 1. Tactics; 2. Strategy; 3. Scale; and, 4. Societal impact.14  Tactically 
changes in infantry and cavalry formations and maneuver required a more thoroughly 
trained soldier, capable of fulfilling their role in concert with the larger formation.15  The 
process of training soldiers in particular was important; it was through the participation in 
standardized drill that soldiers became a relatively uniform product.16  As noted by 
William McNeill, they became “replaceable parts of a great military machine.”17  Given 
the larger initial investment in training a competent soldier, states were reluctant to 
disband their forces upon the conclusion of a campaign; therefore, changes in tactics 
                                                 
12 Horowitz and Rosen, Evolution Or Revolution?, 443. 
13 Horowitz and Rosen, Evolution Or Revolution?, 441. 
14 Geoffrey Parker, "The "Military Revolution," 1560–1660--a Myth?" The Journal of Modern History 
Vol. 48, no. 2 (June, 1976), 195–197. 
15 Parker, The "Military Revolution," 1560–1660--a Myth?, 196. 
16 William Hardy McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 
1000 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 141. 
17 McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000, 141. 
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precipitated the creation of standing armies.18  Strategically, a large disciplined standing 
army created new employment opportunities for a state because these soldiers could be 
counted on to do their duty in ways that inexperienced troops could not—audacity 
emerges as a decisive element of strategy.19  The realization of the new strategic 
capability of the standing army increased the scope of the possible, thus, to achieve these 
strategic possibilities armies and campaigns increased in size changing the scale of war.20  
Larger scale wars, accordingly, had a larger impact on society.21 
Parker’s critique challenges Roberts’s timeline and location of the early modern 
“military revolution,” showing that many of the changes Roberts uses as evidence 
preceded 1560, were evident earlier in the historical record, and had taken place 
elsewhere.22  However, Parker accepts that a change writ large had occurred in the scale 
and societal impact of warfare from 1560 to1660.  Interestingly, Parker also accords 
some of the changes in tactics and strategy to technological factors.  The increased use of 
pikes in both offensive and defensive roles displaced the economically more costly heavy 
knight.23  “This shift in emphasis from horse to foot was crucial to army size.”24  Parker 
also notes that administrative, logistical, and economic reforms were all necessary to 
realize and control larger armies.25  At the strategic level Parker indicates, in an analysis 
reminiscent of the systemic position, that during this time the offensive-defensive balance 
was being redefined by advances in cannonry and fortifications.26  Cannonry struck the 
proverbial first blow with advances in casting making current fortifications obsolete, and 
therefore, favoring offense.27  Architects in Italy responded by redesigning fortifications 
                                                 
18 Parker, The "Military Revolution," 1560–1660--a Myth?, 196. 
19 Parker, The "Military Revolution," 1560–1660--a Myth?, 197. 
20 Parker, The "Military Revolution," 1560–1660--a Myth?, 197. 
21 Parker, The "Military Revolution," 1560–1660--a Myth?, 197. 
22 Parker, The "Military Revolution," 1560–1660--a Myth?, 199–207. 
23 Parker, The "Military Revolution," 1560–1660--a Myth?, 207. 
24 Parker, The "Military Revolution," 1560–1660--a Myth?, 207. 
25 Parker, The "Military Revolution," 1560–1660--a Myth?, 206–210. 
26 Parker, The "Military Revolution," 1560–1660--a Myth?, 203–205. 
27 Parker, The "Military Revolution," 1560–1660--a Myth?, 203. 
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a modified form of the venerable bastion—the sharply angled trace italienne.28  The 
trace italienne, nearly impervious to cannon bombardment, necessitated a siege strategy, 
which neutralized the value of the technologically enhanced cannons, and led, in general, 
to a stalemate in the heavily fortified areas of Europe.29  Thus, the changing strategic 
relationship between offense and defense was responsible for the revolutions in strategy 
during this timeframe not the growth of trained disciplined forces as indicated by 
Roberts.  In the final analysis, Parker differs only in the details of the course of the early 
modern military revolution, he acknowledges that fundamentally the scale and societal 
impact of warfare outlined in Roberts’s thesis were indeed revolutionary.  Others such as 
Jeremy Black go further than Parker, and question the validity of defining this historical 
period as revolutionary at all.30 
Black, like Parker, focuses on the timeline, and argues that Roberts’s thesis 
minimizes the changes that took place before and after Roberts’s 1560–1660 delineation.  
Specifically, Black notes, “[i]n so far as a military revolution occurred in the early 
modern period it could be dated more appropriately to the hundred years, especially the 
first fifty, after the period highlighted by Roberts.”31  However, Black’s criticism is more 
important than a mere quibble over dates.  Black suggests that rather than focusing on 
Swedish tactical innovations, army size, morale, and tactical flexibility were the changes 
that led to increased proficiency.32  More importantly, Black turns the process on its head 
and suggests that rather than the increases in the size of armies leading to the creation of 
modern states, the emergence of the modern state led to the in the increase in the size of 
armies.33  The impetus of this critique is rightfully cautionary, although, it is accurate to 
correlate the rise of states and the size of armies it is misleading to assess causation in 
either direction.   
                                                 
28 Parker, The "Military Revolution," 1560–1660-–a Myth?, 203–204. 
29 Parker, The "Military Revolution," 1560–1660--a Myth?, 204. 
30 Jeremy Black, A Military Revolution?: Military Change and European Society, 1550–1800 
(Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1991), 6. 
31 Black, A Military Revolution?: Military Change and European Society, 1550–1800, 93. 
32 Black, A Military Revolution?: Military Change and European Society, 1550–1800, 94. 
33 Black, A Military Revolution?: Military Change and European Society, 1550–1800, 67. 
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As both the initial formulation of the military revolution hypothesis and its 
subsequent criticism indicates, it is exceedingly difficulty to characterize and demarcate 
transformational time periods in the historical record.  However, it is also true that, to 
some degree, technology plays a role in shaping our society—there is no critique of 
Roberts’s thesis that denies that warfare has changed.  This study will attempt to examine 
the integration of technology into the existing military framework, and will argue that 
military effectiveness is, in part, a function of the degree to which the technology a 
military has is integrated with the overarching conditions for its employment as outlined 
in a state’s grand strategy.  Antecedent conditions affecting integration, such as, civil-
military relationship, military-industrial relationships, the degree of strategic competition, 
and the development cycle of technologic innovation, will be considered in their 
relationship to integration.  Finally, since grand strategy is not always clear, and both 
military professionals and the arms industry are invested in the technological decisions 
made by a state, the integration of technology is not always as straightforward as one 
would hope.  When discussing technology it is useful to think in terms of three broad 
archetypes: evolutionary, revolutionary, and imitative.   
1. Technological Archetypes 
With the observation that the term RMA has lost some of its caché, and the 
definition supplied by Horowitz and Rosen above, it is time to think more deeply about 
what constitutes a revolution.  Clearly a true revolution cannot happen every day, nor is 
every new technology revolutionary.  However, it does seem that there are times when 
weapons technology develops in a way that either transcends its previous forms, as in 
nuclear bombs, or takes on an entirely new form.   
The key feature of a revolution is the creation of novelty.  But does successful 
integration of revolutionary technology always lead to increased effectiveness and 
efficiency?  Revolutions, also, are relatively short lived in comparison to the longer 
evolutionary process.  Looking at Thomas Kuhn’s characterization of the history of 
scientific progress outlined in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions provided an  
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accessible and pertinent framework for looking at the progress of military technology, 
and also provides some insight into the military’s organizational difficulties with 
integrating new technology.  
The major distinction at work for Kuhn is between normal science and 
revolutionary science.  During a period of prolonged normal science the details of a 
governing theory are attended to, leading to an increasingly more complete 
epistemological description of reality.34  However, during the process of conducting 
normal science there will be an increasing amount of inconsistencies that are neither 
predicted nor explained by the operating framework of the macro theoretical construct 
within which the experiments are taking place.35  These inconsistencies are indicative of a 
schism between reality and the characterization of reality by the overarching scientific 
theory.36  As these inconsistencies mount a new paradigm will eventually emerge that 
accounts for both the inconsistencies, and also incorporates the previous paradigm’s 
explanatory power.37  Kuhn refers to this as a paradigm shift. 
A paradigm shift occurs because of the process of revolutionary science.  
Revolutionary science is not satisfied with the current paradigm, perhaps, in part due to 
the growing body of counterfactuals, and offers a new explanatory framework for the 
description of reality.38  Interestingly, not all scientists drop what they are doing and get 
to work filling in the details of the new paradigm.39  Part of the recalcitrance to adopt the 
new paradigm is a result of sociological and psychological tension, and Kuhn, in my 
view, does not develop the social issues thoroughly enough.  Robert’s, however, in his 
historical example discussed above is much more prescient in outlining the how social 
institutions, relationships, and norms can all be altered fundamentally by a paradigm 
shift.  However, our question is how well does this model describe the weapons 
                                                 
34 Robert Klee, Scientific Inquiry: Readings in the Philosophy of Science (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 202–207. 
35 Klee, Scientific Inquiry: Readings in the Philosophy of Science, 202–207. 
36 Klee, Scientific Inquiry: Readings in the Philosophy of Science, 202–207. 
37 Klee, Scientific Inquiry: Readings in the Philosophy of Science, 202–207. 
38 Klee, Scientific Inquiry: Readings in the Philosophy of Science, 208–215. 
39 Klee, Scientific Inquiry: Readings in the Philosophy of Science, 208–215. 
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development process?  Does it adequately incorporate the strength of the evolutionary 
model, but also, explain the human design process and the organizational resistance 
present in the historical record?   
Normal science is analogous to the evolutionary process of weapons 
development.  The main feature of normal science is the refinement of the paradigm by 
filling in the details.  In evolutionary development the main feature is specialization.  
Refinement and specialization both narrow the framework—in science this is 
epistemological and in war it is operationally.  Wars occurring during a period of 
evolutionary development, against a roughly peer competitor, take on an almost game-
like quality.40  Revolutionary technology changes the rules of the game.  It creates new 
operational capabilities.  
Just as in science, however, the implications of revolutionary technology may not 
be realized immediately by the existing military bureaucracy.  The military hierarchy, in 
the case of adaptation, is perfectly suited to fail.  All the power at the top of the pyramid 
came to age in the old paradigm; their identity is defined by their association with the 
organizational forms, and operational capabilities predicated by the old technology.  
When a revolutionarily new technology comes into existence, the people in power are the 
least likely to support the transformation of the corresponding cultural idiosyncrasies and 
organizational forms the new technology encourages.  The catalyst that finally forces 
transformation is sadly, often calamity—and sometimes even calamity is not enough.  
Lessons can be ignored just as easily as they are learned the American Army’s reluctance 
to embrace counterinsurgency after Vietnam comes to mind as one example.   
Using Kuhn’s framework as an analogy for understanding the processes at work 
in the interplay between evolutionary and revolutionary technological processes is 
helpful.  However, it is also necessary to consider each archetype individually.  Making 
distinctions between different forms of technology is difficult, and, as with any 
distinction, can be arbitrary.   
                                                 
40 Martin Van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present (New York; London: 
Free Press; Collier Macmillan, 1989), 285–296. 
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a. Evolutionary 
Evolutionary technological development is characterized by a process of 
continual refinement through a process of incremental change directed at improving 
performance. Evolutionary development constitutes the majority of military-
technological history, is relatively stable, and produces an environment where peer 
competitors engage in generally agreed upon styles of combat.41  Evolutionary 
technology is entrenched in the organizational memory of the military that seeks 
continually to improve its technology at the margins, without questioning whether the 
technology renders a decisive advantage.  The evolutionary archetype accounts for the 
majority of technological “progress.”  This conceptualization of technology excels in 
explaining the continual process at work in the refinement of a device over a period of 
time.  Evolutionary analogies are also useful in explaining the back-and-forth one-
upmanship of arms races.  
b. Revolutionary 
Revolutionary technology is characterized by the appearance of a 
significant innovation, or a series of mutually supporting innovations.42  This can occur 
as part of a deliberate design and production process, or as the result of cumulative 
improvements that eventually morph the technology.  Revolutionary technology from 
either process presents a difficult organizational, and doctrinal challenge to integrate, but 
may offer an advantage if the integration is successful.  Revolutionary technology is rare, 
and the window of opportunity to capitalize on its potential advantages is brief due to the 
tendency for advantageous technologies to be imitated, and the diffusion that any 
successful idea or device will naturally enjoy.  Consider what the implications could have 
been if the German Navy had recognized the potential of submarines during the interwar 
period.  It was a revolutionary technology ignored, until it was too late to take full 
advantage of it.    
                                                 
41 Van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present, 342. 
42 Max Boot, War made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today (New 
York: Gotham Books, 2006), 7–8. 
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c. Imitative 
Finally, the imitating organization, acknowledging that it cannot compete 
with an adversary’s research and development and manufacturing dominance, adopts a 
strategy to capitalize on the widespread proliferation of technology in general, or actively 
seeks out and copies proven existing technology in an effort to reduce the opponent’s 
advantage.  Imitation can be a valuable strategy.  Imitation results from diffusion.  
Diffusion, as articulated by Everett M. Rogers in Diffusion of Innovations is a four-part 
process that starts with an innovation, which is communicated by various channels over 
time through individuals in a social system.43  Moreover, it may be that countries that are 
late to modernize are able to “inherit” the most advanced technology without the detritus 
of preconceived paradigms, which, in some cases, promotes greater acceptance and 
further innovation.44  
Although there are at times similarities between imitation and 
revolutionary development, the two are separate based on the distinction between 
innovation and imitation as it relates to development of technology.  In the area of 
doctrine and organization the imitator may be revolutionary, but in terms of development 
and production it is imitative.  Interestingly, the imitator may at times be more integrated 
both doctrinally and organizationally with a technology that it did not invent then the 
inventor.   
2. Modeling Relationships 
A model can be constructed by placing the degree of integration on the X axis and 
the type of development on the Y axis as shown in Figure 1. 
                                                 
43 Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations, 4th ed. (New York: Free Press, 1995), 35. 
44 Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, a Book of Essays 
(Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962), 7–9. 
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Figure 1.   Model showing the degree of integration on the X axis and the type of 
development on the Y axis. 
Four relationships are thus depicted: 1. Revolutionary and disintegrated; 2. 
Revolutionary and integrated; 3. Evolutionary and integrated; and, 4. Evolutionary and 
disintegrated.  Furthermore, the model can show changes over the life cycle of a piece of 
technology.  Some predicted movements are shown in Figure 2; which shows eight trends 
inherent in the model.  The first four represent stasis, and are operating when a 
technology remains in its current quadrant.  The next four apply to technology over its 
life span.  Also, while imitation is absent along either axis it is still operating, most likely 
in quadrant three, which represents evolutionary and integrated technology.  This 
quadrant is the most susceptible to imitation because the technology in this quadrant, 
presumably, has diffused enough to be copied, and has been proven to work within an 
existing concept of operations.   
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Figure 2.   Model showing the predicted trends of technology over its life cycle 
Movement from quadrant one to quadrant three is the typical progression.  
Generally this is the movement that exist when a new technology emerges that challenges 
the status quo.  At first it is unwieldy, but, over time it is assimilated, while 
simultaneously it is improved and imitated.  There is one example of a technology that 
has moved over the course of its production from quadrant one to quadrant three.  Tanks 
made their debut in 1916 during the Somme offensive in WWI, however, their initial 
employment was disjointed.  Over the remainder of the war the technology evolved and 
the strategy for their employment was improved by the battle of Amines in 1918 tanks 
played a decisive role in crushing the German Army.  Movement from quadrant one to 
quadrant four represents when a revolutionary technology emerges that is not integrated, 
but, yet receives continued support resulting in subsequent generations that are improved 
but remain disintegrated.  Possible explanations for this include collusion between 
powerful lobby groups and the military, or incongruity between the part of the 
organization that uses the technology and the one that procures it.  The Strategic Defense 
Initiative could be an example of a revolutionary technology that was disintegrated, and 
remained disintegrated despite subsequent improvements in its technological foundation.  
Movement from quadrant one to quadrant two represents the integration of revolutionary 
technology, while maintaining its revolutionary character.  This progression is inherently 
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hard to achieve, but could in the best case represent an agile military that is quick to 
realize and integrate the advantages of a new technology.  Arming aerial drones, which 
were initially a revolutionary reconnaissance device, is an example of maintaining 
revolutionary technological advantages while continuing to integrate.  Movement can 
also be upward. The proliferation of technology into less advanced areas of the world can 
make technology in a sense revolutionary even if elsewhere it is familiar.  The 
proliferation of AK-47s is one example where a technology may have moved from 
quadrant three to quadrant two.  In this case a seemingly evolutionary technology was 
reimagined as a central feature in the “irregularization” of warfare in otherwise 
technologically unremarkable societies.  Machine guns are an example of a technology 
that moved from quadrant four to quadrant three during the course of the First World 
War.  The machine gun contribution to defensive concepts was ignored in favor of the 
organizational preferences for offensive.  During the course of the war the machine gun 
was integrated into defenses leading to a protracted stalemate on the Western Front.   
Over time, like all technology the trend is to become evolutionary, but given the absence 
of having to learn how to integrate a technology, this movement enables a longer period 
of advantage. 
The cycle of invention and counter-invention, and the tendency for older 
technology to be replaced by new innovations can displace evolutionary technology.  
This process is reflected in the model as growing disintegration, which is represented by 
movement, from quadrant three to quadrant four.  This constitutes a second order 
movement, whereby, evolutionary and integrated technology ceases to be demonstrably 
effective, but is retained.  The displacement from evolutionary and integrated to 
evolutionary and disintegrated, also, may imply that new technology and doctrine is 
available for adoption.  The resulting friction between those who want to maintain the old 
and those who embrace the new is, potentially, indicative of the conditions that support a 
paradigm shift or RMA.  This friction is again reminiscent of Kuhn, where some 
scientists continue to hold onto the old scientific paradigm after a new paradigm is 
presented.  One example of this movement might be the continued support for and the  
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development of battleships in the interwar period when developments in both submarines 
and aircraft carriers were increasingly making them arguably obsolete, or at a minimum 
increasingly vulnerable.   
3. Hypotheses  
This thesis focuses on the conditions under which each type of technological 
development best serves strategic objectives.  In essence this fit is what constitutes 
techno-strategic integration.  To understand these conditions, I will examine the 
following four hypotheses.   
a. Hypothesis 1: Political-military Interactions, Which are 
Characterized by an Informed and Involved Political Process 
Positively Affects the Integration of Revolutionary Technology 
The military side of civil-military relations can be construed as a 
continuum marked on one end by traditionalists and the other by progressives.  The 
traditionalists hold that the current force structure, technology, and doctrine are mostly 
adequate, and consist of the majority of the senior leadership in the military.45  The other 
side of the spectrum is marked by progressives, who are interested in exploring new 
organizational, doctrinal, and technological paradigms.  Due to the inherently hierarchical 
nature inherent of militaries the voices of the progressives, which are traditionally 
associated with lower rank, are drowned out by the more senior traditionalist. 
The political side also contains traditionalists and progressives.  
Furthermore, the relations between politicians and the military can be construed as a 
continuum from permissive to restrictive.  Permissive relationships are characterized by 
allowing the military a free hand in its affairs.  Under these conditions the integration of 
revolutionary technology is not expected due to the disparity of power between the 
mostly higher ranking traditionalists and the younger, lower ranking, progressives.  
However, under certain conditions, such as when a high-ranking progressive senior 
leader is empowered within a permissive environment, the integration of revolutionary 
                                                 
45 John Arquilla, Worst Enemy: The Reluctant Transformation of the American Military (Chicago: 
Ivan R. Dee, 2008), ix–x. 
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technology is likely to be facilitated.  Restrictive relationships, also, may limit the ability 
of a military to integrate revolutionary technology, perhaps due to, among other things, 
budgetary constraints.  However, a restrictive environment arising from the exercise of 
civilian control of the military to force change as a response to a new definition of grand 
strategy may be the catalyst that forces traditionalists to support and then integrate 
revolutionary technologies.  Civilian control of the military, when it is found, implies a 
responsibility of the civilian leadership to define the grand strategy within which a 
military can expect to find itself employed.  Since grand strategy dictates how and under 
what conditions a military will be employed, it is therefore inclusive of technological and 
organizational structuring.  Although, a certain degree of inclusion of the military in the 
definition of grand strategy is expected, acquiescence to the military will be considered as 
indicative of poor relations.  Therefore, political relations defined by knowledgeable and 
involved politicians will, when necessary, force techno-strategic integration on the 
military, thus, leading to an increased likelihood of integrating revolutionary technology.   
b. Hypothesis 2: Technology Produced Predominantly by a Highly 
Specialized Weapons Industry, Characterized by Specific and 
Narrow Product Lines with a Large Investment Overhead, is 
more Likely to Result in Evolutionary Technology 
The other side of civil-military relations is embodied by the relationship 
between the military and the industrial apparatus that designs, manufactures, and markets 
the tools of the military trade.  As technology has advanced, the investment in the 
manufacturing equipment needed to produce the technology has grown.  This represents a 
sunk cost to industrialists; one which is recouped if the technology it is designed to yield 
has a relatively long production span.  A long production span is assured if the only 
change that occurs is in the form of performance upgrades, which do not significantly 
alter the overall design.  One way that industrialists potentially try to shape market forces 
is to recruit retired military traditionalists, presumably to leverage their ties to the still-




c. Hypothesis 3: Periods of Adversity and Intense Strategic 
Competition will Increase Pressure to Integrate Revolutionary 
Technology, Whereas Periods of Stability will Promote the 
Continuation of Evolutionary Integrated, and Potentially 
Evolutionary and Disintegrated Technology 
This hypothesis focuses on the antecedent conditions of the security 
environment within which technology is designed and integrated.  In short, not all 
conflict is created equal.  States fight wars for a variety of reasons, the most adverse of 
which would be a war for existence.  A state’s perception of its vulnerability is also a 
component of strategic competition, thus, the perception that a war is imminent can 
provide motivation to explore new technological forms.  It is also possible that once a 
state has achieved a position of relative dominance, and, therefore, does not feel the 
necessity of innovation, it will lapse into a period of technological comfort marked by the 
continued evolution and reliance of the technology that vaulted them to their dominant 
position past the point of its rendering an advantage.  Disintegration is likely when other 
states, striving for relative dominance, continue to innovate and introduce new 
technological and doctrinal combinations, which render the older forms obsolete, or 
develop countermeasures that negate the dominant powers advantages.   
d. Hypothesis 4: Complexity and Exposure to Others’ Advances 
Affect Technological Imitability 
In general, the longer a technology has been around and been employed 
the more likely it is that it will be copied.  However, using length of time as a metric is 
problematic for a historical case study methodology because increases in global 
interconnectivity have, in some ways, reduced the time necessary for technological 
diffusion.  Although harder to quantify than time, exposure is more indicative of how 
imitation proceeds.  The exposure of the Soviet Union to atomic technology—through the 
use of espionage—increased the speed of the diffusion of the atomic bomb to four years.  
Exposure also explains how interconnectivity has decreased the relative time required for 
imitation.  Reverse engineering of captured enemy equipment, intellectual property theft, 
or espionage all increase exposure—more exposure equals more opportunity.  The second 
factor, complexity, is also a factor in imitability.  Straightforwardly, technology that is 
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more complex is more difficult to imitate.  But, there is also a potential relationship 
between exposure and complexity, where it is assumed that more complex technology 
requires greater exposure to imitate.  Finally, imitation does not imply that the technology 
is being used in the same way that designer intended it to be used.  The proliferation of 
munitions designed as artillery, but employed as Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) is 
a prime example of this.   
e. Scope 
This study will look at the relationship between technology and strategy 
using the hypotheses above to orient the discussion.  I will narrow the scope of this study 
to the industrial and post-industrial age roughly beginning with the period of history 
immediately preceding the American Civil War and continuing through the U.S.’s 
involvement in recent conflicts, such as, Iraq, Afghanistan.  The reason for selecting this 
time period is due to the weapons industries’ great impact on the integration of 
technology and military doctrine in the mass production era.46  Contextually, factors such 
as the offensive-defensive balance, technological superiority, and the process of 
change—whether incrementally, transitionally, or through imitation—will be explored to 
see the variety of ways that technology has affected doctrine and organizations.  
Technology strategy will be looked at distinctly to discern the conditions that may favor 
innovation or imitation in both peacetime and during war.    
4. Methodology 
Methodologically this study will employ an heuristic approach.47  This method 
assumes that broad historical studies are better suited for phenomena when existing 
theories cannot adequately explain or few existing theories are available.48  In other 
words, the heuristic approach analyzes cases inductively in order to arrive at a 
                                                 
46 Benjamin A. Taylor, "Military Innovation in the Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Lessons for 
America" (MS Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School), 1–129. 
47 Harry Eckstein, Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1992), 143–147. 
48 Eckstein, Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change, 143. 
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preliminary theoretical construct or constructs.49  This method is critical for exploring 
techno-strategic interaction because the human variables involved are hard, if not 
impossible, to quantify.  Vignettes will be selected to highlight the process of integrating 
technology.  Furthermore, the heuristic method will allow the search for inductive 
generalizations, which can facilitate prescriptive recommendations.  Policy 
recommendations will be formulated with a goal toward reducing unnecessary 
expenditures and increasing the likelihood of a techno-strategic advantage. 
                                                 
49 Eckstein, Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change, 144. 
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II. CASE STUDY: 1840 TO WWI 
The impact of the industrial revolution on warfare was felt only gradually during 
the years leading up to World War I.  Throughout the period beginning in the 1840s, 
accelerating in the 1880s, and coming to horrible fruition in WWI, a series of changes 
took place that transformed warfare.50.  The industrialization of weapons manufacture 
had implications for the relationships between industry, politicians and the military that 
were not as apparent prior to large-scale, fast pace technological change became possible.  
Technical innovation at time preceded doctrinal developments; however, much of the 
character of modern warfare is evident in the historical record as early as the American 
Civil War (1861–1865). 
A. 1840–1914: THE GROWING INDUSTRIALIZATION OF WARFARE 
The industrial revolution, with its technological and manufacturing implications, 
radically altered the tools of warfare in a relatively short time period.  However, it is 
wrong to attribute the carnage of WWI strictly to the appearance of new machinery.  
Although there were some limited efforts, notably by the Prussians, to integrate new 
technologies into an overarching cohesive system of warfare, the majority assumed that 
warfare remained unchanged.  How this was possible in the face of examples from the 
American Civil War, the small wars of British Empire, and the Russo-Japanese War, all 
of which indicated that fundamentally war had changed, is in itself an indication of the 
difficulties of techno-strategic integration. 
The industrial revolution made larger, better equipped militaries possible, 
resulting in an increased atmosphere of strategic competition starting in the 1840s, as 
indicated by a non-comprehensive list of conflict that includes the Crimean War (1854–
56); the American Civil War (1861–65); the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71); the Boer 
War (1899–1902); the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05); and the countless colonial actions 
of the British Empire.  Astute observation of these conflicts should have left little doubt 
about what the outcome of applying old tactics in the face of new technology would be.  
                                                 
50 McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000, 223. 
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Tracing the technological developments in military technology from 1840 through 1914, 
and comparing their design to both their planned and actual use should provide insight 
into the difficulties of techno-strategic integration. 
1. Armies 
Small arms development during the time period from 1840–1914 represents an 
unusual case where a number of discrete advances in the rate of fire, and accuracy over 
time culminated in a technological revolution of firepower.  Ultimately, small arms, to 
include machine guns, and the failure to integrate them into a new overarching doctrine, 
resulted in the tragedy of trenches and frontal assaults in WWI.  Tracing the development 
of small arms through this period shows how a series of seemingly small technological 
changes may mask the wider implications of an actual technological revolution.   
a. Small Arms Development into the American Civil War 
The impact of the British and French victory at the siege of Sevastopol 
during the Crimean War showcased to the world the effectiveness of an army in 
possession of a superior small arm.51  While the British charge of the Light Brigade into 
withering cannon fire during the battle of Balaclava showed the lethality of artillery.52  
Similarly, at the battle of Sinope Russian cannons would decimate the Turkish Navy.53  
The difference highlighted at Sevastopol was the superiority of the rifle over the musket 
in terms of accuracy—the rifle capable of hitting targets out to 1000 yards to the muskets 
200.54  Rifles did not represent a new technology, but they had generally not been the 
preferred small arm of field forces due to the difficulty of ramming the shot down a rifled 
barrel.55   
                                                 
51 McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000, 231. 
52 Alan Warwick Palmer, The Banner of Battle: The Story of the Crimean War (New York: St. 
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53 Robert B. Edgerton, Death Or Glory: The Legacy of the Crimean War (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1999), 16. 
54 McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000, 231. 
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This problem was solved in two ways.  One solution was developed in 
1849 by French Captain Claude-Etienne Minié who developed a round smaller than the 
bore of the rifles and had a hollow base capable of expanding as the gun was fired, thus, 
creating a tight seal that allowed the round to bite the grooves within the barrel and 
impart the spin necessary for accuracy.56  A second solution developed in Prussia in the 
1840s was to change the method of loading from ramming a shot down the muzzle to 
loading a shot at the breech resulting in the Dreyse breech-loading rifle, or needle gun.  
However, precision manufacturing was not quite on par with the requirements of an 
accessible breech that could open to accept a round, and then close with a seal tight 
enough to channel the explosion well enough for extended range.57  The needle gun had a 
range about half of a rifle that fired a Minié ball; however, an advantage of the needle 
gun was that it could fire seven shots per minute as opposed to two Minié balls.58  In both 
cases, the necessity for speedy standardized production and precision tolerances led to the 
transformation of the arms industry from a tradecraft practiced by skilled craftsman to a 
mechanized industry capable of mass production.  
Efforts to standardize arms manufacture had been underway in America 
since the 1790s when Eli Whitney, of cotton gin fame, was contracted to produce 10,000 
muskets.59  Importantly, Whitney was attempting to produce a musket standardized to the 
point that its parts would be interchangeable with any other musket of the same 
production, a feat unobtainable by a craftsman based manufacturing process.60  Whitney 
was unsuccessful in pursuit if his goal, but, importantly, the idea caught on.  Mass  
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production utilizing machinery promised to solve the problem of long production times 
and ensured the precision necessary for uniformity.61  The birth of the modern arms 
industry was under way. 
Others took up the challenge, such as, John H. Hall, another American, 
who was instrumental in the adoption of viable machine based weapons manufacturing.62  
Hall developed a viable breech loading rifle and, more critically, a manufacturing process 
emphasizing machinery and measurement protocols that standardized production.63  
Significantly, Hall’s manufacturing techniques were adopted by Roswell Lee and 
instantiated at the Springfield armory where refinement in the industrialization of arms 
manufacturing continued to improve.64  A period of rapid innovation in small arms, 
spurred by competition for market share, and fostered, in part, by the successful adoption 
of machine based manufacture descended on the Connecticut River valley in the years 
just prior to the American Civil War.   
Many of the participants in this competition formed companies that are 
still influential in American Small arms manufacture to this day, or produced weapons 
that are iconic such as: Colt, Smith and Wesson, Henry, Spencer, and Winchester.65  
Moreover, innovation was not limited to rifles.  Significant progress was made in pistols 
and metallically encased self-contained cartridges.  The latter innovation promising to 
free soldiers from both laborious loading procedures and the storage problems associated 
with powder.   
The Crimean War foreshadowed some of the growing disintegration 
between small arms technology and military strategy, but the American Civil War, 
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considered by many historians to be the first modern war, really brought the growing 
divide into the open.  Due to its modern nature many of the variables in this study are 
clearly evident.  Interestingly at the start of the war in 1861 rapid firing repeating rifles 
utilizing metallically encased munitions, such as the Henry and Spencer rifles, were 
available; however, both the Union and the Confederacy went to war largely with 
smoothbore muskets.  This would change dramatically over the course of the conflict.   
Starting in 1855, based on the conclusion of Jefferson Davis, in his pre-
confederate role as secretary of war, the armory at Springfield had been directed to start 
producing rifled muskets resulting in the Model 1855, and followed shortly thereafter by 
both the Model 1858 and the 1861.66  Throughout the war, the armory accelerated 
production resulting in a total of 802,000 by the end of the conflict.67  Diffusion, enabled 
in part by the long development cycle of American manufacturing technology, and 
England’s Enfield Arsenal’s hiring of a former Harpers Ferry mechanic and inventor 
James Henry Burton resulted in the 1853 Enfield Rifle many of which ended up in 
Confederate hands.68  Both sides neglected the more revolutionary repeating rifles 
available.  However, the advances in range and accuracy resulting from the use of rifled 
barrels were more than enough to antiquate the preferred tactics of both sides. 
b. Small Arm Techno-strategic Disintegration in the American Civil 
War 
The generals of the Civil War came from various backgrounds, but many 
had attended West Point in each other’s company and had fought together as younger 
officers in the Mexican War.69  Officers on both sides adopted strategies that pitted close 
order linear formations opposite one another—musket tactics for a rifled war.70  The 
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resulting techno-strategic disintegration, in this instance, resulted in the deaths of 
620,000.  Had both sides used the better weapons available it is true that the casualties 
may have been higher, however, it is also possible that if only one side had used better 
weapons and integrated them into a coherent strategy that the war would have been won 
more quickly.  The disintegration of close order tactics in the infancy of the modern arms 
industry offers a clear look at one the variables under consideration in this study. 
What was the role of civil-military interaction in the integration of new 
small arm technology?  As noted above, Jefferson Davis played a key role in setting the 
conditions for the adoption of rifled muzzle loading arms.  Ignoring the irony and 
focusing on the more interesting question of why repeating rifles, which were clearly 
superior in terms of rate of fire, ignored?  Furthermore, the Enfield 1853 suggests that the 
military reluctance to adopt repeating rifles was not confined to North America.   
Two reasons for the apparent favoritism emerge.  First, the adoption of a 
breech loading rifle whether holding one shot such as the Sharps and Henry rifle, or the 
seven-shot Spencer rifle (1862), necessitated tactical adjustments that departed from the 
organizational entrenched doctrine that had been learned from Napoleonic study, 
reinforced in the collective Mexican experience, and promulgated in the curriculum of 
West Point.71  The preferred strategy emphasized the offensive “assault troops advanced 
with cadenced step, firing volleys of command and then double-timing the last few yards 
to pierce the enemy line with a bayonet charge.”72  Breech-loaders allowed soldiers to 
load from the prone, and could, therefore, lead to a breakdown of the close order 
formation. 
The second reason for ignoring the superior breech-loading rifle was 
concerns over the increased consumption of ammunition that would accompany the 
higher rates of fire.  This concern was clearly operating in the mind of Union Chief of 
Ordnance General James W. Ripley who resisted President Lincoln’s urging to adopt 
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breechloader for as long as possible.73  General Ripley’s concern may have had some 
merit; however, it seems that he not only failed to grasp the revolutionary impact that a 
rapid-firing, breech-loading rifle would have on the battlefields across America, he also, 
failed to realize the impact of the revolution in the manufacturing process that had 
occurred to meet these demands.   
Moreover, President Lincoln’s personal involvement in a trial of both the 
Spencer and Sharps rifle is an indication to the degree that civil military relations were at 
work during the American Civil War.  Lincoln was notably interested in “machinery and 
gadgets,” and spent time throughout the war investigating new inventions—anything that 
promised to bring the war to a more expedient ending.74  Perhaps if Lincoln’s suggestions 
had been more forceful, or his attention more focused, he could have accelerated the 
adoption of the repeating rifle for the entire Army and not just select units such as 
Colonel Hiram Berdan’s sharpshooter regiments.75 
Other variables such as the influence of strategic competition, and 
specialized weapons industries do not figure into the American Civil War’s narrative of 
techno-strategic integration as it pertains to small arms.  Primarily this is due to the 
absence of a period where strategic competition could have taken place since both sides 
in this conflict were united up until the outbreak of hostilities.  Furthermore, the arms 
industry was still relatively new, and had not yet diverged into an industry that solely 
supported militaries—many of the innovations coming out of the Connecticut valley were 
available, and necessary to a nation with a broad and largely ungoverned frontier.  This 
would soon change.  Working machine guns, notably the American Gatling gun patented 
in 1862, were on the horizon in the twilight of the Civil War.  Gatling guns were not 
adopted by either side during the war, presenting further evidence of the difficulty 
militaries have recognizing the potential of new weapons.  They would become small 
arms technology that would solely be under the control of the state, and that would only 
be at home on the battlefield.  As the machine gun developed, the arms industry that 
                                                 
73 Boot, War made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today, 129. 
74 David Herbert Donald, Lincoln (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 431–431. 
75 Bruce Catton, Glory Road (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1952), 179. 
  28
supported militaries began to take on the specialization that would eventually lead to 
more incremental evolutionary changes, but in the time period between the American 
Civil War and the Franco-Prussian war the arms industry was still moving at an 
exceptionally fast pace.  
c. Small Arms Development on the Continent  
True strategic competition was taking place in Europe.  As a result the 
pace of arms development was accelerated.  In a relatively short time three wars 
occurred: first the Second Schleswig War between Prussia and Austria against Denmark 
lasting 10 weeks from February to October 1864; next the Austro-Prussian War lasting 
seven weeks from June to August 1866; and finally, the Franco-Prussian War lasting just 
under a year from July 1870 to May 1871.  The Prussians adoption of the breech-loading 
needle gun, its impact on military effectiveness, and the resulting imitation and diffusion 
were apparent.   
An example of successful techno-strategic integration of breech loading 
rifles through civil-military relations is presented by the Prussians who adopted the 
Dreyse needle gun by monarchical decree in the early 1840s76.  The Prussian military 
correctly recognized the need for new tactics to incorporate both the ability to load and 
fire from the prone position, and to enforce the conservation of ammunition and set up a 
six-month training course to instruct the officers and non-commissioned officers in the 
proper use of their new small arm.77 
Technically inelegant, the needle gun’s only real advantage was its high 
rate of fire.  Furthermore, the nearly three decades it took to equip the Prussian army with 
the needle gun, and its demonstrated effectiveness in the short wars of the 1860s, ensured 
that other nations would imitate, and improve upon, its design.78  Moreover, the now 
established “American” practice of manufacturing would greatly expedite the process for 
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other nations.  Both France and Britain took note of the needle gun and followed suit.  In 
1866 the French adopted the Chassepot.  The British, lacking the pressure of a common 
border with Prussia, made due by modifying their Enfield rifles to breechloaders while a 
more technically advanced solution was sought.79  Industrialization made it possible for 
France to complete the switch to Chassepots in four years in stark contrast to the nearly 
30 it had taken Prussia to convert to the needle gun.80   
Machine gun development was also taking place.  The American Gatling 
gun and the French Mitrailleuse were roughly developed simultaneously starting in the 
early 1860s.  However, the Gatling gun saw little action in the American Civil War, while 
the Mitrailleuse was purposely kept so secret that the French army did not possess 
enough awareness of it to integrate it effectively into their doctrine.  As a result the 
Mitrailleuse resembling cannon was employed alongside artillery, which by this point 
decisively outranged it.81  It was a mistake that could have been easily prevented had the 
French experimented more thoroughly. 
The decisive victories enjoyed by the Prussians during the 1860s through 
1871 were in part a result of their techno-strategic integration of a breech-loading rifle 
and their adoption of tactics that supported it.  There were other reasons that Prussia 
dominated warfare in this time period, which will be discussed below, but for now the 
story of small arms needs to be finished. 
The back-and-forth development that was starting to characterize small 
arms manufacture going into the Franco-Prussian War as a result of imitation is 
indicative of a transformation from revolutionary technological development to 
evolutionary development.  Once the effectiveness of breech-loading rifles was shown by 
the contrast of the American Civil War and the three quick Prussian victories, nations had 
little choice but to join in the “small” arms race.  Furthermore, the now established 
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“American” manufacturing techniques, and the requirements for companies large enough 
to equip an army in a relatively short time specialized the small arms industry enough to 
engender incremental evolutionary progress of small arms. 
Rapid changes were still occurring, but now instead of radically changing 
the very nature of individual small arms, the changes were garnered more toward 
perfecting the now established paradigm.  Innovation continued to increase the rate of fire 
from the combined effect of self-contained metallic cartridges, and a series of solutions to 
develop a way to store multiple rounds effectively.  The Prussians adopted the first 
repeater by retrofitting the Mauser Model 71 (1871) in 1884 with a tubular magazine 
reminiscent of the Winchester repeating rifle.82  The English small arms innovator James 
Paris Lee developed a separate solution—metallic magazines.83  This necessitated a 
switch from the single shot breech loading Martini-Henry adopted in 1869 to the Lee-
Metford rifle in 1888, and finally, to the iconic Lee-Enfield in 1895.  The service length 
of the Lee-Enfield 1895 to 1957, and its nearly similar counterpart in all of the countries 
that would fight in both world wars, is indicative that the evolution of small arms was 
reaching its apex.   
Machine guns were still developing.  The most significant development 
took place in 1885 when American innovator Hiram Maxim released the “Maxim” 
Machine Gun.84  In reality the Maxim was the first true machine gun.  Unlike the 
Mitrailleuse and the Gatling gun, the Maxim gun capitalized on advances in powder 
technology that enabled the gun to cycle the next round by using the gas from the 
explosion of the previous round achieving rates of fire between 400 and 500 rounds per 
minute, barrel temperature resulting from this rate of fire was mitigated by an outer  
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casing filled with water.85  Another significant improvement embodied by the Maxim 
gun, and in contrast to its predecessors, was that the Maxim weighed in at about 50 lbs. 
making it entirely portable.86   
The Maxim was decisively employed at Omdurman on the second of 
September 1898.  Both Winston Churchill, as a correspondent for the Morning Post, and 
General Herbert Horatio Kitchener as commander in chief, were present at the battle. 
Sadly, it seems that the lesson being taught that day was missed by both men.  Churchill 
acknowledged the impact of the Maxim  
The empty cartridge-cases, tinkling to the ground, formed small but 
growing heaps beside each man.  And all the time out on the plain on the 
other side bullets were shearing through flesh, smashing and splintering 
bone; blood sprouted from terrible wounds;…The charging Dervishes 
sank down in tangled heaps.87 
Initially there were 52,000 dervishes to the 20,000 commanded by Kitchener; however, 
due to the effectiveness of the Maxim, the dervishes suffered 10,800 killed and 16,000 
wounded as opposed to the British force that lost 48 killed and 382 wounded.88   
As is typical, the advantages enjoyed by the British were short lived; 
diffusion would ensure that they too would find themselves on the receiving end of 
machine gun technology.  The British got their first taste soon after Omdurman during 
the Boer War (1899–1902) at Spion Kop on 24 January 1900.  Winston Churchill was 
again present, although not on the hill top.89  Also, the Germans, noting the power of the 
Maxim during a demonstration in 1888, obtained the requisite licensing and began 
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manufacturing their own Maxims in 1892.90  To further ensure the guns integration, the 
Germans instantiated a four-gun battery in every Jäger battalion, and by 1908 the Maxim 
was standard issue for every German regiment.91  Continued improvements would be 
made to machine guns, but for the most part, by the turn of the 20th century the 
revolution was over.  Machine gun technology would soon reach its limitations and 
modern machine guns are only marginally better than the ones developed either going 
into or coming out of WWI.  Indeed, the Browning M2 .50 caliber machine gun was 
designed in 1918 and is still in service today, and the life span of the venerable and 
ubiquitous AK-47 has no end in sight. 
d. Artillery Development and Integration 
Advances in small arms were not the only changes in weapons 
development taking place from 1840 going into WWI.  Artillery was also undergoing a 
massive transition.  Many of the variables under consideration are more clearly visible in 
the history of artillery than they are for small arms because there is no convolution 
between what was being developed for the use of the state as opposed to designed for use 
by the private citizen.  Therefore, the state’s role in the integration and diffusion of 
technology is clearer.   
All areas of artillery were simultaneously improved during this time 
period in a series of advancements in material, design, shot, propellant, and recoil 
mechanisms.  Furthermore, artillery advancements were not confined strictly to land but 
were also taking place as part of the large naval technological overhaul occurring during 
this time.  During the Crimean War, in a naval action between the Russian and Turks in 
the port of Sinope, the Russian’s cannon improvements decisively outrange the Turks 
leading to a rout.92  The Franco-Prussian War would further spur the development of 
cannons.  As William McNeill notes, “after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71, armies 
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too found themselves swept into the vortex of a rapidly evolving artillery technology.  In 
that war, Prussian breech-loading steel guns outclassed the bronze muzzle-loaders with 
which the French entered the fray.”93   
Artillery development proceeded as part of the overall industrial 
revolution taking place broadly in the west.  In the same vein as the innovators in small 
arms, advancements in other industrial fields were applied to weapons manufacture.  
However, two notable differences emerge.  First, unlike with small arms, most artillery 
development took place in Europe.  Second and in part explaining the first, artillery 
development is more exclusively evidence of the state’s war-making capacity.  Therefore, 
unlike small arms, which was necessarily a ubiquitous feature of America’s frontier 
expansionism, artillery more clearly reflects the strategic competition occurring in 
Europe during this time.  Successful industrialist from other areas, such as William 
Armstrong in 1854, decided it was time for military armament to be modernized.94   
Armstrong’s foray into artillery produced a new manufacturing process 
that utilized composite design, whereby; reinforcing metal was wound around the core 
and then encased in a heated outer shell that was subsequently cooled to exponentially 
increase inward barrel pressure.95  Rifling and a primitive breech loading mechanism 
were also part of Armstrong’s design.  However, it was the resulting increase in strength 
from the composite manufacturing technique which ultimately set the Armstrong cannon 
apart.  The newly minted strength was necessary to take advantages in propellant 
technology that were occurring during this same time period.  Also, the spin imparted by 
rifling, and the development of integrated fuses, made it possible for munitions designed 
to explode on impact.96  The biggest weakness in Armstrong’s design was in the breech, 
which was based on a threaded end cap and, therefore, cumbersome to operate.   
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The French, adopting the manufacturing process and rifling, but 
dispensing with the breech, developed a new genre of muzzle loading cannons by 1865.97  
However, the simple solution to ram a shell down the muzzle was a short term fix.  The 
desire to take advantage of propellant technology and barrel strength gave way to an 
evolutionary progression of barrel lengths, which by 1880 reached the point where it was 
no longer a reasonable solution to load down the muzzle—breech loading was the only 
viable option.98  Meanwhile, the main strategic competitor to England and France was 
pursuing a different track. 
Prussian artillery development can largely be attributed to the resolve of a 
single individual: Alfred Krupp.99  Krupp’s foundry, rather than relying on a composite 
manufacturing technique, approached the problem of barrel strength by developing a 
technique that allowed barrels to be cast from steel.  Interestingly, the superiority 
eventually shown by Prussian artillery in the France-Prussian War would not have been 
predicted based on the initial civil-military relations between Krupp and the Prussian 
Officer Corps, which remained largely aristocratic and untrusting of the developing 
middle class.100  In 1847 during one initial interaction between Krupp and this 
antagonistic military hierarchy—the Artillery Test Commission—a steel cannon 
delivered for testing by Krupp was left in the weather to rust for two years only to finally 
be tested and, although found superior, Krupp was informed that only bronze would be 
suitable.101  Krupp was undaunted and took his cannons around the world selling then to 
any interested party, thereby, ensuring the diffusion of his technological 
advancements.102   
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The nature of Prussian civil-military relations was also moving in a 
favorable direction for Krupp when, in 1858, Wilhelm I came into power and soon 
thereafter began modernizing the army through his chief administrator Otto von 
Bismarck.103  The new civil-military order decided to equip the army with the needle 
gun, and to order 300 of Krupp’s cannons.104  Both decisions represented a break from 
tradition, and neither may have been possible without the direct intervention from the 
highest authority in the Prussian state. 
By the Franco-Prussian War, as a result of strategic competition both sides 
had made revolutionary advancements in the range of their artillery.  Whether by 
composite manufacture or casting, each side had significantly strengthened their barrels 
to the degree necessary to take advantage of the advances in propellant technology and 
fuses.  The relatively long development cycle combined with the deliberate expositions 
and foreign sales ensured that going into the conflict there was relative parity in cannon 
capability.   
However, the Prussians had two advantages.  First, their extremely 
cohesive civil military relations following Wilhelm’s ascension accelerated the Prussian 
procurement process.  Second, the Prussian army’s recent wartime experience against the 
Austrians had shown them that the doctrine relevant for the employment of bronze 
cannons was obsolete.  The range enabled by the new artillery required new tactics—it 
needed to be integrated.  The Prussians integration proved lethal “As a result French 
troops found themselves distracted by long-range bombardment as they were trying to 
form into columns for the attack… whereas the more open order favored by the Prussian 
infantry gave the French gunners nothing comparable to shoot at.”105   
Recoil was still an issue.  If it could be eliminated than a battery would be 
able to fire successive rounds on a target without having to take time to reset the gun.  
Krupp tried to solve the problem by developing a mounting mechanism in 1875 that 
                                                 
103 McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000, 246–247. 
104 McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000, 247. 
105 McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000, 251. 
  36
prevented recoil, but this solution was untenable.106  The French, however, pursued a 
more enduring solution borrowed from designs in Belgian hydropneumatic brakes.107  
The result was the Mademoiselle Soixante-quinze in 1897, which was capable of 
accurately launching 15 75mm shells up to five miles in a minute.108  The French 
showing the same penchant for secrecy that they had with the Mitrailleuse, closely 
shrouded the design and performance of their new artillery piece.109   
By the turn of the twentieth century, advances in artillery began to take on 
a decidedly more evolutionary character as can be expected from a “large-scale industry, 
full of sunk costs and huge investments in research and development that might or might 
not pay off.” 110  Governments were struggling to determine how to limit the diffusion of 
the technologies produced by their native industrialist that negated their own advantages.  
In 1891 87 percent of Krupp’s cannons were sold internationally; government subsidy to 
arms manufacturing resulted in a system of fiscal patronage that further contributed to 
evolutionary advancements.111   
2. Industrial Infrastructure 
“Industrialization altered the nature and production of weapons, the transport of 
troops and supplies, and the methods of communication.  It increased the complexity, 
scope, scale, and lethality of warfare.”112  Modern industrial methods have already been 
shown in their relationship to the development on small arms and artillery.  However, in 
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isolating those two areas of manufacture it must not be forgotten that industrialization 
was broadly occurring across all sectors of manufacturing.  Furthermore, increasing 
industrialization was impacting political as well as social transformations in all areas of 
life.  Some areas, such as, communications and transportation may not have been 
specifically driven by military considerations, however, once they were developed their 
military expediency could not be ignored.  As states and their militaries grappled with 
integrating the diversity of technological forms emerging from the industrial revolution, 
between 1840 and the outbreak of WWI, a shift in doctrine was also occurring. 
Through a process of tactical necessity when troops faced more capable weapons 
and through the deliberate harnessing of the mobilization and communications 
advantages of the industrial revolution, the Napoleonic system was replaced by the 
Prussian.113  America also faced these challenges, and interestingly developed some of 
the same solutions, although, as noted by William McNeil, “European military 
professionals felt that they could safely disregard the American experience of war.”114  
Moreover, the evidence that in nearly similar technological situations armies were 
developing similar approaches highlights to some degree the relationship between 
technology and strategy and the resulting process of techno-strategic integration. 
a. Land Doctrine 
Officers on both continents during the time between 1840 and 1914 began 
the time period with a Napoleonic concept of operations.  Industrialization’s influence on 
mass production and technology resulted in sweeping improvements in the areas of small 
arms, artillery, transportation, and communication.  Over time these improvements made 
the Napoleonic concepts increasingly obsolete.  Although both “American” armies 
showed some learning during the course of the Civil War, in the end the generals were 
too wedded to the Napoleonic concepts that comprised their formal education and 
Mexican War experience.  General Winfield Scott had translated Napoleon and 
subsequently written on infantry tactics—one of the junior officers in his command was a 
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fellow Virginian Robert E. Lee.115  America’s post war drawdown, and renewed focus on 
the various small wars of the frontier expansion prevented a close examination of some of 
the lessons coming out of the American Civil War.  On the continent, however, the 
repeated and frequent success of the Prussians left little doubt that warfare had 
fundamentally changed.  The Prussian fusion of military power, in part facilitated by their 
early adoptions of numerous small arms and artillery technologies, and their co-opting of 
the industrial architecture of railroads for mobilization and telegraphs for communication 
was soon adopted by all. 
b. Transport and Info-Systems 
Railways and telegraphs were, as noted by Martin van Creveld, “two 
technologies not only developed simultaneously but often did so at the hands of the same 
people.”116  The link between the two is explained as a function of synchronization—a 
synchronization that required a “system-approach for its operation.”117  The system 
required preciseness to be effective.  Factors such as the synchronization of time keeping, 
the regulation of speed, de-confliction of track usage, the standardization of track gauge, 
and setting the location of nexus depots all depended on the abilities of planning and 
communication.118  Furthermore, although neither technology was designed by the 
military for military use, both were readily perceived by militarist as conferring 
advantage.  By the 1840s militaries were beginning to conduct maneuvers to determine 
what impact railways could have for warfare.119 
The initial advantage was with the French who adeptly employed a rail-
based logistical system in the siege of Sebastopol during the Crimean War, and later 
managed to move 250,000 soldiers into Italy during the War of 1859.120  The Prussians 
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were slow to start, and in 1852 their failure to fully integrate rail technology resulted in a 
botched mobilization and defeat at Olmütz.  However, recognizing the importance the 
railways played in mobilization and the complexity of synchronizing train tables, the 
Prussian General Staff created the a railway section.121  This resulted in through 
integration of the railway into the Prussian concept of operations.  Again highlighting the 
importance of civil-military integration, Herrera and Mahnken note that “The Prussian 
rail net was no different from the French, or any other….  The Prussian difference was in 
the way the army coordinated with civilian companies and planned the mobilizations in 
advance.”122  However, with new capabilities come new vulnerabilities as Union 
Generals would learn during their militarization of the railway during the American Civil 
war. 
In the relatively early stages of the Civil War, (January1862), Congress 
gave the president broad powers to oversee the railway as he saw fit for military 
expediency.123  To accomplish this, the Union established the United States Military Rail 
Roads (U.S.M.R.R.), and placed an experienced rail executive at its head.124  The 
Confederacy did not follow suit, therefore, the Union was more technologically 
integrated then the Confederacy in regards to railways.  Accordingly, there was a benefit 
to military effectiveness.  The benefit was keenly felt in areas of logistics and troop 
movement.  To be fair though, the Union was somewhat predisposed to logistical 
superiority due to the primacy the North had given to manufacturing in the pre-war era: 
Northern states had manufactured 97 percent of the country’s firearms in 
1860, 94 percent of its cloth, 93 percent of its pig iron, and more than 90 
percent of its boots and shoes.  The Union had more than twice the density 
of rail roads per square mile as the Confederacy, and several times the 
mileage of canals and macadamized roads.  The South could produce 
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beginning of the war to distribute food, soon began to deteriorate because 
of a lack of replacement capacity.  Nearly all of the rails had come from 
the North or from Britain; of the 470 locomotives built in the United 
States during 1860, only nineteen had been made in the South.125  
With this caveat in mind the most that can be said is that the North capitalized on their 
opening advantage through further integration of rail technology.   
The South on the other hand, realizing the inherent disadvantages of 
extended supply train in hostile territory, encouraged partisan operations by passing the 
Confederacy’s Partisan Ranger Act in April 1862.126  The novel development of cavalry 
tactics that supported the partisans under command of Confederate Generals such as John 
S. Mosby, John H. Morgan, and, most of all, Nathan B. Forrest were among the lessons 
that should have been learned going into WWI; the other being the consequences of 
accurate long range fire to the offense from a foe in earthen fortifications.   
However, the lessons of the American Civil War tended to be dismissed 
on the continent as amateurish—Liddell Hart would study it closely, but after the First 
World War.  The lessons were also largely forgotten by Americans in the military 
drawdown that followed the conclusion of the Civil War.  Furthermore, the swift Prussian 
victories throughout the 1860s and against France in 1871 and the lessons “learned” from 
them dramatically colored the conception of warfare going into WWI.  Moreover, the 
success of Prussia forced other countries to take notice of the Prussian method, and adopt 
their doctrine as best they could.   
3. Navies  
The impact of the industrial revolution was also influencing navies.  Wooden 
ships were being slowly replaced by iron, sails were replaced by steam, and, as 
previously mentioned, the developments in artillery were dramatically affecting naval 
gunnery.  Interestingly, many of the technological developments were slowed or 
deliberately ignored by naval professionals who, among other things, nostalgically clung 
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to the idea of sails on the high seas.  The USS Monitor would soon challenge the existing 
state of naval affairs.  The Monitor was revolutionary—the design alone entailed 40 
patents.127 The Battle at Hampton Roads would dramatically alter ship design. The 
process of techno-strategic integration on the seas is in some way even more clear, due to 
the shipbuilding industries ties to government subsidy and a relatively high degree of 
manufacturing specialization.  Furthermore, the relationship between naval doctrine and 
equipment manufacturing is somewhat clearer in the era directly leading in to the First 
World War due to the acceptance of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s view of naval influence on 
international power. 
a. The Rise of Battleships 
The technological capability of surface ships underwent a relatively rapid 
transformation during the latter half of the nineteenth century.  The history assumes an 
evolutionarily familiar pattern where advances in one area, such as armor, prompt a 
corresponding advancement in a contrasting area such as gunnery.  Although the net 
effect of these improvements produced a vastly different warship in a short period of 
time, the evolutionary character of the changes as a whole nullified any truly decisive 
advantage as other nations kept pace.   
Britain, enjoying and wanting to maintain their relative naval dominance 
had the most to win or lose based on the technological decisions they made.  Therefore, it 
is not surprising that the majority of evolutionary development occurring during this time 
was initiated in the shipyards of Britain.  Starting in the 1830s, the broilers necessary for 
efficient naval steam energy became available; although, sails were still required to move 
longer distances.128  The Royal Navy, in effect starting the industrialization of naval 
technology, adopted a paddle wheeled hybrid in 1837; however, paddles presented too 
great a target to last for long and were replaced by screw propellers by 1844.129  The 
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Royal Navy was also experimenting with iron construction in the early 1840s; however, 
iron armor was initially abandoned when the effect of solid shot was demonstrated more 
effective against it then its wooden contemporaries.130  The movement back to wood was 
short lived; by 1855 the French had demonstrated the superiority of armor dramatically 
during the Crimean War.131   
By 1858, France was pursuing modernization in the form of armored 
warships, the British were forced to follow suit.132  As expected, increases in armor 
coexisted with simultaneous improvements in gunnery, and developments in both cannon 
construction, and shell design occurred.  In short order, solid shot gave way to exploding 
shells, and one piece casted muzzle loading cannons gave way to compositely 
constructed breechloaders.  France took the initial lead in the transition to breechloaders 
in the mid-1860s, but by the 1880s, the Royal Navy had followed suit.133  The 
introduction of larger, heavier guns dramatically effected ship design—no longer could 
guns be mounted broadside.  Ships were soon mounting fewer larger guns encased in 
rotating turrets on the top deck, which necessitated the removal of the iconic vestiges of 
the age of sail to be removed.134  The HMS Devastation perhaps named with the 
emotions of the nation’s sailors in mind, being the first in 1871.135  The competition 
between France and Britain was not exclusive; events in the U.S. Civil war would soon 
demonstrate the growing disparity between armored and wooden ships. 
The Confederacy took the initial lead in the introduction of armor, when it 
retrofitted the hull of the U.S.S. Merrimack captured—and quickly redubbed the C.S.A. 
Virginia—from the Gosport navy yard near Norfolk Virginia in April 1871.136  In what is  
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easily a period of intense strategic competition, the Confederacy, under Union blockade, 
and lacking navy yards, minus Gosport, needed every advantage.  Therefore, they 
engaged in both revolutionary and imitative techno-strategic innovation.   
The Confederacy, spearheaded by their Secretary of the Navy Stephan R. 
Mallory, a former U.S. senator from Florida, employed a deliberately parasitic strategy 
that transformed existing vessels into gunboats.137  Also, in an example of effective civil-
military relations Mallory, with a keen understanding of the advantage that a fleet of 
modern armored battleships presented against wooden ships, sent Commander James D. 
Bulloch England in 1861 to enlist English shipyards in the Southern struggle.  The 
resulting ships, rather than seeking to annihilate the Union’s fleet, occupied themselves as 
commerce raiders impeding Union shipping and distracting ships from the blockade.138  
On the revolutionary side, Mallory, expanded the Confederacy’s use of 
mines, which by the end of the war had sunk 43 Union ships and he deployed one of the 
first submarines, the C.S.A. Hunley.139  Submarines were not yet developmentally ready, 
and the Hunley sank four times, killing its crew each time for the price of one Union 
blockader.140  However, revolutionary Mallory’s thinking was, without a robust internal 
manufacturing capacity, the Confederate navy could not rise itself above to the level of 
nuisance in the Civil war.  However, that did not stop the Union from taking note of the 
potential advantage the Confederacy would enjoy if it alone possessed armored ships, and 
very quickly the Union pursued its own ironclad development. 
The Union, enjoying a huge naval advantage, did not feel any pressure to 
innovate in shipbuilding, however, once the plans of the Confederacy’s armored designs 
became more or less known, the atmosphere of competition was raised to the a level that 
the Union could not ignore.  The Union navy took manufacturing bids, and settled on two 
prototypical ironclad designs, which would sail as the U.S.S. Galena and the U.S.S. New 
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Ironsides.141  However, the innovativeness of these ships is marginal, they were standard 
steam driven ships retro-platted with iron armor.142  A more innovative design was 
submitted by John Ericsson, who had a previous and not altogether harmonious 
relationship with the U.S. navy.143  Ericsson was, however a known naval innovator 
whose screw propeller design had played a hand in rendering the paddlewheel 
obsolete.144 
Ericsson’s design not only incorporated all iron construction, but also 
included a two gun turret.145  Furthermore, the low profile design presented a small target 
to the enemy, while maintaining a reasonably shallow draft and a light displacement 
combined to give the Monitor a solid advantage in maneuverability, as long as the seas 
were calm, over her southern cousin.146  Wartime conditions prevented a full series of 
tests and evaluations, and both the Monitor and the Virginia were launched within two 
weeks of each other in late January and early February of 1862.147   
Given the developmental similarities and the reasoning behind the 
construction of these two ship, it seems as though they were destined to engage each 
other, and soon enough this destiny became reality.  The eventual dramatic engagement, 
on the mouth of the James River at Hampton Roads, between these two ships occurred 
soon after their respective launches in March, 1862.148  The outcome, although not 
decisively won in regard to the ironclad participants, was a clear victory of armored 
design and changed global naval affairs decisively.   
The Virginia was the first to arrive.  Guarding the mouth of the James 
River were five Union ships.  As an example of the pace naval innovation had assumed, 
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three of the ships, (St. Lawrence, Congress, and Cumberland), facing the Virginia were 
still powered by wind, and, although, they had been the “pride of the navy in the 1840s” 
they were now relics of the age of sail.149  By the days end, the other two would be just 
as outdated.  The Virginia’s first opponent was the Cumberland which was sank by 
ramming after an initial salvo of cannon fire.150  Next, the Virginia turned its attention 
toward the Congress, which was dispatched after shell fire ignited her magazine.151  
However, the Virginia’s deep draft and the dwindling daylight prevented it from closing 
in for one final kill of the day when she turned her sights on the Minnesota, which had 
been beached during its maneuvers in the assistance of her sisters.152  The technology of 
the Virginia was clearly significant in terms of military effectiveness, although, the 
Virginia was hit 98 times; her armor had not been penetrated.153  The Confederate 
advantage however, was short lived.   
Overnight the Monitor had steamed in, and the following day the 
inevitable clash of the titans began.  In an ironic twist of fate, neither side possessed guns 
with the penetration necessary to score a coup de grace, and by the end of day, both ships 
retired leaving no clear victor except that of iron over wood.154  The results of the battle 
between the Monitor and the Virginia were also felt across the Atlantic leaving the 
London Times to comment that “[t]here is not now a ship in the English navy apart from 
these two [the Warrior and Ironsides] that it would not be madness to trust to an 
engagement with that little Monitor.”155  The price of failing to update a navy was clearly 
demonstrated by the Virginia’s decisive victory on 8 March.  It was also clear that cannon 
technology had to continue in its evolutionary arms race against armor if ships such as 
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the Virginia and the Monitor were to be countered.  As discussed above, developments in 
cannon technology were already occurring by the time of the American Civil War in 
Europe.  Soon though, the pace of naval change in Europe would outstrip anything that 
had occurred to date. 
As noted by William H. McNeill, Britain’s security situation was 
systematically eroding through the diffusion of military technology by the 1870s.156  In 
part the diffusion that precipitated the Royal navy’s decreased dominance was generated 
by the decision, in 1864, to consolidate artillery production solely into the hands of the 
Woolwich arsenal.157  Competing firms, such as Armstrong, had no recourse except to 
court outside sales, and indeed, from 1884 to 1914, that firm sold 84 ships to 12 
countries.158  Moreover, the ships being sold by Armstrong abroad rivaled or even 
exceeded the capabilities of the current British fleet to the degree that the government 
was forced to respond by placing contracts to update its force.159  The resulting situation 
exhibits a classically evolutionary contest where advances in one area would be offset by 
advances in a contrasting area in a vicious cycle of marginal capability improvement. 
Furthermore, the consolidation of production into Woolwich became 
increasingly troublesome once advances in propellant technology produced muzzle 
velocities that necessitated an increase gun barrel length that eventually exceeded what 
could reasonably be muzzle loaded, and in 1879 the British navy finally made the move 
to breech loading cannon.160  This created a problem for Woolwich, which needed to 
simultaneously transform its production machinery, and, based on metallurgical 
advancements, its basic construction material from wrought iron to steel.161  The process 
was time consuming and the pace was compounded by inter-service rivalry with the army 
which was ultimately responsible for the Board of Ordnance, and was, in the navy’s 
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opinion, not meeting their requirements quickly enough.162  By 1884 Captain John Fisher 
decided that it was time to increase the pressure on the government through a calculated 
use of the media to incite an outcry for additional naval resources.163  The Pall Mall 
Gazette obliged, releasing an article entitled “The Truth about the Navy,” which 
attributed its information to a confidential source.164   
That confidant was in fact Royal Navy Captain John Fisher.165  Although, 
in the short term, the result of Fisher’s pandering to the media was an increase in 
production, it also may have limited the government’s role of providing oversight.  If this 
were the case, then it is an example of poor civil military relations.  The politicians were 
forced—through public outcry—to take action.  Taken in this context it is not surprising 
that rather than calling for an assessment of the navy’s shipbuilding plans, and looking 
critically at what types of revolutionary designs may now have been possible the 
politicians, instead, just simply increased the production of the navy’s preferred 
platform—the battleship.  The outcry for more ships corresponded with an economic 
depression presenting the obvious solution to end Woolwich’s monopoly and open the 
nation’s shipyard for armament.166   
As competition was introduced, the jobs created in the arms industry 
through an increase in government military expenditures began to emerge as a viable 
solution for tough economic times.167  Taxes, to pay for the increased expenditure, were 
collected from the rich.168  A newly inaugurated military-industrial complex emerged in 
Britain as a small handful of technologically minded officers worked closely with private 
industry to churn out weapons desired by an economically depressed population and paid 
for by the wealthy.  As the first five year naval building program was coming to a close 
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in 1889, a bill quickly emerged in parliament to continue the program for another five 
years.  By this time, the political impetus behind increased expenditure was clearly in 
control and the Naval Defense Act actually ended up allocating more money than the 
navy had asked for.  Strategic competition was also increasing at this time as other 
countries such as France, Germany, and the United States were in part driven to expand 
their navies by the extortions of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s in his influential book The 
Influence of Sea Power on History, published in 1890.  Mahan stressed the importance of 
controlling sea lines of communication, which in war meant, finding and destroying the 
enemy’s fleet, or at a minimum bottling it up.169  As other countries entered into the 
naval arms race the evolutionary advancement of battleships in Britain increased 
resulting in a perfection of the form—the H.M.S. Dreadnought, which was completed in 
1906.   
This ship was so “advanced” that Germany stopped building ships until it 
could produce a comparable ship.170  The immediate imitation of the form itself enabled 
the long and evolutionary character of the naval arms race in terms of improvements at 
the margins of performance in the same genera of ship.  The Dreadnought had some 
significantly different features than its predecessors.  First, speed had been increased by 
replacing reciprocating engines with turbines.171  Second, the “Invincible” class was 
specifically designed for long range gunnery, as such; it was the first class of ship to 
adopt the all big gun form.172  Finally, the invincible class used oil to fuel its turbine 
engines rather than coal resulting in a top speed of 21 knots.173  Bigger, faster, stronger—
the Dreadnought and her imitators were perfection in form; they occupied the top of the 
evolutionary hierarchy, and were presumed to be the answer to controlling the sea.  
However, another line of technology was developing, one based on negating the  
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formidable battleships advantage using speed, surreptitiousness, and torpedoes.  
Understanding the alternative lines of technological development requires a closer 
examination of the competing schools of doctrine.  
b. Naval Doctrine: Mahan and the Jeune École 
Two major schools of thought competed for naval minds in the period 
between the American Civil War and the onset of WWI.  The first—best advocated by 
Alfred Thayer Mahan in his three part series examining sea power’s relationship to 
national power—centered on a concept of operations that stressed the importance of sea 
lines of communication and specified the objective of the navy as the destruction of an 
adversary’s fleet.174  The second major school of thought was being developed in France 
in the jeune école, and advocated a concept of operations pitting smaller faster ships, and 
eventually submarines, armed with torpedoes against capital ships of the line, commerce, 
and shore defenses.175  Each influenced the pursuit of technology in different ways based 
on the implicit concept of operations that each school engendered.   
Mahan’s works were based largely on history—largely British history in 
the age of sail.  Published in 1890 the main thrust of Mahan’s analysis detailed naval 
interaction in a time before the prevailing technology of his day had been invented or 
incorporated into shipbuilding and ordnance manufacture.  Britain, the predominant naval 
power of the time, had the most to lose from the changing techno-dynamics of naval 
power, and, therefore embraced Mahan’s analysis concentrating their shipbuilding efforts 
on using the technology of steam and cannon to replace their ships but not to reexamine 
their role.  At first, Britain’s numerous colonies and domination of the coal market 
provided the means to transition to a coal powered navy.176  Later, when ships 
transitioned to oil, Britain was faced with a new vulnerability—oil in wartime would 
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have to be imported.177  Other nations, seeking parity with Britain’s command of the 
seas, followed suit.  Surface ships came and went quickly in the resulting arms race.  
However, it was an arms race governed by evolutionary development, and imitation.  
Although a contrasting approach emphasizing the asymmetry posed by a more 
revolutionary integration of the new technologies of torpedoes and submarines had been 
formulated, it was relatively ignored—for now.178   
c. Different Strategy, Different Ships 
The main technological contrast to the battleship was enabled by the 
torpedo, which by hitting a ship below the waterline negated the advantage of armor.179  
The torpedo required a delivery system, and a variety of forms emerged, all existing to 
negate the power of the battleship.  Torpedoes got off to a relatively slow start, making 
their first appearance in 1864 as a result of the musings of an Austrian naval captain.  
They were subsequently championed by an English engineer Robert Whitehead; 
however, initial performance was slow and erratic.180  Underwater propulsion, stability 
and accuracy all were increased as solutions ranging from hydrostatic depth regulators to 
gyroscopic rudder controls were worked out by various interested parties.181  By the early 
1900s the torpedo presented a true threat and could travel at speeds approaching 29 
knots.182  Furthermore, the distances they could travel reached 18,590 yards by 1913.183  
Range was a critical issue for a weapons system designed to neutralize a battleship whose 
all-big-gun construction made them capable of ranging out to 35,000 yards.184   
Adversaries’, seeking to neutralize the naval dominance Britain was 
fighting so hard to maintain, recognized the inherent usefulness of the torpedo.  Admiral 
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Theophile Aube in the jeune école and others theorized that reliance on foreign trade and 
the interconnectedness of global shipping had revived commerce raiding as a decisive 
form of naval warfare.185  The conclusion was to build a navy centered on ships that were 
capable of closing quickly and delivering their torpedo.  Torpedo boats thus emerged 
onto the naval scene by the 1850s.186  Admiral Raoul Castex, another French naval 
theorist, also questioned how important control of the sea was for wars between states 
that were accessible to each other by land—command of the sea was important only if it 
enabled effective land operations.187  While commerce raiding was not new, its 
theoretical resurgence and the technology it necessitated were decidedly more 
revolutionary than the evolutionary routine that had developed in the battleship arms 
race.  Not surprisingly, torpedo boats were met with scorn; however, the threat could not 
be denied and various countermeasures developed.   
Ultimately, the task of interdicting torpedo boats required the creation of a 
class of ship designed to defeat them giving rise to the torpedo boat destroyer.  With the 
sanctuary of the battleship preserved inside an illusion of safety provided by its screening 
force of destroyers, subscribers of Mahan’s tenets went back to work building navies 
capable of crushing their foes in decisive battles for the control of the high seas.  
However, a better method of delivery was soon to become technically viable, one that 
would make the best of the torpedo’s ability to be fired underwater by being underwater 
itself—the submarine.   
In the years that followed the C.S.A. Hunley’s demise during the 
American Civil War, the technology that supported submarines had progressed to the 
point of viability.  John P. Holland, newly immigrated to America from his native 
Ireland, was largely responsible for developing a modern submarine.188  Holland, while  
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working for Sinn Fein to design a vessel capable of countering the British, constructed 
the Fenain Ram in 1881, which was capable of deliberately diving and could fire a 
torpedo while underwater.189   
By 1900, Holland had solved some of the problems running a combustion 
powered engine underwater by developing a hybrid engine that ran on battery power 
while submerged and a combustion engine while surfaced.190  The union of torpedo and 
submarine seemed to offer a solution to counter the threat of battleships.  
Technologically, the submarine represented a revolutionary form as evidence, in some 
ways by the stark contrast between it and its chief rival the battleship.  Battleships 
operated on the surface, capitalized on might, and sought to engage their quarry in the 
age old naval tactic of crossing the “T,” whereby, they would be able to make maximum 
use of their guns in destroying the enemy in depth while simultaneously limiting the 
enemy from hitting them.  Submarines, in contrast, operated below the surface, 
capitalized on stealth, and sought to engage their targets from the side to maximize the 
effects of a torpedo strike on the enemy’s hull.   
Given the opposites involved, it is not surprising that the naval 
establishment, particularly in countries that had set sail with Mahan and embarked in a 
battleship building frenzy, found it hard to integrate the submarine effectively into the 
existing naval order.  Even after Holland produced a design capable of traveling twice the 
distance the U.S. Navy had specified, the establishment still balked at the idea of the 
submarine performing an oceanic role, and instead, based on the testimony of Admiral 
George Dewey to Congress in 1900, looked to the submarine as a costal defense 
platform.191   
The response from the other contenders in the naval arms race was 
decidedly imitative.  Although, Britain, Japan, and Germany would all continue to 
develop submarines, none would divert more than a fraction of money and effort away 
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from their battleship programs.  While the torpedo had shaken the naval establishment—
the U.S. Naval War College acknowledged by 1909 that torpedo attacks would likely 
prevent a battle fleet from closing into effective range—the submarine remained, for 
now, a revolutionary and disintegrated technology at the fringes of acceptance.192  Grand 
Admiral von Tirpitz notes in his post-WWI memoires concerning his pre-war philosophy 
“of waiting to prove the military usefulness of a new invention before adopting it 
universally.”193  Later, Tirpitz abdicates responsibility for not realizing the potential of 
the submarine before the war, arguing that that would be “the same as to demand that the 
army should have prepared some defence against the tanks in time of peace.”194  Clearly 
Tirpitz is conflating his argument since the tank had not even existed before the war 
while the submarine was available for anyone willing to push on the boundaries of naval 
thought. However, the implicit faith of navies worldwide in the battleship’s ability to sail 
out and meet the opposing fleet remained resolute.  It was a faith predicated on both 
fleets desiring to enjoin in battle; a condition that would not be realized during WWI.   
Although the naval action in the straits of Tsushima during the Russo-
Japanese war, from February 1904 to September 1905, seemed to confirm Mahanian 
theory, and therefore validated an all-big-gun battleship building plan; the reality was that 
half the ships sunk during the course of the conflict were the result of mines.195  
Furthermore, there had been serious problems with accuracy on both sides as gun range 
exceeded optical range finding ability.196  The real reason for the Japanese victory, which 
was largely dismissed, was that Admiral Togo, using wireless command and control 
technology, had simply out-maneuvered his Russian counterpart.197  The battleship was  
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too integrated into the fabric of the naval establishment to be challenged by small 
nuisances such as actual combat performance—the answer, for now, was to build them 
bigger. 
4. Summary 
On the eve of the First World War there were some mounting inconsistencies in 
techno-strategy.  Small arms, cannon and machine gun advancements had reduced the 
effectiveness of massed close-ordered formations.  Railways had changed time-distance 
analysis in the areas where there were sufficient rail lines to move troops.  Telegraphs 
and other communications advancements were exerting pressure on methods of command 
and control.  At sea, there had been a series of technological innovations that were 
causing debate amongst naval strategist about what the best choices were to maintain sea 
control.  Although there were some examples of how these technological advances had 
changed the effectiveness of some of the older favored strategies, none were seriously 
reformulated going into the First World War. 
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III. WWI 
The technology available at the outset of the First World War was predominantly 
evolutionary in character, and the process of integrating it had for the most part, been 
occurring since the American Civil war.  In hindsight it is clear that the net effect of this 
technology promoted the strength of the defense over the offense; however, 
organizational preferences among the military traditionalists of the day incorrectly 
calculated that the offense had been strengthened.  The result was a suite of technology 
that was perceived as integrated but was, in reality, “disintegrated.”  Over time, the 
innovation on the western front would reconcile the misperceptions and integrate the 
technology, but the price in the process of integration would be high.  Also, new 
revolutionary technology would appear, as the stark strategic competition of war is 
predictive of new technological ideas.  Indeed, toward the end of the WWI, offensive 
concepts of operations become plausible through the integration of tanks on one side, and 
through the reformulation of small unit tactics supported by machine guns and artillery 
on the other.  At sea, the old paradigm of controlling the sea lines of communications 
would be tested as naval strategic calculations changed due to the impact of submarines.  
In other theaters, and often fighting as an economy of force, alternative concepts of 
operation would show that sometimes the best offenses are conducted against the techno-
strategic integration of an adversary. 
A. DOCTRINE 
The successive Prussian victories starting in the 1860s—enabled by the 
integration of technological changes in rifles, artillery, telegraphs, and railroads into a 
cohesive strategic doctrine orchestrated by the general staff—spurned others to imitate 
them both technologically and organizationally.198  Although complete imitation of the 
Prussian system was not possible due to inherent social differences between innovators 
and adaptors, Herrera and Mahnken note that by WWI “the diffusion of German military 
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methods produced armies that at least superficially resembled one another.”199  Certainly, 
it is true that the armies in the spring of 1914 were equipped similarly, but the degree of 
integration varied.  The Germans—who originated the system—were the most integrated, 
they had successfully both adopted and integrated the new technology resulting in 
tactical, operational and administrative changes.200  Interestingly, France at the time was 
at the forefront of technological development and had been the first to use the railroad for 
military mobilization as early as 1859.201  However, France failed to integrate the 
industrial age technology at the organizational and doctrinal level to the same degree as 
the Germans, who had also benefited from the reflection inherent in late modernization in 
their imitation and innovation of some of France’s early forays into rail mobilization.202  
However, in the execution of the Schlieffen Plan, the Germans may have miscalculated.  
The further they moved into France, the closer the French were to their logistics, and the 
more quickly they could reposition against German offensive efforts.  The importance of 
civil-military relationships in the integration of revolutionary technology is evident by the 
fact that railroads in both France and German were controlled by civilians, but only the 
German general staff coordinated and planned for mobilizations with the civilian railroad 
representatives.203  However, the integration of industrial age technology also created 
dissonance amongst militaries in their perception of the offensive-defensive relationship.   
How is it possible that offensive concepts of operations were accepted in spite of 
evidence to the advantages of defense?  There were contrasting concepts of operations to 
choose from, such as those of Ivan (latter Jean de) Bloch who, writing in advance of the 
Russo-Japanese War 1904–05, had concluded that war in the face of recent technological 
advancements rendered decisive engagements obsolete.204  Unfortunately, Bloch’s 
arguments were overshadowed by others, notably Colonel Charles du Picq, whose 
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writing in Battle Studies reaffirmed the older more organizationally palatable paradigm of 
drill, mass, and morale.205  The cavalry retained their swords and hoped for a valiant 
charge, and the infantry kept their bayonets so as to imbue them with the force of will 
necessary to close with the enemy.  Both arms would soon find themselves deadlocked in 
a maze of trenches.   
Meanwhile, traditionalists such as Ferdinand Foch evaluated technologies like 
machine guns and artillery as increasing the power of the offense.206  The successes of 
Japanese frontal assaults in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) were misinterpreted as 
validating the traditionalist idea that highly trained and disciplined troops could 
overcome the technologies of machine guns and artillery.207  However, the real lesson of 
the Japanese assaults was that infiltration, using a series of successive defensive positions 
could bring you close enough to your enemy that small dispersed teams might have a 
chance at closing the distance.208  Military leaders in England, Germany, and France 
inaccurately cited Japanese victory as sanctifying the offense lead their armies to war in 
the summer of 1914.  But did the offensively minded military lead their countries to war 
in 1914, if so to what degree, and what does that tell us about the role of civil-military 
relations and the integration technology and doctrine?  
Stephan Van Evera argues that the German obsession with offense underwrote the 
Schlieffen plan, which famously called for quick and overwhelming attacks into Russia, 
Belgium, and France.209  France, also swept into offensive fervor, developed “a single 
formula for success, a single combat doctrine, namely, the decisive power of offensive 
action undertaken with the resolute determination to march on the enemy, reach and 
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destroy him.”210  Both the German Schlieffen plan and its French counterpart—Plan 
XVII—were based on an incorrect assessment of the offensive/defensive relationship that 
recent technological advancements in guns, cannon, transportation, and communication 
inexorably altered.  Van Evera, utilizing the strengths of systemic theory, draws a series 
of conclusions regarding how offensively minded countries interact, and how that 
influenced the onset of WWI.  Specifically, Van Evera concludes that offensive 
mindedness predisposes countries to five “dangers”:   
1. Aggressive foreign policies 
2. Increased risk of preemptive war 
3. Increased attention to shifting force ratios because of the opportunities and    
     vulnerabilities they represented 
4. Diplomatic competitiveness 
5. Greater enforcement of political and military secrecy.211   
None of the five factors however, are solely the province of the military—they all 
require acceptance, and ultimately, imply action from a state’s politicians.  Jack Snyder 
takes a closer look at how the general military obsession with offense skewed civil-
military relations in favor of the military leading to a calamity of techno-strategic 
disintegration at the outset of WWI.   
Snyder shrewdly connects the military’s penchant and the political acceptance of 
offensive doctrines in Germany and France at the outset of WWI to a combination of 
organizational preferences on the military side and a lack of oversight on the civilian 
political side.  Militaries prefer offense because offensive strategies enhance the 
perceived potency of the military, increase the initiative in planning, and provide a 
solidified doctrinal framework of standard operating procedures for the inculcation of 
younger soldiers and officers.212  Therefore, lacking political oversight, military’s will 
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trend towards an offensive doctrine.  The trending toward organizational offensive 
preference can, in some cases, even overcome evidence that supports different 
conclusions.  In the case of Germany, the General Staff defeated the offensively 
dominated Schlieffen plan in a one war game, and shamelessly stacked the deck in 
others.213  However, the by-product of an overly offensive military doctrine is that it 
leads to an exceedingly narrow range of military options because there is only one 
available response to any and all security questions—attack.214  German political leaders 
failed to provide the necessary oversight because matters of military strategy were 
outside of their purview, and furthermore, they could rest easy because the military had 
them convinced that when a war came it would be both concluded in the favor of the 
attacker and short.215  Surprisingly, civil-military relations in France, although unfolding 
from antagonism between the military and politicians instead of blind acquiescence, 
produced similar techno-strategic disintegration. 
France is especially interesting in the evaluation of how civil-military relations 
affect techno-strategic integration for two reasons:  First, because civil-military relations 
following the Dreyfus affair noticeable shifted and second, because senior French officers 
deliberately used military doctrine as a tool for institutional justification.  Prior to the 
Dreyfus affair, civil-military relations in France were characterized by civil oversight that 
reflected a mutual understanding between an informed and involved political body and 
the military.  Politicians balanced the desires of their constituency with adequate 
concessions to military requirements.216  Skillful politicians such as Léon Gambetta and 
Charles de Freycinet were able to work with the army to make reforms to the 
conscription system without making the army feel as though it was fighting to preserve 
its existence.217  However, the Dreyfus affair eroded civil-military relations, and 
exacerbated old fears among the French army that their institution was under attack from 
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reformist minded republican politicians.218  Significantly, the promotion system was 
restructured to give greater control to the war minister for selection at all levels not just 
the top appointments.219  The French army’s defense against the political inroads to their 
autonomy was to increasingly favor an offensive concept of operations.  The rationale 
behind the French army’s return to an offensively dominated doctrine insulated it from an 
opposing doctrine which was based on a concept of operations where a strategic defense 
fought by short–term reservist.220  It was commonly thought at the time that offense 
required longer periods of conscript service and a larger dedicated standing army because 
reservist would lack the discipline needed to close with the enemy in the face of 
withering fire.  French military leaders such as General Joffre were able to wrest control 
back from republican–minded politicians, but at the cost of recognizing the inherent 
techno–strategic disintegration between his tools and his offensively informed concept of 
operations.   
The macro techno-strategic position of pre-war France and Germany provides 
insight.  The preponderance of the technology was evolutionary, with the notable 
exceptions of submarines and airplanes.  Most of these forms had existed and had been 
used in the wars discussed during the preceding chapter.  However, through a variety of 
factors discussed above, the bulk of this technology was mistakenly thought to favor the 
offense.  The perception of von Moltke the Younger, Joffre, Foch and others was that this 
evolutionary technology was integrated into a comprehensive offensive scheme.  They 
were wrong.  In reality, the organizational biases among the militaries and a lack of 
informed oversight by the politicians of the time were forcing the acceptance of a 
technologically disintegrated concept of operations.  The resulting casualties, general 
stalemate, and ubiquitous adoption of defensive trenches represent, in this case, what 
might have been an avoidable cost of integration.  
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During the war different integrative strategies were employed with varying 
degrees of success.  German commerce raiding using submarines in contrast to the 
indecisive employment of battleships, both sides attempting to unlock the revolutionary 
technology of air power, and a return of cavalry in its new technological form, the tank, 
must be considered against the backdrop of the unfortunately more common practices of 
“men against fire” taking place at Verdun, on the Marne, and at the Somme.   
B. MOBILIZATION 
The rapid mobilization of alliance networks in 1914 by both the Central and 
Entente powers was accomplished through the diffusion of the Prussian mobilization 
methods of the preceding century.  The techno–strategic integration of rail roads in 
support of national mobilization was demonstrated decisively in the Franco–Prussian 
war.  Other nations, whether directly involved in the conflict or having studied it, were 
exposed to the idea and emulated it in their own ways.  Rapid mobilization was ensured 
by the integration of the railroad and the common reserve system of the time, which 
combined compulsory service and an enduring commitment to return to service in time of 
war.  Moreover, the commonly held belief that the first country to mobilize would enjoy 
a decisive advantage in the opening stages of a conflict combined with the universal 
embrace of the offense created the conditions of mistrust that prevented effective 
diplomacy after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on 28 June 1914.  
Furthermore, extremely weak civil–military relations already highlighted above as 
contributing to the evolutionary and disintegrated fusion of technology and strategy, were 
at work behind the scenes in both France and Germany where senior military leaders 
oscillated between cajoling and deriding their political counterparts into mobilization.  
Moltke directly interceded, going around his civilian “leaders” and calling his Austrian 
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Meanwhile, in France, General Joffre tacitly threatened his superiors that he would not be 
responsible for their continued delays which by his estimation, would result in 15 to 25 
kilometers of lost ground daily.222   
The deterministic view of technology highlights the mobilization of Europe in 
WWI as a key example of technology shaping history.  However, as always, technology 
was not operating alone.  Clearly masked by a suspension of disbelief at the time, the 
effectiveness of rapid mobilization and offensive operations decisive in the Franco–
Prussian war had been checked by diffusion.  Rail technology, so crucial in the 
mobilization for offensive operations, was just as useful moving men to check an 
opponent’s advance.  Within days (28 July 1914–6 August 1914) Austria-Hungry, 
Germany, Serbia, Russia, France, Belgium, England had mobilized and gone to war, and 
within weeks, the grandiose plans of rapid capitulation were replaced with the grim 
realities of static trenches.  The trenches themselves, and the fighting that trenches 
engender, were indicative of the disintegrated character of techno-strategy in the opening 
phase of the First World War.  However, the static defensive character that broadly 
emerged by the conclusion of 1914 exerted its own pressures on the integration of 
technology and strategy.  Initially “generals on both sides would try to smash through the 
opposing front” highlighting the intransience of the traditionalist offensive ideal.223  
Toward the end of the war, revolutionary technology and its integration would emerge to 
break through both the front and the old paradigm, but first, the offensively skewed 
disintegrated techno-strategy had to be rectified with the defensive realities of the ground 
campaign.  
C. LAND: STALEMATE AND “SHOCK AND AWE” 
As with most big wars, the literature on the First World War is vast.  Therefore, 
determining what to address and what to leave to another day is a difficult decision.  In  
 
 
                                                 
222 Keegan, The First World War, 68. 
223 Bernard Law Montgomery, A History of Warfare (Cleveland: World Pub. Co, 1968), 464. 
  63
order to draw clarity to the process of techno-strategic integration that was occurring 
during this war, I will focus my analysis of land operations primarily on the Western 
front.  
On 1 July 1916, the British launched a major offensive at the Somme. The battle 
would last into November and would leave 450,000 British, 195,000 French, and 650,000 
German dead for a gain of six to seven miles.224  The Somme, both in terms of its scale 
and historical positioning—roughly the middle of the war—represents an example of 
how the war was broadly being fought.  Also notable for the first appearance of tanks—
15 September 1916—the Somme provides a starting point to analyze the integration of 
some of the new technological forms that emerged as the stalemate continued.  Before 
discussing the Somme, however, a quick summary of the opening stages of the war, the 
establishment of the existing frontage, and the onset of attrition is needed to contextually 
understand the carnage of the Somme.   
The famous Schlieffen Plan, conceived of by Count von Schlieffen who headed 
the German general staff from 1891 to 1906 and continually modified by both himself 
and his successors, proposed a quick campaign in France followed by a subsequent 
campaign in Russia.225  Bold in its conception—and its assumption that France would be 
subdued in six weeks—the Schlieffen Plan was flawed.  The German general staff 
neglected the fact that the further they went into France, the more exposed their lines of 
communication would be while at the same time shortening France’s.  Not surprisingly, 
France was ultimately able to check the German advances by using the same rail 
technology that the Germans had believed would enable their rapid decisive victory.226  
Furthermore, the Germans’ reliance on roads and rail created a new vulnerability to 
sabotage, which was easily accomplished with dynamite—a technique used with great 
success in another theater by T.E Lawrence.227  In short, the French ability to maneuver 
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against the Germans using rail and the susceptibility of German logistics to sabotage 
prevented the rapid capitulation of France and allowed the Russians the time they needed 
to enter the fight, which they did by late August, further compromising Germany’s 
strategic position.   
As the Schlieffen Plan’s technological infeasibility became manifest to German 
field forces at Mons (23 July), Le Cateau (26 July), and Guise (29 July), German First 
Army Commander Alexander von Kluck altered course and failed to envelop Paris.228  
Failing to take Paris preserved France’s ability to both generate combat forces and 
logistically supply them; furthermore, von Kluck’s action exposed his flank, which was 
attacked forcing his retreat and creating a seam that allowed British forces to join with 
the French on the Marne.229  The Germans were repulsed at the Marne and pushed back 
to the Aisne where they established defenses.  Germany proved a quick student of the 
integration of technology into a defensive schema selecting the high ground, and 
establishing interlocking entrenchments guarded by barbed wire obstacles ranged by both 
machine guns and artillery.230  Both sides in a series of successive maneuvers tried to 
turn their respective opponents flank in what is known as “the race to the sea,” eventually 
concluding in the first battle of Ypres in October and November 1914.  Kenneth Macksey 
indicts the degree of techno-strategic disintegration “neither side was able to overcome 
even the semblance of an artillery, machine-gun, wire-entrenched position.  The 
technology of defence defeated the current technique of attack, and with quite appalling 
loss of life, to reinforce the lesson.”231  By the end of 1914 the iconic trenches were dug 
separated by a swath of land so foreboding to the soldiers that it came to be known in 
history as “no man’s land.”  Yet on the Somme 20 months later, the idea that an offensive 
push could overcome defensive positions was still as firmly entrenched as the defenders 
themselves.  
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During the 20 months intervening between Ypres and the Somme, steps were 
taken to further integrate both new and existing technology in support of an offensive.  
Modern hand-grenades, such as the “Mills bomb” and the Stielhandgrante, both appeared 
in 1915, also, modernized mortars—especially useful against trenches due to the steep 
angle of the projectile—appeared on both sides with England going so far as to knight 
Fredrick Wilfred Scott Stokes for his 3-inch “Stokes” trench-mortar.  More insidiously, 
and foreshadowing the role science would eventually play in the advancement of weapon 
technology, the Germans employed chlorine gas at the Second Battle of Ypres on 22 
April 1915.232  Although surprised by the first attack, which the Germans failed to 
capitalize on, the allies quickly improvised countermeasures by placing a pad over their 
faces, and within a year, produced their own offensive chemical weapons233  Further 
chemical developments would continue, and again it was the Germans who were first to 
innovate producing both phosgene and mustard gas munitions by the end of the war.234  
Although casualty estimates produced by both sides’ use of chemical weapons number 
around 1.3 million, neither side was able to gain a strategic breakthrough using 
chemicals.235  Furthermore, the demonization and relative abstinence from continued use 
of chemical weaponry, both then and now, suggests that psychological factors exert 
pressure on the integration of technology.  On the whole, the emergence of the above 
technologies did not alter the static situation of the front and neither would the British 
offensive at the Somme.   
The British began preparing for a summer offensive at the Somme largely to 
relive the pressure France was facing from the German’s early spring offensive at 
Verdun.236  By this point in the war, whether acknowledged or not, both sides were 
locked in a battle of attrition, however, continued improvements were made in the 
integration of machine guns and supportive artillery fires—killing had become science 
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and both weapons would come to bear at the Somme.  Artillery was seen as the panacea 
for the problem inherent in attacking a defensive strongpoint over open terrain, and was 
expected to both clear the wire obstacles to the front of the enemy’s trenches, and to 
essentially bury the enemy alive in their current positions, paving the way for a 
minimally contested walk across no-mans-land.237  In a situation eerily reminiscent of 
Pickett’s charge at Gettysburg 53 years earlier, which was preceded by the largest 
southern artillery barrage of the American civil war, British leaders at the Somme 
erroneously assumed that artillery could nullify the advantages of well-constructed 
earthworks.  Much had changed in the half century between Gettysburg and the Somme, 
but some things had not.  By 1916 the industrialization of war manufacturing was able to 
produce 2,960,000 shells for the Somme offensive.238 Shell uniformity, necessary for a 
scientific approach to bombardment, was also ensured through the standardization 
required in mass production, although quality issues remained.  Furthermore, range and 
lethality were decoupled by the increases in accuracy achieved by rifled barrels and 
conically shaped rounds as well as the exploding nature of the shells themselves.  
Effectiveness was now a matter of getting rounds on target, and that required an 
observer.239   
Organizational inroads towards the scientific techno-strategic integration of 
artillery were made by the inclusion of a forward observer, whose duties included moving 
behind the infantry advance to sight and adjust rounds using his field telephone to call in 
deflection and elevation corrections to the battery.  The appearance of this organizational 
addition was predicated on the advancements made to integrate artillery tactics into a 
more precise “combined arms” approach.  At the Somme, the artillery plan consisted of 
two phases: First a week long general bombardment designed to destroy the German 
frontline fortifications and the supporting logistical trenches that allowed the covered 
movement of men, weapons, and materials from the “safe” rear areas to the front.240  The 
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second phase was the echeloning of fires in support of the infantry’s advance; it is in this 
second phase that the science and professionalization of artillery integration is manifest.  
Technological improvements in manufacturing had affected both the areas of supply and 
quality.  This permitted the construction of standardized firing tables specific to both the 
type of gun and the round.241  Furthermore, artillery science now enabled guns to be 
adjusted based on the effects of meteorological factors such as winds, humidity, and 
temperature.242  Gun batteries were also increasingly centralized, which when 
synchronized, allowed for concentrated fires either on a point target or as a linear 
aggregate across a broad frontage.243  The technological improvements in guns and 
munitions enabled a “scientific” understanding of trajectory allowing for a reasonable 
assurance of range, which combined with the organizational variables of centralization 
and observer control lead to the appearance of the rolling barrage.244   
Experimentation with these ideas preceded the Somme but, by the time of the 
Somme offensive, the faith of the British soldiers in the effectiveness of their army’s 
techno-strategic integration of artillery was total.  Still, it was unfounded.  Ideally 
conceived, the infantry would advance just outside of the effective bursting radius of 
shells landing linearly across the enemy’s fortification.  Subsequently, the fires would be 
shifted by the forward observer onto the enemy’s second line supporting positions 
creating the conditions for either a continued attack or for repelling a counterattack.  Wire 
based communication between observer and battery were the weak point in the system.  
Although radios were appearing on the seas and in the air, they were still too unwieldy 
for tactical land operations.  The default plan in the absence of communication, which 
was nearly always the case, was for the guns to shift according to a preconceived 
schedule loosely based on the anticipated rate of march for advancing troops.  Given the 
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amount of optimism the artillerist had for the effectiveness of their week long preparatory 
fires, the rolling barrage was sequenced much too quickly.  When the Germans emerged 
from their fortifications, which they did on July 1, the barrage that was supposed to be 
covering the advancing infantry had already been irrevocably shifted on its subsequent 
targets due to failed communication.245  Also problematic, was that for all the precision 
the British showed in the laying of guns and synchronization with the other supporting 
arms, they failed to select the right composition of shells needed to truly impact the 
German fortifications.  Of the 1,500,000 rounds launched during the week-long 
preparatory fire, roughly 1,000,000 were fired by the 18-pounders.  Furthermore, they 
were shrapnel rounds, rather than the preferred and more effective bunker-busting high-
explosive rounds.246  The shrapnel rounds were supposed to slice the Germans’ wire 
obstacles, but the real issue was one of production; British factories simply were not able 
to produce the quantity of high-explosive rounds needed for the war, and instead were 
just mass producing what they could—in this case shrapnel.247  The remaining 500,000 
shells were unequally distributed toward the smaller end among the various howitzers, 
which ranged from the 4.5-inch to the behemoth 15-inch.248  The 15-incher’s shell 
weighed 1,400 pounds but unfortunately there were only around 1,500 of these “super-
sized” shells.249  Furthermore, although accuracy had increased, artillery was still very 
much an area-effect weapon with a modest error of 25 yards.250  However, against the 
intended targets of British artillery—German machine gun positions—of which many 
were inexactly known to begin with, an error of 25 yards would prove insurmountable.  
Later in 1917, General Plumer, an innovative British commander, would develop an 
artillery tactic that divided the German front into zones of fire so that the guns could 
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saturate an entire area.251  After the preliminary saturation, Plumer would have his troops 
advance behind a rolling barrage to seize the immediate German position.252  Once in 
control of the immediate positions, however, the attack would cease rather than push 
deep and expose itself to a possible counterattack.253 
This example shows some of the inherent difficulties in integration.  The British 
army, for the most part, had adapted its organization and developed a rudimentary 
artillery-infantry combined arms doctrine by the Somme offensive.  Certainly there were 
still areas of friction, specifically, in the communication between observer and battery 
and the synchronization of the rolling barrage with the march-rate of infantry soldiers.  
However, the real weakness of techno-strategic integration in this case was with industry.  
Failures of production in the type of shells needed could not be made up for with larger 
quantities of another type.   
The Germans, having roughly similar technology, due in part to the diffusion of 
the arms industry prior to the onset of the war, had made the same integrating steps in the 
area of artillery science.  The German defenses were laid out such that their secondary 
trench network was out of artillery range thus minimizing their adversary’s artillery 
threat.254  Furthermore, the Germans had established their defensive lines to take 
advantage of higher ground, also, their line was strengthened at regular intervals by what 
remained of the formerly built up villages in the area.255  Where the urban maze of rubble 
did not exist, the German’s “mined” their fortifications in some places as much as 30 feet 
underground.256  But the masterpiece of the German defense was in their integration of 
machine guns.  In many ways machine guns are similar to artillery.  Foremost they are an 
area weapon; the “play” in a machine gun even when paired with a tripod due to the 
recoil it produces, creates a dispersed area where the rounds strike in what is known as a 
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“beaten zone.”  Machine guns, like artillery, were centralized and were capable, 
depending on the degree of elevation, of plunging fire which created a beaten zone as far 
out as 2000 yards.257  Machine guns are also capable of, and more commonly used for, 
“grazing fire.”  In this use, the idea is to traverse the gun across a broad front at a fixed 
elevation so that the rounds are approximately one yard, or chest high, above the ground.  
Interlocking machine gun positions “ranged” onto wire obstacles designed to channel 
infantry into kill zones completed the defensive integration of machine guns, and was 
what awaited the British across no-mans-land; the small 18-pounder’s shrapnel rounds 
were largely ineffective against the wire they were supposed to breach.  
However, it is deceiving to say that the Germans were more techno-strategically 
integrated.  At Verdun in late February 1916, the roles were generally reversed, the 
Germans employed an artillery preparatory barrage before an offensive thrust that gained 
little in the way of strategic objectives and were eventually ground down over the course 
of the next six months by the French who were primarily defending.  In both cases, 
defensive concepts of operation were the more integrated techno-strategic approach.  On 
the Somme, however, there appeared a new technology that fused armor with mobility 
and firepower.  In an ironic juxtaposition of the old and the new, General Haig’s three 
divisions of horse cavalry stood in fading glory while tanks entered the battle.258   
Another solution to observation was increasingly being sought not from a forward 
observer, but from the air.  Balloons had been used as a reconnaissance platform in the 
American Civil war, and now, with the addition of wired communication between the 
balloon and the ground it was only natural to employ them to assist gun batteries.  In 
another of the First World War’s peculiar juxtapositions, balloons rose gently into the air 
alongside the emergent revolutionary technology of airplanes.  Of course, the main 
advantage of the airplane over the balloon was its mobility, but the airplane’s ability to 
provide corrections was limited somewhat by the lack of a wireless radio capable of 
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sending voice transmission—observations had to be sent by Morse code.259  Besides 
balloons and airplanes, aerial combat in the First World War also saw the use of 
zeppelins.  The zeppelin—basically combining the gaseous-based loft of a balloon but 
with a rigid metal frame—was able to carry a payload of bombs.  Another advantage 
zeppelins had was their ability to fly above the altitude obtainable by the airplanes of the 
day; at least in the beginning of the war.  Had the Germans integrated zeppelins into a 
larger reconnaissance role, on sea as well as on land, the advantages would have been 
significant.  Instead the Germans would use zeppelins, in January 1915, to bomb cities in 
England and France—efforts that yielded no significant gain, but would later capture the 
imaginations of airpower enthusiast.   
Combat in the air, and against air forces, became increasingly intense as the war 
progressed, thus, initiating a rapid cycle of evolutionary development and increasing 
techno-strategic integration.  Innovation proceeded rapidly as a product of both deliberate 
design and trial and error.  Prompted by a desire to limit enemy observation, it may have 
been inevitable that aviators would try to shoot each other down.  Indeed, by early 
October 1914, aerial combat came of age when French Aviator Joseph Frantz shot-down 
his German counterpart.260  However, true “dog-fighting” could not be realized until 
machine guns were built into airplanes by design.  Work had begun on this problem in 
1913, and by the spring 1915 Frenchman Raymond Saulnier had devised a solution 
whereby armored deflectors were incorporated into the propeller to shield it against errant 
bullet strikes.261  Roland Garros, a pilot working with Saulnier utilized this solution 
successfully scoring three German kills before being forced down behind enemy lines.262  
Soon afterwards a more elegant solution was advanced by Germany.  Pioneered by the 
Dutch engineer Anthony Fokker, the interrupter gear provided a mechanical solution that 
synchronized the rotation of the airplane’s propeller with the trigger mechanism of the 
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machine gun so that the gun could only fire when the propeller was clear.263  The 
dawning age of fighter airplanes arrived in July 1915 with the release of the German 
Fokker E1.264  Controlling the air became an increasingly crucial component of an 
effective strategy.   
The Fokker E1, known in the press as the “Fokker Scourge,” gave the Germans an 
initial advantage in the battle for air superiority.  However, by the offensive at the 
Somme a year after the “Scourge’s” inception, the initial German advantage had been 
overcome by allied development of the British DH2 and the French Nieuport.265  Both 
the DH2 and the Nieuport were equipped with a forward-facing machine gun, and both 
were able to out-climb and out-turn the Fokker—essentially making the Fokker obsolete.  
Evolutionary pressures to build a better machine, thus, controlling the skies, would 
continue to shift the balance of air superiority, but while air superiority was becoming 
necessary it was not sufficient to ensure success.   
Even with control of the sky, the allied effort at the Somme quickly devolved into 
the back and forth attrition so commonplace in the battles of the “Great War.”  By the end 
of July the Germans had lost 160,000 men and the combined losses of the French and 
British were over 200,000.266  The pressure of necessity to innovate a technological 
solution that could enable a breakthrough had been mounting, and an officer in the Royal 
Engineers had hit upon a solution.267  Colonel Ernest Swinton began circulating the idea 
in December 1914, but fundamentally, the tank sprang from a novel combination of 
existing technology.268  Armored cars had been successful in the early stages of the race 
to the sea, but had quickly lost their mobility when fortifications were erected.269  The 
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answer lay with tracked vehicles, which had been in use since 1899 for agricultural 
purposes and were now readily transformed to the business of planting men by the 
addition of plating and weapons.270  Admiral Reginald Bacon had already designed a 
tracked artillery platform.  As an example of the positive effect civil-military relations 
can have on the adoption of revolutionary technology, tanks—the name originated as an 
attempt to keep the project secret—were championed by Winston Churchill then first lord 
of the Admiralty.271   
As Churchill’s involvement suggest it was the Royal Navy that originally formed 
the “landship” committee.  Given their relatively recent experience with armored ships 
this represented a natural, albeit odd, choice.  Indeed, the same figures instrumental to 
dreadnought design and adoption, such as Lord John Fisher and battleship designer 
Eustace Tennyson-d’Eyncourt, were called upon to design and deliver an armored vehicle 
capable of making the all important breakthrough.272  Industrialists too were called upon 
for their expertise.  William Trinton, of William Foster’s agricultural machinery 
company, teamed up with motor engineer Walter Wilson to design an improved track link 
which they coupled with a rhomboidal shape.273  The fusion of political involvement, 
military necessity and input, and industrialist expertise produced three prototypes.  The 
committee eventually settled on the Mark I design known affectionately as the “Mother;” 
it would become the basic design for all tanks in the First World War.274  The Mark I 
went into production early in 1916, however, although a technology now existed that 
promised a return of mobility to the stagnant battlefields of 1916 there was no well 
thought out concept of employment—the process of techno-strategic integration had 
merely begun.  As Robert O’Connell notes “the requisite device technology was more 
easily acquired than a suitable doctrine of employment.”275 
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Swinton, who’s musing were largely responsible for the creation of the tank, 
suggested that the tank’s effectiveness would be greater if they were kept off the 
battlefield until there were enough to affect a concentrated attack in conjunction with 
infantry.276  However, in the hope that a few weapons alone would be enough, 32 tanks 
made their wartime debut on September 15, 1916 at the Somme.  With so few a number, 
a large-scale strategic breakthrough was unlikely; however, where the tanks were 
employed an advance of 3,500 yards—nearly two miles—was achieved before the 
majority of the tanks mechanically failed and were subsequently destroyed by artillery.277  
With the debut made three processes started: evolution of the design, diffusion of the 
form, and integration into a concept of operation.   
The British perhaps having learned from the relatively uninspiring effect of 
having too few tanks on the Somme brought 476 fourth generation Mark IV tanks to 
Cambrai in November 1917.278  Also, and more importantly, the British brought an 
integrated concept of employment that capitalized on both surprise and combined arms 
coordination to achieve a four mile push through the heavily defended Hindenburg 
Line.279  Unlike the Somme the decision was made to forgo a preparatory barrage at 
Cambrai to increase the likelihood of surprise.280  Artillery, which had needed to register 
its guns to ensure accuracy, had been alleviated from this step by the innovations of 
artilleryman Brigadier General H. H. Tudor who was commanding the 9th Scottish 
Division during the Cambrai offensive.281  Tudor, who along with Tank Corp 
commander Brigadier H. Elles had devised the operational plan for Cambrai, had 
developed a method where the guns could be electronically registered against the normal 
pattern of round distribution and then graphically depicted on a map eliminating the need 
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to fire a physical shell alerting the enemy to the possibility of attack.282  Since surprise 
could also be foiled by enemy reconnaissance, the plan for Cambrai also included an 
extensive air component tasked to prevent enemy aerial observation of the pre-assault 
marshaling.283  Furthermore, the artillery barrage was synchronized with the tank and 
infantry assault while the airplanes shifted from their pre-assault aerial denial role to a 
more aggressive bombing role directed toward German command and control 
positions.284   
This was techno-strategic integration.  It was also fleeting.  Communications, still 
primarily by cable, inevitably broke-down preventing further offensive coordination as 
the initial assault objectives were obtained.  The Germans, in many ways unable to 
capitalize on the advantages of imitation due to material shortages, had not been able 
manufacture tanks on any significant scale.285  Although, by the end of the war, the 
Germans had managed to produce the A7V assault tank, which in the first instance of 
tank-on-tank battle engaged a Mark IV on 24 April 1918.286  Diffusion of tanks also saw 
the development in France of the venerable Renault “light” tank.  The Renault design 
included a rotating turret and was designed for mass production; the latter factor ensuring 
that when the Americans arrived they would be fighting in French tanks.  In the 
counterattack at Cambrai on the 30th of November however, the Germans, lacking tanks, 
relied on a different type of techno-strategic integration.  An integration that utilized 
infiltration techniques performed by small unit “shock troops” supported by lighter 
portable machine guns and artillery.287  The German counterattack nullified the British 
gains at Cambrai, but it could not cancel the inevitable return of mobility to the 
battlefield. 
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The endgame was afoot when Russia succumbed to internal pressures resulting in 
the Bolshevik revolution in March 1917.288  Germany freed of some of its commitments 
to the East was able to shift manpower and material to the West.  By November 1917 this 
was occurring at a rate of 10 divisions a month.289  Some of these “new” troops were 
specifically trained in infiltration tactics—the tactics employed in the counterattack at 
Cambrai.  The United States declaration of war on April 6, 1917, however, would more 
than counter Germany’s repositioning of forces.  By March 1918 the American 
Expeditionary Force (AEF) numbered 318,000; by August the number had more than 
doubled twice to 1,300,000.290  Furthermore, the Americans, having been spared from the 
preceding four years of fighting arrived at the front with an enthusiasm that had long 
since been beaten out of the other combatants.291  Germany, although reaching the end of 
its ability to conscript new forces, and materially disadvantaged by 830 planes, 4,500 
guns, and 790 tanks, was not ready to capitulate.292 
The German spring offensive of March 1918 was prefaced on the techno-strategic 
integration of infantry infiltration tactics and artillery.  It was a doctrinal solution to the 
failure of the frontal assault.  Operation Michael was commenced on March 21, 1918, 
and was designed to pierce the British’s Fifth Army who was holding the line on the old 
Somme battlefield.293  The British line wavered and fell “the BEF had suffered its first 
true defeat since trench warfare had begun three and a half years earlier.”294  The worst 
was yet to come.  Defeats continued to mount—by April 5th the Germans had pushed 20 
miles across a 50 mile front, and were threatening Amiens295  Germany’s success 
however, prompted a revision of plan.  Instead of continuing in a single thrust the 
modified plan directed forces along three separated avenues but the division of forces 
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ensured that none were strong enough to meet their objectives.296  The Germans mounted 
five offensives in the spring and summer of 1918 demonstrating the effective techno-
strategic integration of infiltration and artillery.   
The performance characteristics of aircraft also continued to rapidly evolve, and 
continued experimentation led to increasing techno-strategic integration.  By 1916 
aircraft performance and incendiary ammunition had thwarted the initial advantages of 
zeppelins.297  Delivering bombs increasingly became the role of aircraft.  In part this was 
a function of increased capability; better engines meant faster speed which translated into 
increased lift making aircraft, such as, the German 1917 Gotha IV bomber capable of 
carrying a 1300 pound payload.298  Fighters had evolved as well, and by 1917 the British 
Sopwith Camel, French Spad XII, and German Fokker DVIII were nearly twice as 
capable as the planes available at the start of the war.299   
On land, aircraft broadly performed four roles: 1: reconnaissance; 2: air-to-air 
combat; 3: air-to-ground combat (either by strafing or bombing); and, 4: bombing (here 
separated from air-to-ground to delineate the differences in attack against ground troops 
and attacks against city dwelling civilian populations).  At sea the role of air-to-ground 
was morphed into air-to-ship by torpedo carrying seaplanes.  As aircraft technology 
evolved specialization became increasingly necessary to maximize an aircraft’s 
effectiveness within the role it was expected to perform.  Techno-strategic integration 
occurred within each of the sub-forms but also as a whole.  Holistically, the question is: 
How well did either side integrate aircraft across the broad spectrum of emerging forms 
into a cohesive concept of operations?   
Reconnaissance, perhaps, presented the fewest challenges to integration—
airplanes basically inherited the role from their aerial precursors.  Integration of this form 
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was largely a matter of improving communications equipment, and photography.  Air-to-
air combat presented different challenges.  Aircraft performance became in some ways 
the critical feature of air-to-air dominance in WWI with rapid shifts taking place over the 
course of months, and performance in general nearly doubling over the course of the 
war.300  Innovation in this area was important but so was rapid imitation as noted by 
American ace Eddie Rickenbacker, “No Matter what innovation one side might develop, 
the other was quick to find out about it, copy it, and incorporate it in a new design.”301  
Technological advances produced a better more capable aircraft, but integration was 
achieved by the development of aerial tactics.  The iconic image of the individual “ace” 
testing himself and his machine against another equally capable foe is largely 
mythological—most aces, in fact, earned their reputations by gunning down novice 
pilots.302  Aerial combat increasingly became a question of massing and synchronizing 
aircraft, which as a group in formation would hunt for their adversaries and then swoop in 
for the kill.  Massing itself only became possible later in the war as industrialist applied 
mass production techniques to aircraft manufacturer—Germany alone produced 21,000 
aircraft in 1918 in spite of growing resource constraints.303  Alteration of the basic fighter 
form increased air-to-ground integration which also increasingly relied upon massed 
synchronization of aircraft working in conjunction with infantry and tanks.304  The major 
split in form, however, occurred in the increasingly evolutionary development of 
bombers.   
Bombers are effective based on their capability to carry a high payload of bombs 
over extended differences, as opposed to fighters which must be fast and maneuverable.  
Simply put, a good fighter cannot also be a good bomber and vice versa.  Bombing 
against enemy troops and rear areas and against civilians in cities became increasingly 
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important as the war entered its final year.  American colonel William Mitchell would 
mass 400 bombers carrying 79 tons of bombs against troop concentrations and munitions 
dumps in support of the Meuse-Argonne offensive in 1918.305  Bombers targeting 
civilian residential and manufacturing centers also became both more prevalent, and also, 
more valuable.  As the continuing trend of techno-strategic integration emphasized the 
mass production of material for use in a doctrine of mass synchronization it seems all but 
inevitable that the necessity of targeting production would arise as a central component of 
strategy.  In this endeavor the bomber would eventually—and perhaps wrongly—be 
venerated above all other forms, but for now, in the final stages of the First World War, 
air-power for all its promise was not enough to break the stalemate.   
 
Figure 3.   Figure showing the techno-strategic integration of aircraft during the First 
World War. 
Although the evolution of airplanes was in many ways driven by the competition 
inherent in war, airplanes remained a revolutionary technology throughout the First 
World War.  Point 1 represents airplanes at the start of the war where they were easily 
integrated into the role of reconnaissance.  At point 2 continued advancements in 
photography and communication further integrated airplanes as reconnaissance 
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platforms; also, airplanes increasingly became integrated as observation platforms for 
artillery.  Early forays into air-to-air and air-to-ground combat were relatively 
disintegrated (point 3) with most engagements performed by individuals against targets 
of opportunity.  Evolutionary pressure to produce a better airplane led to rapid 
advancements in aeronautical engineering.  Engineering advances created the ability for 
specialization and the form to diverged resulting in both fighter and bomber archetypes.  
Fighters (point 4) became increasingly techno-strategically integrated with an overall 
concept of operations that stressed mass synchronization.  Manufacturing capabilities 
increased to include mass production of aircraft, which were now working in groups to 
find, fix, and finish their opponents, and were also performing the additional task of 
bombing and strafing enemy field units.  Pure bombers (point 5), such as, the German 
Goth IV while showing increasingly evolutionary design were disintegrated.  Bombers 
were rarely able to find and hit their targets, and were easily thwarted by both the more 
nimble fighter aircraft, and anti-aircraft gunnery. 
In addition to integration of both sides in the air the allies had also integrated on 
land.  The allies successfully countered German infiltration advances with their own 
application of combined arms tactics, which, unlike the Germans, included tanks.  As the 
fighting continued it became clear that the allies, possessing the ability to replace their 
casualties with the untapped manpower of America, and possessing a material and 
manufacturing advantage had the upper hand.  At Amiens on the 8 August 1918, using 
tactics reminiscent of Cambrai, the allies employed 604 tanks fracturing the German line 
in both depth and breadth.306  It was the beginning of the end.  Subsequent victories 
mounted for the allies whose force was strengthened daily with the arrival of fresh 
American units.  On 26 September 1918 the allies attacked with 123 divisions, another 57 
were held in reserve, against 197 German divisions of which only 51 were considered full 
strength.307  Half-hearted fighting occurred right up to the end 46 days later, but the fight  
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was really over.  The political situation in Germany was also deteriorating.  Socialism 
was on the rise and the monarchy was in decline, and days before the armistice Wilhelm 
II relinquished the emperorship.308   
There is little doubt that the Germans would have built more tanks, more 
airplanes, and thrown more men into the war if they had the capability.  They had 
successfully reconciled their pre-war disintegration between a doctrine of offense and the 
technology of the day; however, in the end this example shows that integration of 
doctrine and technology without an underlying industry that is capable of meeting the 
need of its military is also an important factor in techno-strategic integration.  The allies 
were also, able to reconcile their pre-war disintegration, but in their case industry was 
able to produce, and specifically, to produce tanks.  Furthermore, the late entry of 
America ensured that the machines of war would be manned. 
 
Figure 4.   Figure showing allied and German (solid), allied (dashed) techno-strategic 
integration on the Western front during WWI. 
Point 1 represents Germany and the allies at the start of the war and reflects the 
disintegration between the evolutionary technologies of rail, artillery, and machine guns 
and an offensive concept of operations.  Point 2 reflects German and allied movement 
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toward the integration of artillery and infantry in an offensive concept of operations 
through the development of artillery tactics such as the rolling barrage, and the inclusion 
of meteorological data to enhance accuracy through registration. Later integration 
included the development of firing accurately “unregistered,” which was accomplished 
through the study of round deviations conjoined with mathematical modeling and maps.  
In point 3, Germany took a further step toward integration of artillery and infantry by 
developing infiltration tactics, which employed a light machine gun combined with close 
coordination of artillery and the employment of smaller dispersed units of shock troops. 
In point 4, allied forces, employing the technologically revolutionary tank exhibited early 
disintegration such as at the Somme in Sept 1916.  By point 5 however, further evolution 
of the form and increasing integration in a comprehensive concept of operations that 
employed infantry and artillery in conjunction with tanks and airplanes was evident by 
Cambrai in Nov 1917.  At Amiens in August, 1918 continued evolution and integration 
had occurred and was evident in what, according to Ludendorff, was the “black day of 
the German Army.”309 
1. Irregular Integration: Camels, Dynamite, and Sabotage 
In the Middle East and Africa a completely different type of techno-strategic 
integration was occurring; one that in some ways shows an inverse relationship to what 
was occurring on the western front.  The Middle East and Africa were an economy of 
force efforts; a constraint that may have fostered the unique approach to techno-strategic 
integration seen in those theaters.  While on the western front integration primarily 
consisted in designing techniques to use tools, such as airplanes, tanks, and artillery in the 
most efficient way, integration in both the Middle East and Africa shows how the tools 
themselves present vulnerabilities which can be exploited.  The latter integration, of 
course, also relies on man’s application of technology toward a specific end, but in this 
case the method involves subterfuge, dispersion, and sabotage over massed manpower 
and manufacturer.   
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The German campaigns in their relatively recent and discontinuous colonial 
holdings in Africa—Togo, Cameroon, Southwest Africa, and East Africa—were for the 
most part uninspired with the exception of East Africa.  In East Africa Colonel Paul von 
Lettow-Vorbeck would lead a guerilla campaign to the very end of the war in 1918.  
Lettow-Vorbeck, with his relatively small force the, Schutztruppe numbering 2,500 
askaris and 250 white officers, was able to repeatedly antagonize and attrite superior 
British forces.310  Lettow-Vorbeck’s attrition strategy however, in contrast to the Western 
Front, did not rely solely on throwing soldiers at the enemy and hoping to come out 
ahead.  Instead of futility meeting his enemy head on, Lettow-Vorbeck employed a 
strategy emphasizing mobility and dispersion, which not only resulted in a 
disproportionate allied casualty rate, but also created attrition by drawing increasing 
numbers of British soldiers and material away from the main theater of the war.  Part of 
what made Lettow-Vorbeck so successful was his techno-strategic integration of the 
machine gun.   
Instead of massing machine guns into centralized companies, and positioning 
them to maximize the mass effect of their fires, Lettow-Vorbeck recognized the value of 
dispersing his guns into individual positions held by small teams.311  Dispersed gun 
teams could simply control more terrain, furthermore, when threatened these guns teams 
would ideally hold until other Schutztruppe arrived to reinforce them.312  When 
reinforcement was impossible the gun teams would displace before being overrun 
fighting a mobile defense in contrast to the static defense on the western front.  Lettow-
Vorbeck used these tactics effectively to staunch an early British invasion at Tanga in 
November 1914 against odds that were nearly eight-to-one.  The British forces retreated 
in such haste that the Schutztruppe captured 16 machine guns and 600,000 round of 
                                                 
310 Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits: How Masters of Irregular Warfare have Shaped our 
World, 146. 
311 Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits: How Masters of Irregular Warfare have Shaped our 
World, 148. 
312 Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits: How Masters of Irregular Warfare have Shaped our 
World, 148. 
  84
ammunition.313  Lettow-Vorbeck was also able to repel another invasion this time at the 
port of Dar es Salaam causing the British to abandon landings in favor of an overland 
invasion from their colony to the north.   
Undeterred, Lettow-Vorbeck continued his campaign of mobility, dispersion, and 
timely reinforcement defeating the British at Jasin.  Supplied with captured equipment, 
Lettow-Vorbeck extended his concept of dispersion to a limited offensive campaign 
throughout 1915 aimed at the sabotaging the British East African rail line.314  In this 
instance Lettow-Vorbeck was essentially targeting the techno-strategic integration of his 
adversary, whose dependence on the rail stands in sharp contrast to the Schutztruppe who 
could resupply off the land and from captured enemy depots.  Indeed, one of the most 
important lessons the study of Lettow-Vorbeck teaches is that techno-strategic integration 
can work both ways—for every advantage there may be a corresponding vulnerability.315  
Dispersion of Lettow-Vorbeck’s forces throughout the countryside, and their nearly 
constant attacks on the railroad, also, gave the appearance of a much larger force causing 
the British to allocate more men and material against them in a type of attrition by 
misperception.316   
By 1916 the British had had enough.  The British reinforcements under the 
command of Jan Smuts were able to reposition forces within Africa due to the poor 
showing of German colonials in German Southwest Africa, and the conclusion of a 
limited Boer rebellion that had occurred at the start of the war in 1914.  Lettow-Vorbeck 
held firm to his techno-strategic integration of machine guns, dispersion, and mobility; 
fighting a prolonged retrograde southward that paired Schutztruppe hit-and-run tactics 
against massed numerically superior forces.  However, unlike the British who seemed to 
only know one tactic—the frontal assault—Lettow-Vorbeck forces were also capable of 
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holding their ground when the situation called for it, as it did in October 1917.317  By this 
date Smuts had returned to Britain and had been replaced by Major General Jacobus van 
Deventer, who, seeking to destroy Lettow-Vorbeck’s forces attacked en masse along the 
Mahiwa River.318  As on the Western Front the technology favored the defender; Lettow-
Vorbeck’s 1,500 held against van Deventer’s 6,000; although, both sides took 
proportional casualties.319  Lettow-Vorbeck, as before, did not limit his activities to the 
defense.  Rather in 1917, and generally through the remainder of the war, he conducted a 
primarily offensive campaign that favored raiding.   
Lettow-Vorbeck’s employment of technology never exhibited the disintegrated 
character that defined operations on the Western Front in the early offensive push of 
1914.  Rather, from the start Lettow-Vorbeck concept of techno-strategic integration 
accounted for the inherent defensive nature of a well emplaced machine gun.  Using 
mobility and dispersion Lettow-Vorbeck was able to extend the power of his machine 
guns into a larger area of operation, and repeatedly attrite British offensive attacks.  
Partly this was enabled through Lettow-Vorbeck’s inferior numbers, which prevented 
him from meeting the British head on.  Lettow-Vorbeck, brilliantly, attacked where the 
enemy was weak along the miles of undefended railroad track that the British needed 
logistically, which stands in contrast to the Schutztruppe’s ability to live off the land and 
from what he could capture.  Interestingly, German infiltration tactics toward the end of 
the war in some ways made the same use of mobile dispersed units armed with machine 
guns against weaker targets, but, in Lettow-Vorbeck’s case, the similar solution was 
arrived at without the carnage.  Perhaps his paucity of troops inspired Lettow-Vorbeck’s 
concept of operations leaving us to question whether the availability of manpower in 
itself was the cause for its apparent disregard in Europe.  
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Roughly during the same time, but in the Middle East, T.E. Lawrence, another 
undermanned raider, was using a similar concept of operations using Arab fighters 
against the Turks proving that this type of techno-strategic integration was not confined 
to Africa.320  Lawrence’s case however, offers a subtle difference.  While Lettow-
Vorbeck was using his Schutztruppe against a conventional force, Lawrence was using 
his Arab fighters in conjunction with a conventional force.  Indeed, the allied 
conventional effort against the conventional Turkish Army—strongly buttressed by a 
German advisory effort—engaged each other in one of the most famous battles of the 
war: Gallipoli.321  However, rather than diverting German men and materials away from 
the war in the western front the allied defeat at Gallipoli (January 1916), and soon 
thereafter at Kut (April 1916) reversed the situation and was now costing the allies more 
than it was hurting the enemy.322  Lawrence, arriving after Kut in 1916, offered a new 
approach to British operations in the Middle East.   
Echoing Lettow-Vorbeck, Lawrence pitted his efforts against the Turkish reliance 
on the rail line, again demonstrating a relationship between capability and 
vulnerability.323  Furthermore, Lawrence’s concept of allying with the disenfranchised 
Arab freedom fighters under the leadership of Sherif Husein reduced the British 
manpower investment, thus magnifying the impact of his operations.  Lettow-Vorbeck 
techno-strategic integration focused, primarily, around machine gun technology 
combined with an operational concept of mobility, and dispersion.  Lawrence also, 
recognized the need for mobility and dispersion, but his favored technology was 
dynamite.324  However, Lawrence did not limit his action merely to sabotage; he was 
able to orchestrate cooperation between his dispersed forces when needed against larger 
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targets which he did successfully at Aquba in July 1917.325  Moreover Aquba, which was 
held by 1200 Turks cost Lawrence two men—a startling contrast to the attritional battles 
of the Western Front and evidence that an offensive concept of dispersion may carry with 
it an increased likelihood of surprise.326  As the campaign in the Middle East continued, 
Lawrence found himself extending his concept of irregular operations in concert with 
General Edmund Allenby’s more conventional operations.  Following Allenby’s capture 
of Jerusalem toward the end of 1917, pressures on the Western Front, from Germany’s 
renewed 1918 offensive, forced the British high-command to reallocate some of 
Allenby’s forces.327  Allenby, however, would not be content to sit in Jerusalem.  Instead, 
working with Lawrence, an offensive campaign for 1918 was devised that made effective 
use of Lawrence’s Arabs, and Allenby’s mass.  Lawrence would in essence create a feint 
inland using his dispersed forces in a series of attacks designed to give the appearance of 
the advance guard of the main attack.328  Meanwhile, Allenby would concentrate the 
main body of his forces against the Turks along the coastline en route to Damascus.  
When Damascus fell in October 1918 at the cost of 450 men it was a clear victory, as 
opposed to the pyrrhic victories of the Western front.  It was also a clear demonstration of 
the power of technology.  Machine guns and dynamite concentrate destructive power, 
and, in both the case of Lettow-Vorbeck and T.E. Lawrence, this concentration was used 
to extend the capabilities of the small groups by dispersing forces rather than massing 
them—a concept of techno-strategic integration that yielded both surprise and protection. 
D. NAVAL IMPOTENCY AND INNOVATION: BLOCKADES, 
BATTLESHIPS, AND COMMERCE RAIDING. 
The allied advantages of men and materials at sea were in some ways predicated 
by the techno-strategic disintegration inherent in Germany’s pre-war adherence to 
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Mahan’s concept of naval operations, which favored decisive combat between fleets over 
commerce raiding.  Naval technology such as submarines was changing the paradigm, 
control of the sea was no longer a two dimensional enterprise.  However, it is arguable 
that the German Admiralty recognized this in their initial, and later resumed pursuit of 
unrestricted submarine warfare.  But, the grip of naval traditionalist in the pre-war naval 
arms race and international condemnation during the war prevented Germany from 
committing to a submarine based fleet of, at that time, undetectable commerce raiders, 
and had rather predisposed them to a position of numerical inferiority in battleships. 
Naval competition and it effect on ship development leading into the war, 
(discussed in the last chapter), had in rapid order transformed the Royal Navy’s fleet.  In 
a series of evolutionary advancements—advancements aimed at improving existing 
characteristics—ships went from mounting four 12-inch guns at 13,000 tons capable of 
18 knots powered by a coal burning piston engine in 1896 through the Dreadnought 
design in 1906 to a design mounting eight 15-inch guns at 26,000 tons capable of 25 
knots by an oil burning turbine engine in 1913.329  Keegan also notes that this rapid 
change is all the more remarkable because each evolution in ship design had the 
corresponding impact of making the entire previous generation obsolete—a clear 
indication of the monetary investment Britain was willing to make in the “maintenance of 
maritime predominance.”330  Technological diffusion, a product of the privatization of 
arms manufacturing which resulted in foreign sales and industrial collusion between 
private firms, ensured that any short-term evolutionary gain was rapidly imitated by 
strategic competitors.  The international bonds of the arms industry were, indeed, so tight 
that some of cooperation between British and German manufacturers continued into the 
early years of the First World War.331   
The similarities in ship design can be explained, in part, by the environmental 
pressures both Germany and Britain faced.  Both countries had accepted a Mahanian 
view of naval operations, which stipulated a doctrine of naval dominance and correlated 
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to standing “traditionalist” views of naval power.  Also, the privatization of the naval 
armament industry, which was highly specialized and entails significant investment cost, 
increased foreign sales as private firms sought to recoup expenses.  Foreign sales 
increased the exposure of the technology, leading to widespread diffusion.  Finally, 
diffusion undercut any strategic advantage generated by the current technological suite, 
thus, increasing the demand for next generation technology.  Hence the rapid 
evolutionary cycle of ship design between England, Germany, and others.  However, for 
all the similarity between British and German navies there were also some important 
differences.  German ships had better shells, better armor, and better optical gun sights.  
German shells, unlike their English counterparts, were capable of penetrating armor on a 
glancing blow.332  However, having better ships does not mean that the Germans had 
made the right techno-strategic decision.  Tirpitz’s decision to forego investing in 
submarines shows a lack of consideration for the new in favor of the old.  German ships 
were good ship they were more heavily armored and had a more survivable 
compartmentalized magazine design.333  Finally, German ships had better range finding 
equipment.334  The latter in some ways being the most egregious of the three because the 
British admiralty made the decision to forgo A.J. H. Pollen’s better, privately developed, 
range finder in favor of an “in-house” design was made to avoid having to pay Pollen the 
sum of £100,000.335  However, besides the saving the £100,000—a truly inconsequential 
sum when compared against the 32.3 million pound budget of 1909—Pollen’s device was 
deemed unnecessary because it yielded the capability of firing while the ship was 
performing maneuvers.336 
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The competing device, which could not account for lateral movement, conformed 
to the traditionalist conception of line-ahead tactics.337  The failure to adopt the Pollen 
design is indicative of a lack of coherency in Royal Naval Doctrine.  Nelsonian line-
ahead tactics which made the Pollen sight unnecessary rested on a conceptualization of 
naval encounters as a race to close the distance with and decisively defeat the enemy 
fleet.338  However, the Nelsonian concept of operations was already being impugned by 
other technological decisions being made in the Royal Navy.  British ships had and 
maintained a gun-size, and therefore, a range advantage over the Germans.  Thus between 
1905–1910, in an effort to make the most of the range advantage inherent in their larger 
guns the Royal Navy under the leadership of Admiral Fisher designed a new class of 
ships—the battle cruiser.339  Traditionally, cruisers were tasked to screen in front of the 
main armada capitalizing on their speed to alert the fleet while avoiding danger.  Battle 
cruisers, however, were conceptualized not only to screen but also to fix and possibly 
destroy the enemy’s fleet through engagement while the main fleet moved to join battle.  
To accomplish this task the battle cruiser had the same guns and size of its cousin the 
battleship, but was lightly armored to increase its speed.  The entire concept of the battle 
cruiser was built on its combination of superior speed and range.  It was designed to 
chase down its more heavily armored opponents and destroy them with its larger guns 
while remaining out of range of it adversary.  However, the Admiralty by eschewing the 
Pollen sight had made a technological decision that essentially prevented battle cruisers 
from being able to engage targets at the far end of its range, thus, exposing the lightly 
clad battle cruiser to the enemy’s fire.  The disintegration in Royal Navy techno-strategy 
was indirectly acknowledged in its regulatory guidelines which specified a range 9000 
yards for target practice—a distance of less than half of a battle cruiser’s max range and  
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well within the enemy’s.340  British battle cruisers would, more than any other ship 
design, pay a heavy price for their techno-strategic disintegration at Jutland (31 May–01 
June 1916).  
Battle ships and their attendant fleet of battle cruisers, torpedo boats, and 
destroyers represented, in theory, the techno-strategic integration of early twentieth 
century naval engineering and Mahan’s naval doctrine of decisive battle between massed 
fleets.  However, the conditions of this union between technology and strategy were 
rapidly dissipating.  The troublesome technology of torpedoes was integrated into the 
massed fleet concept by designing a class of swift maneuverable ships to carry the 
weapon system against its primary target the battle ship.  The menace of torpedo boats 
necessitated a counter, thus the torpedo boat destroyer joins the fleet.  So far so good, the 
Mahanian paradigm is maintained with some minor adjustments to the composition of the 
fleet.  Undersea mining and submarines, however, proved more difficult to assimilate and 
both by the end of WWI would demonstrably impact naval operations.   
In contrast to the expectations of Mahan’s disciples in both the Britain and 
Germany, naval operations in the First World War were defined more for their absence 
than for their decisiveness.  Evidence of the growing dissociation between naval reality 
and naval theory was evident in the Mediterranean during one of the first encounters of 
the war.  German Admiral Souchon commanding a “fleet” of two ships ran into British 
Admiral Troubridge commanding four armored cruisers as the former was headed to 
Constantinople.  Although Troubridge enjoyed a two-to-one advantage over Souchon, 
decisive battle was not sought.  Troubridge broke off after some minor action because in 
accordance to WWI naval logic his force mounting twenty-two 9.2-inch guns was 
“outnumbered” by Souchon’s ten 11-inch guns.341  Troubridge’s actions would be called 
into question and he did face a court-martialed.342  However, Troubridge’s hesitation was 
indicative, to some degree, of a larger fear shared throughout the navy of losing ships.  
Granted no navy wants to lose a ship, but the balance between calculated risk and risk 
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aversion can sometimes separate victory from defeat.  Winston Churchill commented that 
commander of the Grand Fleet John Rushworth Jellicoe was “the one man who could 
have lost the war in an afternoon.”343  Martin van Creveld commenting on the lack of 
audacity in the employment of battleships, notes that “[t]o be in use in war, however, a 
weapon must be expendable.”344   
Underwriting the lack of audacity on the English side was their adherence to an 
increasingly evolutionary disintegrated concept of naval operations.  The admiralty had 
done everything right to fight within an outmoded paradigm, their ships were more 
numerous345 and more heavily gunned; in any straight forward meeting of fleets England 
had the advantage.  However, British perception was incongruent with reality—control of 
the sea was no longer confined to the surface.  Germany’s movement of the High Seas 
Fleet to the Baltic and out of harm’s way after losing four out of five ships in naval action 
off the coast of the Falkland Islands in December 1914 showed a similar lack of audacity, 
at least in its surface fleet.346  Tirpitz had pushed the development of German sea power 
during the pre-war years as a challenge British hegemony.347  The High Seas Fleet was 
built based on Tirpitz’s “risk theory,” as a deterrent that fixed the ratio of naval strength 
of Germany to Britain.348  Germany would have fewer ships than Britain, but would 
locally achieve superiority by concentrating the High Seas Fleet in the North Sea.349  
When the First World War broke out Germany was, by design, inferior in number, and 
was now facing the entire British fleet not merely the portion allocated to duty in the 
North Sea.  Germany, perhaps recognizing that their numeric disadvantages excluded 
them from a decisive victory in the Mahanian tradition, sought a concept of operations 
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that could take advantage of the more revolutionary technology of submarines.  However 
by the time the advantages of submarines were realized it was already too late.  If the 
integration had occurred before the war the consequences may have been great.    
While early encounters between surface fleets were largely indecisive in 1914—
as they would be later at Jutland—submarines were proving their mettle.  In one early 
encounter (September 1914) the German submarine U-9 sank three armored cruisers 
within an hour.350  The Royal Navy, recognizing the dangers of undersea mines and 
short-range submarines to a close blockade, established its blockade force at a distance in 
the Scapa Flow off the Orkney Islands where it could intercept merchant shipping.351  
Although submarines never penetrated the Scapa Flow it was not because of a lack of 
range.352  The growing presence of submarines and mines in the North Sea only served to 
increase the precautionary mindset of Jellicoe who, after losing the HMS Audacious on 
27 October 1914, wrote to the Admiralty of his fears of being baited into a mine / 
submarine ambush.353  Jellicoe’s apparent solution—to not give chase—foreshadowed 
Germany’s minimal contested retreat at Jutland.354  However, the general fear of 
submarines infiltrating the Scapa Flow never materialized.  By the end of 1914 Germany 
was already questioning the wisdom of risking its submarine force against battleships 
when it could be used instead to attack commercial vessels.  By February 1915 the 
decision was made.  Germany declared the areas surrounding Great Britain and Ireland a 
war zone and advertised that ships in these waters could be sunk at will—Germany 
commenced unrestricted submarine warfare.355  This decision, for as long as it was 
practiced, became an element of Germany’s grand strategy in the First World War, as  
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such, it was not solely a military matter.  Rather it represented a civil-military agreement.  
At first Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg resisted the idea he eventually agreed and within 
months of the decision 39 commerce ships had been lost to submarines.356    
Although, in essence all this amounted to was a reformulation of the age-old 
method of commerce raiding, the German willingness to attack commerce ships without 
warning seemed especially reprehensible given the inherent surreptitiousness of 
submarines.  However in commerce raiding the relatively revolutionary technology of the 
submarine may have found its techno-strategic niche in the First World War.  The losses 
escalated, reaching 135,000 tons monthly by the summer of 1915.357  Importantly, 
though, submarines were not able to interdict every merchant ship, and many ships 
continued to get through, in contrast to the “distant” blockade imposed by Britain which 
eliminated Germany’s access to seaborne supplies.358  The Royal Navy, lacking effective 
counter-measures, and unwilling to detach its destroyer fleet to safeguard merchant 
vessels, did not have a viable solution to defeat this revolutionary-integrated form of 
warfare.  However, the foundations of Germany’s grand strategy of unrestricted 
submarine warfare were already sinking.  On 7 May 1915 the German submarine U-20 
sank the Lusitania, and on 19 August U-24 sank the Arabic.  American President 
Woodrow Wilson was particularly incensed and the British, having no other counters, 
joined him in renouncing Germany’s tactics.  The moral indignation of the strong, facing 
an asymmetric threat that showed their underlying weakness to the techno-strategic 
integration of submarines and commerce raiding, found their voice in diplomatic 
castigation.  Germany ceased its submarine campaign against commercial shipping in 
September 1915 only to resume it in February 1917.  In a variation of diffusion whereby 
the style of integration is not directly imitated but is instead countered, the exposure to 
unrestricted submarine warfare and the short reprieve enabled the development of 
countermeasures—technological as well as tactical.  In the meantime however, the  
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techno-strategic fusion of big gun battleships and a traditional Mahanian naval concept of 
operations would occur at Jutland; and, in its inconclusiveness, Jutland would shed light 
on the disintegration of this union. 
In some ways the abandonment of unrestricted submarine warfare made Jutland 
possible.  With the astronomical casualty rates pouring in from the fronts the German 
navy must have felt compelled to act.  Indeed, Bethmann-Hollweg and the German 
government were increasingly facing pressure to resume Germany’s crusade on 
commerce as early as February 1916.359  Unwilling to face the diplomatic torpedoes of 
international condemnation but nevertheless needing to take action, Bethmann-Hollweg 
placed the High Seas Fleet in the command of Vice Admiral Reinhard Scheer—an officer 
that had long championed using the surface fleet in a more offensive role.360  Scheer 
started using elements of his fleet in a series of hit-and-run raids, but the range and 
duration of his attacks were limited by the looming presence of the Vice Admiral David 
Beatty’s battle cruiser fleet, which had been positioned at Rosyth.361  Scheer, 
unknowingly echoing Jellicoe’s fears, constructed an operational plan to use a contingent 
of battle cruisers under Franz Hipper to lure the British battle cruiser fleet into a 
submarine ambush.362  The Germans’ gambit included a deception plan to misdirect the 
British by leaving a ship in port sending transmission as though it were Scheer’s flagship 
giving the appearance that Scheer’s fleet was still in port.363  The British were partially 
deceived; Jellicoe, believing that the German fleet was still in port slowed his advance to 
conserve fuel.364  However, if Scheer had known that Jellicoe and the battleships he 
commanded were moving it is likely that the battle would have never occurred.  Scheer’s 
plan was orchestrated to achieve superiority by drawing out Beatty’s battle cruiser fleet 
and pitting against the entire German fleet.  England in possession the German code book 
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was able to deduce Scheer’s intention to resume the offense as he had done throughout 
April and May, therefore, Jellicoe had preemptively sailed to a position where Scheer 
could be interdicted in effect setting his own trap.365  Socially sanctioned traditionalist 
approved naval battle would commence on May 31, 1916.  Like a heavyweight boxing 
match that goes to decision the battle between these opposing fleets would leave the 
audience unsatisfied.   
First contact occurred after Beatty’s battle cruisers passed through the submarine 
ambush undetected.366  Both Beatty and Hipper played their part after elements of their 
fleets identified each other while conducting reconnaissance of the same merchant vessel.  
Hipper withdrew towards Scheer’s superior force, and Beatty gave chase.  The British 
battle cruisers, which had been designed for speed, closed the distance.367  However, the 
evolutionary-disintegrated British battle cruisers were speeding to their own demise.  
They had been designed to employ their speed and big guns to range the enemy while 
remaining outside of the enemy’s range, which, but their speed came at the cost of armor.  
However, lacking an adequate optical range finder, the battle cruiser’s ability to hit 
targets at the max range of their guns was purely theoretical.  Closing to within effective 
range exposed the swift but lightly armored battle cruisers to the enemy’s fire; and, the 
Germans, having the technological advantage of Zeiss optics fired the opening salvos at 
Jutland.368  The British battle cruiser fleet’s techno-strategic disadvantages were 
tragically becoming apparent.  The Lion, Indefatigable, and Queen Mary were all hit 
within 20 minutes wounding the Lion and sinking both the Indefatigable, and Queen 
Mary—a third battle cruiser, ironically named, Invincible would be lost be the end of the 
day.369  The weakness of the battle cruiser’s poorly protected magazines made them 
especially vulnerable to German shells, which unlike their British counterparts penetrated 
                                                 
365 O'Connell, Of Arms and Men: A History of War, Weapons, and Aggression, 257. 
366 Keegan, The First World War, 272. 
367 Macksey, Technology in War: The Impact of Science on Weapon Development and Modern Battle, 
79. 
368 Macksey, Technology in War: The Impact of Science on Weapon Development and Modern Battle, 
79. 
369 Macksey, Technology in War: The Impact of Science on Weapon Development and Modern Battle, 
79. 
  97
before detonation.370  The rapid loss of two ships and the near catastrophic hit on his flag 
ship the Lion caused Beatty to comment to his flag captain that “[t]here seems to be 
something wrong with our ships today”—and there was, they were techno-strategically 
disintegrated from naval reality.371  The battle had merely begun. 
Beatty, in pursuit of Hipper, recognized his vulnerability upon contact with some 
of the additional elements of Scheer’s fleet and turned course toward Jellicoe.  The tide of 
battle was now ebbing in the British favor.  Scheer’s fleet found its T crossed, and unable 
to match the range of the British’s 15-inch guns, was subjected to a withering barrage.372  
Scheer, fortunately for his sailors, had thought through the implication of having his T 
crossed, and disseminated the order to execute a turning maneuver that allowed them to 
quickly exit the engagement area.373  Scheer, perhaps feeling the weight of the navy’s 
unequal contribution in blood, was not ready to capitulate.  A second clash of battle ships 
commenced as Scheer attempted to maneuver his ships around the British.  Jellicoe, 
however, had received reports from his cruisers of the German course, and once again 
was able to position himself across the German T.374   
The German fleet was illuminated by the setting sun allowing the British gunners 
to exact 10 minutes of horror as they struck the enemy fleet 27 times while only suffering 
two hits.375  Had Germany recognized the value of a zeppelin based reconnaissance effort 
in support of naval operations Scheer may have been able to out maneuver Jellicoe.  
Instead, lacking information, Scheer ordered the second turnabout of the day, only this 
time it was also followed with instructions to his battle cruisers and torpedo boats to 
charge the enemy in a “death ride” action to cover the retreat of the main battle fleet.376  
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As the German battle cruisers turned toward the British with the intention to ram, they 
also fired a salvo of 31 torpedoes.377  Jellicoe on the precipice of history was true to his 
word; he turned away from the enemy’s underwater onslaught—Jutland would not be a 
second Trafalgar.  As night settled in, the German fleet would complete their 
disengagement at the price of three ships.378  The literal “death ride” of the battle cruiser 
in some ways morphed into the metaphorical death of the techno-strategic integration of 
battle ship fleets and Mahanian notions of control of the sea.  The High Seas Fleet and the 
Grand Fleet would not meet again in the First World War.379   
 
Table 1.   British and German losses at Jutland 1916 (From380) 
Inconclusive results yielded controversy, both sides claimed victory.  The British 
lost more ships and more men; however, it was the Germans who had fled.  Strategically, 
Britain remained in “control” of the sea.  However, Germany may have won in the sense 
that even though they considered the battle a victory there may have also been a 
realization that they had escaped annihilation.  Scheer, who had once championed surface 
combat, thus, recommended the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare following 
Jutland.  The “conversion” of Scheer, a surface navy traditionalist, greatly facilitated 
Germany’s acceptance of techno-strategic union between submarines and commerce 
raiding, but it was a conversion too late to be decisive.  Although there were some minor 
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surface engagements following Jutland, the bulk of the German surface navy languished 
in the North Sea and by the end of the war the High Seas Fleet would mutiny rather than 
fight.381   
Unrestricted submarine warfare was resumed in February 1917.  In April German 
submarines would sink 900,000 tons.382  The tactical solution of merchant convoys was 
unsavory to Jellicoe who was unwilling to detach his destroyers for their protection.383  
Nevertheless, vice admiral William Sims commander of U.S. naval forces in Europe and 
an early dreadnought proponent saw things more clearly—command of the surface seas 
was hollow if it did not amount to maintaining sea lines of communication.  Sims 
recognized the techno-strategic imbalance between Jellicoe, who was holding onto the 
old paradigm and potentially losing the men and materials needed to win the war, and 
Germany who had made the paradigm shift and were capitalizing on the techno-strategic 
integration of submarines and commerce raiding.  The U.S. Navy Department thought 
arming merchant vessels was the best solution to the submarine problem, but Sims argued 
arming merchant vessels would just prompt submarines to use torpedoes.384  Sims took 
action, recommending to both the British Prime Minister Lloyd George and the American 
President Woodrow Wilson that America revise its naval plan to include detaching the 
U.S. destroyer fleet for convoy escort and also to redirect construction away from 
battleships into additional destroyers.385  With a senior naval officer making the 
recommendations, the politicians felt more comfortable effecting the changes that they 
had already perceived as necessary.  Civil-military relationships built on the interchange 
of ideas and recommendations by military and civilian officials willing to look at 
problems without the moorings of traditionalist preconceptions once again appear 
effective at influencing change. 
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Importantly, the submarine threat was not solved by the tactical solutions of 
convoys alone.  Technological counter-measures—the mirror image of diffusion—had 
advanced in the 16-month lull afforded by German acquiescence.  Depth charges, 
antennae mines, primitive underwater “hydrophones,” and asdic (an early precursor to 
sonar) made the threat of detection, destruction, or both more likely, although, still 
exceedingly difficult.  By July 1917 convoys combined with the developing anti-sub 
technology had reduced the amount of shipping loss to a manageable level386  Germany 
had allowed international pressure to influence their abandonment of a revolutionarily 
integrated form of combat.   
 
Figure 5.   Figure showing German submarine (dashed) and British surface techno-
strategic integration during the Frist World War. 
Battleships at the start of the war (Point 1) had undergone a series of rapid 
evolutionary developments from 1896 to 1914; they were integrated into doctrinal 
paradigm stressing control of the sea.  However, control of the sea was no longer 
confined to the surface.  Submarines at the start of the war (Point 2), were still relatively 
revolutionary, and posed a significant problem for integration into the existing paradigm 
because their slower speed prevented them from being easily incorporated into the 
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existing fleet concept.  However, Germany perhaps pressured from a position of naval 
inferiority across all ship types was willing to experiment more with alternative doctrinal 
concepts that increased the role of submarines.  Germany started integrating some of the 
asymmetrical advantages of submarines early in the war (Point 3) against British 
warships.  However, further integration was achieved when Germany declared 
unrestricted submarine warfare in February 1915 (Point 4).  The effectiveness of the new 
techno-strategic paradigm, embodied by submarines and commerce raiding, combined 
with an inability of the old paradigm to counter it militarily.  Diplomatic condemnation, 
which was perhaps fueled by the radical paradigm shift, was sufficient however to get 
Germany to temporarily relinquish its advantage (Point 5). The threat alone of a 
subsurface attack whether from another surface ships torpedoes or from a submarine was 
enough to force Jellicoe to turn away—battleship’s represented a huge investment, they 
may have been too big to fail.  At Jutland the lack of decisive victory provides further 
proof of the disintegration of the techno-strategic paradigm of battleships and control of 
the sea (Point 6).  Jutland’s indecisiveness and the extensive damage suffered by the High 
Seas Fleet acted like a conversion experience for Scheer who recommended the 
resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare following the engagement.  Germany did 
resume unrestricted submarine warfare (Point 7) in February 1917, but by then diffusion 
of the paradigm had prompted both tactical and technological counters limiting which 
eventually limited its effectiveness.  Finally, battle cruisers (Point 8) provide an 
interesting example of disintegration by design.  Thirty-three percent of the British battle 
cruisers fleet was destroyed at Jutland.  Battle cruisers were built around a concept of 
long range gunnery; a capability that because of competing optical range finding 
acquisition choices they did not have. 
E. SUMMARY 
Leading into the First World War, poor civil-military relationships in both France 
and Germany encouraged both countries’ militaries to promote an institutionally-favored 
doctrine of offense which would prove, tragically, to be the wrong choice.  However, the 
offensive strategies of the time favored mass.  The Prussian innovations in techno-
strategically integrating railroads to mobilize the huge armies made possible by the 
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conscription systems had diffused following the Franco-Prussian war.  The diffusion of 
rapid mobilization prevented the rapid capitalization of France which was crucial to the 
success of the Schlieffen plan.  Rapid mobilization had failed to achieve victory and soon 
the inherent defensiveness of machine gun and artillery technology increasingly made 
offensive strategies of mass untenable.  Techno-strategic reconciliation on the western 
front broadly took two forms.  The British sought a technological solution that offered 
protection, firepower, and mobility, thus, the tank was developed.  During the rest of the 
war the tank would simultaneously be improved technologically and integrated 
doctrinally.  Although Germany did imitate by building, tanks, during the war their 
efforts were limited due to widespread material shortages.  However, Germany 
reinvigorated their offensive doctrine with a reformulation of the techno-strategic 
integration of machine guns.  Their doctrinal innovation was to use the machine gun in as 
the technological centerpiece of infiltration tactics—dispersion against mass.  
Interestingly, both tanks and a doctrine of dispersion were prompted by the need for 
protection.  Lawrence and Lettow-Vorbeck were showing how, in other theaters, 
dispersion was also playing a role in an entirely different form of techno-strategic 
integration.  These “masters of irregular warfare” were using the concentration of 
destruction made possible by technology against the techno-strategic integration of their 
opponent’s reliance on rail showing how the relationship between capability and 
vulnerability can be exploited.387   
At sea the history of naval tradition was being tested by a new threat that had 
shifted control of the sea from a two-dimensional paradigm to a three-dimensional 
paradigm.  Rapid and increasingly expensive evolutionary development occurred prior to 
the war in the paragon of sea control—the battleship.  But on the whole the performance 
of battle ship during the war was inconclusive; they were vulnerable to underwater 
attacks and lacked the expendability needed for audacity.  Also, on the surface, battle 
cruisers show one example of how a techno-strategy can be disintegrated by design.  In 
this case, the battle cruiser represented a system of technologic advancements that 
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seemed to make a nimble big gun ship nearly invulnerable—as long as it remained out of 
range.  But the lack of a targeting sight capable of engaging targets at the range necessary 
to safeguard the lightly armored vessel instead made battle cruisers unsuited to their task.  
Meanwhile, submarines were offering a novel techno-strategic solution to conducting 
naval warfare.  In this example there is further evidence of the benefits of attacking an 
adversary’s techno-strategic integration.  Doctrines of mass and attrition require stores of 
materials, by engaging in unrestricted submarine warfare Germany was attacking its 
enemy’s ability to wage war—a concept that would also be pursued aerially.  Also, this 
example shows the revulsion inherent in a paradigm shift.  The diplomatic pressure 
Germany faced because they were pursuing a new type of war is eerily similar to the 
condemnation of terrorist and other asymmetric adversaries who may merely be exposing 
our weakness to their reformulation of techno-strategy.  Although, Germany was initially 
persuaded to abandon their one form of revolutionary integrated techno-strategy their 
eventual resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare indicates that it is unrealistic to 
assume that international sanctions alone will be enough to counter new techno-strategic 
paradigms.   
Like submarines, airplanes extended into a third dimension, and would come to 
play an ever larger role in combat.  Naturally filling the need for reconnaissance airplanes 
soon showed promise in a variety of roles.  As the different technological requirements of 
the various roles became apparent increasing specialization of the form was evident in the 
evolution of fighters and bombers.  Although, airpower alone was not sufficient to break 
the stalemate of the western front it would become increasingly necessary component of 
offensive techno-strategic integration.  Airpower too, in the bomber archetype, promised 
to threaten the enemy’s ability to wage war.  Unlike submarines, which could only target 
materials airplanes seemed to offer the capability to target production, and possibly, 
through terror, civilian support for war itself.   
Information was also becoming more important.  As doctrines of mass gave way 
to doctrines of dispersion informational requirement increased as it became more difficult 
to “know” where friendly and enemy units were on the battlefield.  The rudimentary 
wireless radios and cable bound telephones of the First World War limited the flow of 
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information.  However, the continued evolution of communications technology was 
already starting to make itself known.  The German interception of Russian 
communications transmitted in the open at Tannenberg led to a resounding Russian 
defeat.388  As communications developed they would offer, like all technology, a 
capability and vulnerability.  Already at Jutland, and in other cases, radios were being 
used as much to misinform the enemy as they were to inform other friendly units.  
Furthermore, the development of direction finding equipment, and encryption was a 
burgeoning frontier of revolutionary technology by the conclusion of the First World 
War.  “Plan 1919,” was unnecessary, had it been executed it may have been the final 
proof that the paradigm on land had shifted just as dramatically as it had on sea.  It was 
built around techno-strategic capabilities and doctrines that had not existed at the start of 
the war, but had become necessary as the disintegration of the current paradigm became 
apparent in the trench lines.389  In the intervening years between world wars the techno-
strategic integration of the new paradigm, evident at the conclusion of the First World 
War, was broadly pursued.  As the ramifications of the armistice exerted their subtle 
pressure on both the victors and the vanquished it became apparent that the test of 
integration would soon be at hand.    
                                                 
388 Meyer, A World Undone: The Story of the Great War, 1914–1918, 170. 
389 McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000, 334. 
  105
IV. THE INTERWAR PERIOD AND WWII 
By the conclusion of the First World War some of the dissonance between 
offensive doctrines and early twentieth century weapons had been resolved.  Techno-
strategic integration on land had returned mobility to the battlefield.  At sea the Mahanian 
paradigm of positive sea control produced by decisive engagements between surface 
fleets was facing serious threats from submarines.  The nascent technology of airplanes 
was increasingly influencing combat on both land and at sea.  Many of the defining 
technologies of the Second World War—tanks, battleships, submarines, airplanes, 
aircraft carriers—existed by the conclusion of the First.  New technologies were on the 
horizon as well and, none would eventually be more ubiquitous than radar or more lethal 
than nuclear munitions.  Furthermore, the scale of the First World War ensured broad 
exposure to the technology and strategies developed during the conflict, providing a 
historic backdrop for future imitation and continued development.  However, the 
magnitude of the conflict, while ensuring exposure, seems to have prevented a uniform 
analysis of what future war would look like.  Organizational biases, war weariness, and 
financial constraints would all influence the process of techno-strategic integration during 
the interwar.  The interwar years, a period of intense strategic competition, post war 
reflection, and imitation in England, Germany, France, America and Japan, provides a 
unique environment to survey the techno-strategic integration of the emerging 
technologies of WWI.  The Second World War, seen in this light, provides a litmus test 
regarding how well each participant integrated the new technological forms. 
As the strategic environment became clearer toward the latter half of the 1930s, 
Germany and Japan benefited from their early rearmament and combat experiences.  
Germany, vanquished and punished under the Treaty of Versailles, had deeply reflected 
on the experience of the First World War.  Its military had solved many of the operational 
problems of integration, and their application of what they had learned shocked the world 
in 1939.  Perhaps though, by looking so hard at the past they failed to appreciate the 
future—their operational success would not translate to ultimate victory.  Japan also 
showed early promise, but was ultimately undone.  Their military expansion, having been 
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checked at Midway, would prove to be unsupportable by their resource base.  The United 
States and Soviet Union were outclassed initially.  The imitation of German practices and 
rapid diffusion of technology would change the allied armies.  Although the course of the 
war was changing before the balance of material production shifted, the unparalleled 
ability of the Soviet Union and the United States for production would eventually 
overwhelming favor the allies  
A. NAVIES 
1. Tough Choices: Battleships, Aircraft Carriers, and Submarines 
At the conclusion of the First World War navies faced tough choices.  To naval 
establishments, battleships were a historically tried and true technology.  Yet battleship 
performance in the First World War did not deliver decisive results, and there were 
evidence that the techno-strategic foundations underpinning two-dimensional control of 
sea control was inadequate.  It was also true that Britain’s more numerous and more 
advanced battleship fleet had effectively blockaded Germany.  To the same degree that 
battleships were favored by navies, submarines were hated.  However, they had shown 
some potential during the First World War and would continue to capture the imagination 
of some naval officers.  During the interwar period submarines faced existential 
challenges in naval disarmament talks, were technically redesigned to support fleet 
operations, and eventually reemerged in the Second World War in the same role they had 
performed in the First.  Although the carrier HMS Argus debuted in 1918 and the Royal 
Navy produced 12 aircraft carriers during the First World War, aircraft carriers 
represented a relatively unknown frontier for navies.390  None of the three forms 
necessitated the abandonment of either of the others.  Therefore, the interwar years 
represented a technological crisis to navies as they tried to decide upon the right fleet 
composition and what technical qualities of each of the three macro designs. 
Civil-military relations affected techno-strategic integration through three major 
interrelated factors immediately following the war although each country experienced 
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them differently.  First, on the political side, international treaty obligations resulting 
from a series of successive naval disarmament conferences started impacting the 
quantities of warships being constructed by type.  Also certain qualitative limitations 
such as displacement were established, impacting the force compositions that naval 
leaders had to plan against.  In some ways this favored the development of aircraft 
carriers as battleship were converted to flattops to meet treaty requirements.  Second, 
financial constraints were prevalent as countries struggled to pay off their debts from the 
First World War, and later from a global depression.  Both affected defense spending.  
Although, financial considerations were one of the primary reasons many of the treaties 
limiting naval expansion were sought, it is also worth considering independently because 
austerity sometimes prevented building to treaty strength.  Finally, on the military side, 
there was a lack of consensus on which technology to choose.  The resulting 
organizational struggles are beneficial in highlighting some of the difficulties in adopting 
new techno-strategic concepts. 
The Treaty of Versailles, with its limitations on Germany’s post First World War 
naval composition, in some ways, began the process of international naval arms 
restriction that would continue through the 1920s.  However, soon after the war Japan 
started planning to construct 40,000-ton ships, prompting the United States and Britain to 
lay down their own plans for ships of equal or larger size—it appeared as though the bell 
had rung starting the next round of the naval arms race.391  As evidenced by their post-
war building programs, navies in all three countries had reverted back to the 
organizationally familiar techno-strategic paradigm of battleships and control of the sea.  
However, there were factions that were starting to question the battleships role.  In 1921, 
William Mitchell, an early and ardent air-power promoter, was able, after relentlessly 
pressuring the navy, to test whether aerially delivered munitions could sink the captured 
German battleship Ostfriesland.392  Mitchell’s airplanes were successful; furthermore, 
Mitchell was in correspondence with Admiral Sims who, as head of the Naval War 
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College, had independently determined the latent power of aircraft carriers through war 
gaming.393  Importantly, the U.S. Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes had also been 
informed of the testing.394 
Over the New Year between 1921–1922, at the Washington Naval Conference 
Secretary Hughes staked his knowledge regarding the battleship’s uncertainty as a means 
of an arms control agreement between the United States, Britain and Japan that would fix 
overall tonnage ratios between the three powers at 5:5:3; individual battleship size would 
be limited to 35,000 tons.395  Aircraft carriers were allotted more overall tonnage which 
was set at 135,000 tons for the U.S. and Britain and 81,000 tons for the Japanese.396  
Submarines faced existential challenges particularly from the British, however, failing to 
get rid of them, the conference instead tried to regulate their actions by ensuring that 
future submariners understood that the laws of “visit and search” still applied.397  A ten-
year naval holiday ensued following the Washington Conference, and although there 
were additional conferences through the interwar it was the Washington Conference that 
set the tone.  The main financial difficulties of entering into another naval arms race 
following the First World War had been averted through political negotiations.  While 
treaty obligations limited what could be constructed; financial pressure limited what 
would be constructed.  Only the Japanese would build up to and, as a means of bargaining 
future strength by appealing to current strength, beyond treaty authorizations by the 
London Conference in 1930.398  Japan moreover, became increasingly antagonistic 
toward negotiations as their negotiated position of inferiority was at odds with their 
growing nationalism and burgeoning desire for imperial expansion.   
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In the absence of international treaties it is reasonable to assume, based on post-
war building plans that another iteration of battleship construction would have ensued.  
Furthermore, the evolutionary trends toward marginal improvements in tonnage and gun 
size were already evident in the construction plans of both the Japanese and the U.S..  
This indicates that it may be plausible that in an atmosphere of strategic pressure 
militaries will fall back of the traditionally tried and true weapons even in light of 
growing indications that the techno-strategic paradigm may be shifting.  When Secretary 
Hughes, who had perhaps become aware that battleships may not have had sole claim to 
sea control, and offered a political solution to slow down strategic competition.  He not 
only effected financial savings, he also bought time for navies to figure out, in general, 
what future naval combat would look like.  It now became incumbent on navies to use 
that time within the limitations of resources to develop their concepts of techno-strategic 
integration. 
The navies of the United States, Britain, Japan, and Germany differed 
contextually in the conditions within which techno-strategic naval decisions were made.  
By illuminating the effects of those differences on the techno-strategic integration of 
aircraft carriers, battleships, and submarines, some best practices were derived.  
Furthermore, all three vessel archetypes were in some way tested against the prevailing 
doctrinal concept of Mahanian control of the sea that was still operating in each of these 
countries.  The persistence of this idea in itself is illuminating because it shows the 
difficulty inherent in a paradigm shift—until there is a new explanatory concept the old 
one will always carry weight.   
In the United States Navy fleet composition decisions were governed in large part 
by recommendations from the General Board.  The General Board occupied a somewhat 
unique position within the U.S. Navy at the time.  They were senior in rank, but not 
involved in the daily operations of the Navy.  Following the Ostfriesland test, and the 
Washington Naval Conference, the U.S. Navy began further experimentation with 
aircraft and battleships.  However, much of the testing was controlled by the navy.  The 
navy’s subsequent stipulations and management of the presentation of the results reveals 
the organizational preference for battleship.  The Washington Treaty’s tonnage 
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limitations made some older ships available for testing as the navy drew down to treaty 
specifications.  By looking at the audiences invited to the tests the navy’s strategy to 
preserve battleships is clear.  In general, for tests using planes, whether armed with 
torpedo or bomb, as were conducted against the Arkansas and Alabama, no members of 
the General Board were present.399  Meanwhile, the tests emphasizing the power of 
battleships to sink battleships were replete with senior officers, General Board members, 
and press.400   
However, Billy Mitchell had caught the attention and imagination of the public.  
Mitchell’s flamboyance and deliberate manipulation of public opinion through 
barnstorming airshows put him at odds with the U.S. Navy’s Admiral , who was the 
navy’s senior airman.401  Moffett effectively established the Bureau of Aeronautics 
(BuAer) one year after taking over responsibility for naval airpower in 1920—an 
extremely shrewd move that put naval aviation on equal footing with the other naval 
bureaus and provided a measure of protection against competing interest.402  Mitchell 
may have overstated his case, but his style could not be ignored.  The House convened 
inquiries into Air Service Operations, first in the Lampert Board and then followed up in 
the Morrow Board.403  Mitchell who was crusading for an independent Air Force, may 
have been instrumental in drawing political attention to the power of air forces, but he 
proved to be unwilling to accept anything less than the acceptance of his ideas and, in the 
end, his agitations would result in his court martial and retirement in 1925.  Meanwhile 
Moffett, a Medal of Honor recipient with a career of service on battleships would, 
through his more moderate approach, make significant advances on both aspects of 
technology and strategy; however, he would do it from within the organization.  
Following the investigations by the House the Navy General Board convened its own 
inquiry into naval air operations.  Presided over by the Chief of Naval Operations Edward 
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Eberle, the committee was predominately stacked against aviation—there were no 
aviators on the panel.404  The seven recommendations coming out of this board were 
presented to President Coolidge as priorities for investment; therefore, these 
recommendations represented the “official” navy position regarding which vessels would 
characterize future naval engagements.  
 
Table 2.   Eberle Board’s seven recommendations to President Coolidge (From405) 
Although favoring battleships, the recommendations appear to indicate a broad 
technological approach, however, underlying the spending priorities was a techno-
strategic approach that kept both aircraft carriers and submarines in supporting roles.  For 
carriers that meant supporting the fleet with reconnaissance aircraft, and for submarines it 
meant screening for the fleet. However, by not rejecting any warship type the Eberle 
Board at least encouraged continued experimentation.   
Britain’s carrier program, in contrast, was falling behind.  At the end of the First 
World War the Royal Navy had invented the refined form.  The Royal Navy had 
produced the first carrier capable of both launching and landing aircraft—the HMS 
Argus.406  Furthermore, at the conclusion of the First World War they possessed more 
aircraft carriers, and were more proficient at carrier operations, than any other country.  It 
is of particular interest that they lost their early advantage.  Financial constraints certainly 
played a role, but were a constant between countries, therefore, additional evidence must 
be considered.  The Royal Navy’s early lead worked against future innovation.  In 
America, Moffett, as the chief of BuAER, was busy developing supporting technologies, 
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such as, launching catapults, tail-hooks, and arresting wires as well as researching aircraft 
engines.407  The British, having the early numerical advantage, were lulled into a false 
sense of superiority and were content to and were willing to let others do the 
innovating.408  Had the British been able to time a rapid build-up when they needed it, 
this strategy may have turned into a brilliant attempt to leverage the advantages of late 
modernization, but as Geoffrey Till notes “Britain’s relative industrial decline and severe 
financial difficulties were the real reasons for the deficiencies in the Britain’s carrier 
program.”409  For the British that meant that when the requirement for carriers presented 
itself clearly, they had already fallen so far behind that they were not able to capitalize on 
late modernization but instead remained irreparably behind.  By 1926 and 1933 the 
British would be surpassed numerically by the American and Japanese respectively, and 
by the start of the war in 1939 the British would field just over 400 naval aircraft some of 
which were not even exclusively tasked to maritime duty.410  In contrast, both America 
and Japan were able to field over 600.411   
Another significant difference that may have been at work relegating Britain to 
third place in the interwar development of aircraft carriers was that unlike Japan and 
America, Britain established the Royal Air Force (RAF) and an Air Ministry—a separate 
service under a separate civilian minister.  In part this was the logical result of the 
strategic environment each of the three nations faced as the interwar progressed.  Japan 
and America could increasingly look toward each other as strategic competitors in the 
vast Pacific.  The planes needed in the Pacific theater would have to be brought to the 
battle, and the expansiveness of the ocean itself validated the early role assigned to naval 
aviation of performing reconnaissance for the main battle fleet.412  England, on the other 
hand, faced strategic ambiguity and the continuing commitments of it waning empire.  
Furthermore, England’s global position made strategic bombing a more likely possibility, 
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a claim that the RAF used to justify the production of bombers over maritime aircraft.  As 
Germany’s naval power increased in the early 1930s England could look to them as a 
primary competitor and envisage naval operations in support of its shipping routes and in 
defense of it shores—the aircraft needed for support in this concept could be based on the 
ground in Britain.413   
Also, as a result of Britain’s creating a separate air service, the Royal Navy lost a 
large portion of their war experienced talent, as navy aviators stood up the Royal Air 
Force in 1918.414  The loss of these aviators created a leadership gap within the Royal 
Navy’s Fleet Air Arm.  The young aviators had no senior leaders to provide mentorship 
or to create an environment conducive to experimentation.  This problem was 
exacerbated by the Royal Navy’s insistence that carriers be commanded by general 
service officers.415  Also a factor was the organizational system that developed where the 
Royal Navy’s aviation initiatives were dually controlled by the Admiralty and the Air 
Ministry.416 The RAF, which controlled the development of all aircraft, quickly 
established precedence for its preferred fighters and bombers over maritime use planes, 
and the Fleet Air Arm, lacking an air minded senior officer, was unable to adequately 
advance the Royal Navy’s naval aviation needs.417   
In contrast one of Moffett’s most prescient changes was to leverage the findings 
of the Morrow Board to get congressional support behind his initiative to make aviator 
qualification a requirement for carrier commands.418  This incentivized senior career 
minded officers such as Ernest J. King and William F. Halsey—both would be 
instrumental in the Pacific theater during WWII—to obtain aviation credentials to make 
them competitive for the broadest number of potential command opportunities.  By 
enticing senior officers Moffett was able to expose a larger portion of the navy to the 
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ideas of naval aviation.  Whether these men went on to command carriers was not 
necessarily the more important or lasting impact of this initiative; rather, Moffett ensured 
the propagation of U.S. naval aviation by creating a vanguard of senior officers who, 
through counsel of their subordinates, would nurture the idea.   
Japan’s early forays into naval aviation experienced some of the same challenges 
of decentralization that were experienced in Britain.419  However, in 1927 the Japanese 
established a headquarters for naval aviation that was independent from, but reported to, 
the naval minister.420  Furthermore, as in America, some of Japan’s senior admirals—
notably Admiral Yamamoto as vice navy minister from 1936–1939—encouraged 
development of naval aviation.421  Geoffrey Till credits “The revolution in naval 
administration which began in 1927 as explaining the impressive surge in the 
development of Japanese naval aviation from the mid-1930s.”422 
The U.S. Navy’s exposure of officers to naval aviation and the advocacy enabled 
by creating an independent BuAER headed by a flag officer may have directly 
contributed to the willingness to experiment with new approaches to carrier doctrine.  
The completion of the Lexington and Saratoga in 1928 provided the test subjects.  These 
carriers were capable of 34 knots and housed up to 80 aircraft each.423  In 1929, during 
an exercise dubbed Fleet Problem IX, both the Saratoga the Lexington participated, but 
on opposing sides.424  However, it was the Saratoga’s actions that were notable.  
Working in conjunction with the cruiser Omaha, the Saratoga separated from the main 
battle line and launched its planes 140 miles away from the intended target, which for the 
purposes of this exercise was the Panama Canal.425  The planes easily achieved their 
objective of bombing the Miraflores Locks; unfortunately, the decisiveness of the 
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exercise was jeopardized when the Saratoga was “sunk” as it moved toward the target 
area to land its aircraft.426  However, Admiral William V. Pratt the overall exercise 
commander took note of what the Saratoga had achieved.  Pratt, although impressed, 
wanted further testing and in 1931 in his role as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) he 
oversaw Fleet Problem XII.427   
Unfortunately, the aircraft carriers Lexington and Saratoga were unsuccessful in 
stopping the fleet’s landing force during Fleet Problem XII, which cast doubt on the 
overall viability of a carrier-centric task force, and Pratt found himself in the position of 
having to use the results of Fleet Problem XII to secure funding for battleship 
modernization.428  However, given that wartime performance would invalidate the 
conclusion that “The battleship is the backbone of the fleet,” questions regarding the 
nature of the test become important as it had rendered a false positive.429  Two factors 
may have contributed to the problem of using this as the deciding test.  First, the odds 
were deliberately stacked against the carriers.  Second, since carriers were a relatively 
new addition, their employment doctrine was not completely worked out.  During the 
problem the carriers split into two groups, and were unsuccessful largely because their 
planes could not locate the opposing force.  At best this represents an operational 
problem, not a strategic weakness; furthermore, it was an operational problem 
increasingly less pertinent in the late 30s as radar became increasingly available.  
However, the naval hierarchy would not be seriously challenged again until after Pearl 
Harbor. 
All navies remained tied to a conventional approach to naval operations 
characterized by the teachings of Mahan and the superiority of the battleship.  Pearl 
Harbor the sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse would rapidly shift perceptions 
among naval leaders.  Aircraft carriers would eventually surpass the battleship, but during 
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the interwar period, their value was perceived in terms of how well they could be thought 
to support the main battle fleet.  In that respect aircraft carriers, although initially 
subordinated to battleships, fared much better than submarines.  Although not abandoned, 
the American submarine program during the interwar was a low priority—when the U.S. 
needed an alternative concept of operations following the destruction of the battleship 
fleet at Pearl Harbor the submarine force would be there.  As already indicated, 
submarines were sixth out of a list of seven priorities for the U.S. Navy.  Furthermore, the 
V-class fleet submarine was a deliberate attempt to subordinate the submarine to a 
techno-strategic concept it was unsuited for—supporting fleet operations—yielded a 
submersible chimera.  The six V-class submarines were poor divers and too slow to 
support fleet operations, but they represented the entire effort of the U.S. Navy during the 
1920s.430  However, it is hardly surprising that the U.S. Navy initially failed to techno-
strategically integrate submarines with a concept of operations emphasizing commerce 
raiding.  At the Washington Conference U.S. political leaders had argued violently for 
increased restriction regarding the rules governing search and seizure.  There was simply 
no indication politically that the U.S. Navy would be asked to perform this mission, 
although Pratt, again showing his insight, noted that the agreed upon conventions for 
submarine use were “made to be broken.”431  Subsequently, with the failure to morph the 
submarine into a suitable accoutrement of the fleet, the General Board recommended that 
submarines be eradicated altogether at both the Geneva and London Conferences in 1927 
and 1930 respectively.432   
By 1935 the U.S. was 18 submarines under treaty authorizations and behind 
Britain and Japan in terms of total numbers.433  The Naval War College, however, was 
experimenting with different concepts of operations in their war gaming during the early 
1930s and, as a result, there started to be reenergized thinking regarding the best 
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employment for submarines.434  Also, by the late 1930s the U.S. Navy could be 
increasingly confident that it was on a collision path with Japan.  Japan had withdrawn 
from the 1935 London Naval Conference after demanding parity, and started a major war 
in China in July 1937.  Furthermore, the assault on Manchuria, conducted by 264 planes 
supported by three aircraft carriers, showed better than any fleet problem or war-game 
both the power of aircraft carriers and how advanced both Japan’s fighters and pilots 
were.435  As Japan’s naval power became apparent, senior naval leaders realized that War 
Plan Orange—the standing plan for war with Japan--was no longer viable due to 
technological advances.  By October 1940 Orange was undergoing a transformation, and 
when it emerged as War Plan Rainbow Five in May 1941 it included provisions for 
commerce raiding.436  Assisting this change with a theoretical underpinning and 
representing the ultimate of ironies, Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus in his duties as president 
of the Naval War College had reevaluated the German WWI practice of declaring war-
zones, and had determined that it was a viable practice.437  Although Kalbfus’s 
recommendation was rejected, it was only a matter of justification not tactics.  Japanese 
merchant ships could be attacked under the presumption that they were armed and 
therefore a legitimate naval target.438  Fortunately, for the U.S. Navy, the Tambor class 
submarine provided a technology that could complement the reformulation of strategy 
following Pearl Harbor on December 7 1941.  The Tambor was a superior class of 
submarine; larger than its German counterpart, it was powered by four diesel engines 
allowing it to charge its batteries while underway, and it also incorporated a firing 
computer that assisted torpedo accuracy.   
Charles A. Lockwood’s persistence, as a relatively junior officer while serving in 
Washington as the submarine desk officer in 1937, was instrumental in the development 
of the Tambor class submarine, which was opposed by the General Board and by 
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Admiral Thomas Hart.439  Lockwood’s, involvement again highlights the power of 
individual leadership to enact techno-strategic transformation.  Lockwood, following a 
tour early in the war as a naval attaché in London, returned to sea duty as a rear admiral 
in March 1942.440  As a commander Lockwood proved adept at both advocating to higher 
authorities for the benefit of his forces, and selecting the type of talent his operational 
concepts required.  The Tambor class of submarines may have been the best in the war 
and the accuracy of a computer enhanced targeting system was highly advanced, but the 
Mark-14 torpedo was nearly useless.  Under the province of the Bureau of Ordnance 
(BuOrd) the Mark-14 suffered two major flaws—it ran too deep, and its magnetic fuse 
was so fragile that it was usually destroyed before it could detonate the warhead.441  In 
contrast the Japanese Long Lance torpedo was a technical masterpiece; fueled by liquid 
oxygen it could travel at 49 knots for distances up to 11 miles, and was truly a formidable 
threat.442  The technical malfunctions with the Mark-14 torpedoes were a result of the 
BuOrd’s failure to test it during its development and fielding under combat conditions, a 
decision based on specious financial arguments.  Even in light of reports from the field, 
including those of senior leaders like Lockwood, BuOrd was slow to address the 
torpedo’s failings, choosing instead to question crew competence.  Eventually, by the 
summer of 1943, the torpedo problem was rectified, but it is reasonable to question how 
much money and lives were lost trying to save money in testing and development.   
Advocating for his sailors made Lockwood a good commander, but what made 
him great was his ability to envisage a techno-strategic fusion of the submarines that took 
advantage of its strengths to perform operations like commerce raiding, assisting guerrilla 
operations, and reconnaissance.443  Lockwood was able to achieve his vision for 
submarine operations in part because he uncompromisingly selected and retained his 
                                                 
439 Herwig, Innovation Ignored, 258. 
440 Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits: How Masters of Irregular Warfare have Shaped our 
World, 194–195. 
441 Herwig, Innovation Ignored, 259–260. 
442 Macksey, Technology in War: The Impact of Science on Weapon Development and Modern Battle, 
123. 
443 Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits: How Masters of Irregular Warfare have Shaped our 
World, 196. 
  119
subordinates based on their suitability to perform within his concept of operations.  
Although the U.S. Navy did not, for the majority of the interwar period, plan to conduct 
unrestricted submarine warfare, they were able to when the situation arose largely due to 
his efforts.  Senior leaders such as Lockwood were able to nurture alternative strategies 
against the conventionally minded thinking of the majority, and were, therefore able to 
present options when the time came.  Other navies, notably the British, were not as 
fortunate. 
The British and the German cases present an examination in opposites.  To 
characterize the general dispositions of these navies’ approaches to the development of 
submarines during the interwar: the British were unwilling but able, and the Germans 
were willing but unable, at least, initially.  The Germans managed to brilliantly stay on 
the cutting edge of technical and tactical developments in spite of the Treaty of 
Versailles, which had forced them to give up their 176 U-boats at the conclusion of the 
First World War and also prevented them from constructing or obtaining new 
Unterseebooten.444  The punitive tone of the Treaty of Versailles, which necessarily 
forced any German submarine program into secrecy, may have directly increased 
collusion in civil-military relations.  Two separate secret funds each administered by a 
captain were created from money garnered in the forced sales of it ships following the 
treaty.445  As early as 1922 the money was invested in collusion with the major 
industrialists of Germany into a front company in the Netherlands to design and build 
submarines.446  While the final product would be built offshore, the Germans would 
“build” submarines for a variety of countries using designs from German engineers, and 
with parts from German manufacturing throughout the 1920s.447  This arrangement 
ensured German capability to design and produce a technically modern submarine and 
also facilitated diffusion.  
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As the restrictions of Versailles lessened, through flagrant disregard or through 
negotiations, the clandestine investment in design and manufacture enabled Germany to 
rapidly build its submarine forces.  The political injunctions were mostly overcome after 
1935, based of stipulations in the Anglo-German Naval Agreement that allowed Germany 
to resume submarine construction up to 35 percent of Britain’s—by 1938 Germany had 
72 U-boats either completed or in construction with the majority in construction.448  
Doctrinally however, the role of the submarine was unclear.  In Germany, as elsewhere 
there was a continued adherence to the Mahanian concept of operations emphasizing fleet 
action. This limited experimentation with alternative concepts of operations.  However, 
unlike other navies there was a core of experienced submariners that had participated in 
Germany’s commerce campaign in the First World War.  Karl Dönitz, who in 1936 
would become the “Commander of U-boats,” often found himself at odds with his 
superior Erich Raeder.  By the late 1930s, Raeder, supported by staff analyses, postulated 
that submarine effectiveness had been reduced by countermeasures, and was therefore 
better suited for the more defensive role of protecting commerce.  Commerce raiding 
would be performed by Panzerschiffes—an armored cruiser.449  Germany despite having 
the most experience in the First World War remained wedded to the battleship—an abject 
failure of learning.  Some had the foresight to see the possibilities.  Dönitz for example 
was training his submarines to operate using “wolf pack” tactics group of submarines 
would converge on and destroy a target.  In contrast, Lockwood’s similar concept of 
operations emphasized individual submarines rather than packs—a difference that 
maximized the probability of locating targets by casting a larger net.450   
The Royal Navy also suffered from a failure of analysis, which in their case was 
compounded by organizational rigidity and a steadfast belief that the interwar resolutions 
would be upheld.  Having “won” the war, the Royal Navy focused it intellectual efforts 
on re-fighting Jutland and slowly convinced itself that Germany’s submarine warfare 
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campaign had not really been that threatening.  This nonchalance toward submarines was 
institutionalized through the officer professional education system; by 1934 the Royal 
Navy’s staff college spent three days examining Jutland—the battle itself had lasted less 
than two days.451  The few serious analyses regarding submarines and the course of naval 
combat during the First World War were deliberately restricted by the Admiralty to 
protect the service’s image.452  Another variable preventing serious analysis in the Royal 
Navy was their unfounded faith that they had solved the problem of submarine detection 
through the advent of asdic.  An early precursor to sonar, asdic was online by 1917.  
Although, asdic was a remarkable achievement, it inspired confidence that far exceeded 
its capacity.  Furthermore, like the mitrailleuse the secrecy that surrounded asdic 
prevented it from being seriously tested.453  Asdic turned out to be more placebo than 
panacea, but the idea that a technical solution like asdic existed fostered the Admiralty’s 
unwillingness to seriously question the impact that submarines would play in future wars.  
Although naval operations during the Spanish Civil War in 1936 revealed some of the 
shortcomings of asdic, the Royal Navy was still claiming detection rates of 80 percent in 
1938.454  By no means was asdic useless.  It was effective, but its effectiveness was 
limited by its capabilities at the time.  From the standpoint of techno-strategic integration 
it is useful to consider whether an environment of technological experimentation with 
asdic would have benefited the Royal Navy which through exploring the capabilities of 
the device may have been able to minimize its limitations through further technical and 
doctrinal innovation. 
Radar offered a different technological capability to gather information about 
positional locations.  Its focus in contrast to asdic was in the air and on the surface instead 
of underwater.  The appeal and power of information explains why radar would become 
nearly ubiquitous during the war.  Radar preceded the Second World War, and was 
independently being researched by all the major participants.  Germany was at the 
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technical forefront in the 1930s, and at the outbreak of the war was ahead in areas of 
resolution, ruggedization, and versatility.455  Radar was also finding applications in 
enhancing naval gunnery.  Germany’s early lead would not lead to the best techno-
strategic integration.  Germany’s technical superiority would begin to diminish in 1939 
when the decision was made to focus continued developmental efforts on the longer 
wavelength end of the spectrum.456  Centimetric, or microwave radar was harder to 
power and thus suffered from shorter ranges, but eventually those difficulties would be 
overcome by the allies.  Radar was a key enabling technology in that it dramatically 
altered the capabilities, both offensively and defensively, of a variety of weapons 
systems.  Accordingly, the techno-strategic integration of radar would yield major result 
to battles at sea, in the air, and against aircraft.  Radar was just one area of the growing 
enterprise of intelligence.  Other technologies, such as radio, proved immensely useful 
for commanding and controlling military forces.  However, while the radio offered an 
unparalleled means of command and control its advantages came with the vulnerability 
that it could be intercepted and exploited.  Encryption seemed to offer the necessary 
safeguards, but the incentive of knowing the enemy’s mind and the abilities of 
cryptologists to crack even the toughest cyphers proved more effective than 
communications security procedures.  Both radar and radio signals intelligence would 
critically affect the outcome of the naval campaigns in the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. 
Organizationally, the navies of the United States, Germany, Britain and Japan all 
chose to retain the techno-strategic paradigm of battleships and Mahanian control of the 
sea.  There was evidence that this union was disintegrated by the conclusion of the First 
World War.  During the interwar period, financial austerity and international arms 
regulation prevented navies from being able to build without constraint.  Austerity 
focused naval priorities, and battleships were the main benefactor—this would prove to 
be the wrong choice.  The Royal Navy emerged in the Second World War the most 
prepared to refight the First.  Britain had doubled down on battleships to the exclusion of 
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naval air power; they had also, misled themselves in their capacity to fight a renewed 
submarine campaign against their commerce.457  However, when the war broke out, new 
techno-strategic possibilities were realized.  What separated the competitors as each 
entered the war was partially a factor of how well each navy had retained options by 
spreading out naval developments during the interwar.  Britain, the most traditionally 
minded of the four, was the least tolerant of organizational dissent.  Having lost the 
majority of it aviators to the creation of the RAF, the Royal Navy failed to incentivize its 
Fleet Air Arm by limiting the command of carriers to general service officers, and 
forcing aviators to alternate their service between aviation and sea billets.458  Japan, the 
United States, and Germany in contrast allowed a certain amount of advocacy by senior 
leaders, such as Yamamoto, Moffett, Dönitz, and Lockwood.  However Germany, whose 
WWI experience should have provided the clearest lessons for the power of submarines, 
deserves criticism for failing to recognize its potentially broader role.  Organizational 
diversity is difficult for militaries, and is exacerbated by both deliberate indoctrination 
and common professional education.  However, organizational diversity may also have 
been the key element in retaining options.   
Options were clearly needed by the Americans after the Japanese decisively 
resolved the question about whether an airplane could sink a battleship at Pearl Harbor on  
December 7, 1941.  The attack on Battleship Row in Pearl Harbor was accomplished by a 
naval task force consisting of six carriers capable of launching 360 aircraft.459  
Battleships, and submarines, attended the task force but it was truly a carrier task force.  
The Japanese plan took full account of surprise attacking before a declaration of war and 
on a Sunday when they knew that the majority of military personnel would be relaxing, 
but the Americans were derelict to some degree as well by misinterpreting and not 
investigating what appeared to be a contingent of aircraft on radar.460  The Japanese had 
benefited techno-strategically from their experience during their previous carrier-based 
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campaigns in China, and their attack would decimate the U.S. Navy.  Over the course of 
two assaults the battleships Arizona, Oklahoma, California, West Virginia, Nevada, 
Tennessee, Maryland, and Pennsylvania were all destroyed or disabled—all but the 
Arizona and Oklahoma returned to service later in the war.461  Eleven other ships and 188 
aircraft were also destroyed.462  America declared war on Japan.  The attack also, 
strengthened the United States’s relationship and support for Britain, and by the 11th of 
December Germany and Italy would declare war on the United States.  Fortunately, the 
United States had options.  Neither carriers nor submarines had been docked at Pearl 
Harbor, and were therefore spared the Japanese onslaught.  Both ship types had been task 
organized throughout the interwar within a battleship centric Mahanian concept of 
operations.  However, the U.S. Navy even in the midst of the austere interwar, when 
pressures to assimilate along traditional lines were the highest had tolerated and promoted 
officers that thought slightly differently about naval operations.  Those officers—Nimitz, 
King, Halsey, Spruance, and Lockwood—and the subordinates they had mentored now 
rose to the challenge and supplied the Navy with a new techno-strategic vision of 
offensive naval operations that entailed, not battleships, but submarines and carriers.   
Although U.S. submarines operated to great effect in the Pacific throughout the 
duration of the Second World War, it would be the carrier battles that captured the 
headlines.  The destruction of battleship row had exposed the U.S. Navy to the strides the 
Japanese had made in the techno-strategic paradigm of carrier-centric naval battle.  Japan 
possessed an advantage in carrier strength of ten to three; furthermore, the Japanese Zero 
well was a well-tested aircraft and its pilots were both battle experienced and superbly 
trained.463  However, the Japanese betrayed their further intentions in the Pacific by not 
attending to their communications security.  American code breakers under the auspices 
of the “Magic” decryption program were able to determine that the Japanese’s next target 
would by Port Moresby.  The Lexington and the Yorktown were sent to oppose the 
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invasion.464 The resulting Battle of Coral Sea from 4–8 May 1942 was indecisive 
tactically.  Poor weather limited the aviators in the first days of the battle, but on 7 May 
in spite of the clouds the U.S. was able to sink the Japanese light carrier Shoho while 
losing the Neosho a refueling ship.465  On the 8 May the two fleets would make contact 
again and in this exchange the U.S. came out behind.  The aviators would attack the 
Zuikaku without effect and damage the carrier Shokaku to the point where it would need 
extensive repairs back in Japan, but the Lexington was so badly damaged that it would 
need to be abandoned and scuttled.466  However, while the Japanese came out ahead in 
the battle tactically, the U.S. Navy had strategically checked the invasion of Port 
Moresby and Japanese expansion in the Pacific had been halted.  Furthermore, the U.S. 
Navy gained some valuable carrier combat experience, which turned to their benefit in 
Midway the following month. 
The Japanese plans for Midway were again betrayed by their poor radio 
procedures and the U.S. Navy’s decryption efforts led by Captain Joseph Rochefort.  
However, in this case particular ingenuity was shown on the part of the Americans to 
clarify the intended target, which was coded by the Japanese as “AF.”467  To confirm that 
“AF” referred to Midway Island Rochefort’s team sent a radio message en clair 
indicating that Midway’s water distillation facility had malfunctioned.468  The Japanese, 
as expected, intercepted the transmission and forwarded it using the notation “AF” which 
confirmed the U.S. Navy’s hypothesis that “AF” referred to Midway.469  Synthesizing the 
information allowed the cryptanalysts to accurately predict the dates for the upcoming 
Japanese offensives in the Aleutian Islands on June 3rd and at Midway on the June 4th.  
The Japanese, under the flag of Admiral Yamamoto, were marshaling a force of 67 ships 
that included four carriers and seven battleships.  The U.S. Navy could only muster 26 
ships.  The odds are deceiving, though, because in terms of aircraft carriers the Japanese 
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only had a one-ship and about a 100 plane advantage.  Furthermore, the Japanese task 
force at Midway, in spite of all their carrier experience, centered itself around the 
battleship Yamato.  In the Yamato class of battleship the continuing preference of the 
Japanese for bigger, faster, larger gunned and more heavily armored battleships is seen 
most clearly—for all their experience and success in using the revolutionary aircraft 
carrier, the Japanese still thought that control of the sea would be found in the 
evolutionary extremes of the battleship.  Ironically by the end of the war both members of 
the Yamato class of battleship, the Yamato and Musashi, would be sunk by aircraft.  After 
a diversionary attack on the Aleutians the Japanese planned to seize Midway using the 
carrier groups, and then to lay in wait for the American response.470  When the 
Americans came the Japanese planned to destroy them using the strength of their 
battleships; a strength epitomized in the 62,000-ton behemoth Yamato.  The U.S. Navy 
was disadvantaged numerically in both ships and planes, but in terms of information it 
had the advantage, and it was an advantage that would prove to be “the beginning of total 
failure.”471 
The overarching intent that governed the U.S. commanders at Midway was to use 
the airplanes provided by the carriers to attrite the Japanese forces while retaining the 
ability to break off the contact if necessary to preserve their forces.  The land-based 
planes assigned to Midway were central to the plan and were tasked with reconnaissance 
to provide further intelligence on the Japanese exact locations.  The land-based aircraft 
located the Japanese fleet and attacked in the morning on the 4 June, successfully sinking 
an oiler and convincing Admiral Nagumo that the islands’ defenses must be subdued 
before the invasion could proceed.472  Nagumo launched his planes to conduct a bombing 
attack against Midway Island, decimating the islands defenses.  The remaining planes at 
Midway launched a counterattack prompting Nagumo to order his returning planes be 
rearmed with bombs for a second attack on the island; however, Nagumo was also 
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receiving reports that a U.S. Navy ship had been spotted.473  The potential of enemy 
ships prompted Nagumo to retract his order to rearm with bombs and instead to load 
torpedoes.474  During the first wave of attacks the U.S. planes fared poorly, especially the 
torpedo planes whose low-and-slow approach made them vulnerable to both anti-aircraft 
fire and Japanese Zeros.475  However, by moving to attack the low level torpedo planes 
the Zeros were not in position when the Enterprise’s dive bombers arrived after 
struggling navigationally to find the enemy ships.476  The 54 dive-bombers found their 
mark, within 10 minutes the Kaga and Soryu were sunk—their deck littered with aviation 
fuel and armament had magnified the effects of the bombardment.477  The Akagi was also 
catastrophically hit, and was scuttled the next morning.478  Later on June 5th, the 
Enterprise’s dive bombers found their target again, sinking the fourth Japanese carrier 
Hiryu.  The Hiryu managed to damage the Yorktown before its demise, and the Yorktown 
stalwart of the Battle of Coral Sea and Midway, was lost for good to a submarine attack 
three days later.479   
Years of hard fighting remained, but the U.S. Navy had won a startling victory.  
Forced to abandon a battleship-centric concept of operations through their losses at Pearl 
Harbor, the U.S. Navy was able to rely on a reserve of experience in carrier operations 
that it had developed during the interwar.  Furthermore, the early led in intelligence 
provided by “Magic” and enhanced by radar—essential to both the Battle of Coral Sea 
and Midway—would be retained.  With the techno-strategic paradigm of carrier-centric 
operations established, the U.S. turned its manufacturing toward production.  During 
1943–44 the U.S. produced 90 carriers in contrast to the Japanese seven.480  Furthermore, 
the interwar revulsion to submarine warfare was readily discarded after Pearl Harbor.  
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Submarines were dispatched to commence unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan 
on the same day as the attack on Pearl Harbor; Lockwood assumed command of the 
submarine effort in the Pacific in March of 1942.481  Three-hundred submarines, over the 
course of 1,500 missions, sank 4,779,902 tons of merchant shipping and 540,192 tons of 
warships—a destruction that represented 54.6 percent of Japans’ total tonnage.482  While 
submarine warfare did not attract the attention that the major carrier battles did, their 
constant campaign of attrition wrecked Japan’s ability to wage war.  Also, Japan did not 
institute convoys until late in the war, and even then they generally sailed without the 
requisite protective naval and air escorts.483  Oil supplies, the lifeblood of modern 
combat, were so diminished that, in the latter years of the war, conservation became so 
critical that the fleet could barely operate, and pilots received little flight time before they 
were expected to perform their duties.484  While the U.S. was waging submarine war 
against Japan in the Pacific it was simultaneously defending against it in the Atlantic.   
The allies narrowly avoided Japan’s fate in the Battle for the Atlantic.  Ultimately 
the intelligence capabilities that the allies obtained in the battle against submarines in the 
Atlantic would prove critical.  Intelligence and effective escort—would, after many nerve 
wracking months, eventually be enough to staunch the Germans assault on merchant 
shipping.  However, the difficulties the allies faced points toward the complexities of 
techno-strategic integration.   
The Germans began their assault on commerce in the fall of 1939.  Having, 
deliberately made the decision to use Panzerschiffes meant that when the assault on 
commerce commenced Dönitz had only 57 U-boats, and roughly half of those were of the 
smaller coastal design.  The Panzerschiffes and the U-boats immediately began harassing 
British shipping, but since the U-boats were few in number and limited in range they 
were not yet a trans-oceanic menace.  Nevertheless, 750,000 tons of shipping was sunk 
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between 1939 and the capture of French ports in June 1940.485  However with the fall of 
France in June 1940, the Germans gained ports closer to Britain, and were able to patrol 
further into the Atlantic.  To thwart the convoy system, which had helped alleviate 
merchant shipping attrition in the First World War, the German submarine arm began 
working in “wolf packs.”  “Wolf packs,” a tactical concept of operations that used radio 
to coordinate the concentration of submarines against a convoy once it had been 
identified, were conceived by Dönitz during the interwar period.  U-boats did not operate 
in packs, but they were able to coalesce in a swarm against merchant ships.  These tactics 
were effective against merchant shipping in the larger expanses of ocean because by 
spreading the force out in a wide area the probability of locating a convoy was increased.  
Throughout 1941 the number of U-boats was increasing, and loses were minimal.  By 
July 1942, U-boat numbers would reach 300, a number Dönitz’s had proposed during 
interwar as ideal.486  Between April and December of 1941 U-boats would sink 328 
merchants carrying a combined 1,500,000 tons.487  With America’s entry into the war in 
1942, new targets were available along the eastern seaboard and in the Gulf of Mexico.  
The United States’s inexperience defending against submarines resulted in naïve 
mistakes, such as, sailing unescorted, not convoying, and using open radio 
communications.488  The allied effort lost 2,600,000 tons of shipping between January 
and April of 1942; 1,200,000 tons off the eastern coast of the United States alone.489  
During a brief operational pause while Dönitz’s U-boats were re-tasked by Hitler to 
Norway, the Americans started instituting more operational safeguards including the 
highly effective aerial escort.490  In 1942 allied shipping losses reached their height.  
Central to the German superiority during this year was that they had the dual advantage 
in intelligence, their B-Dienst code breakers had cracked two successive British Naval 
codes (number 2 and 3), while their Triton cypher remained unbroken for the better part 
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of the year.491  German operational security also increased.  Dönitz started using the 
names of his commanders rather than boat numbers in his message traffic, and grid 
coordinates were further encoded into a unique alpha-numeric system.492 
The allies were disadvantaged but not out.  Realizing the need for accurate 
intelligence, both to avoid and attack the German U-boats, the British relayed on the 
Submarine Tracking Room, a fusion center for intelligence of all types pertaining to 
submarines.493  Importantly the Tracking Room’s efforts were enhanced by its staffing 
which included civilians from a variety of analytic backgrounds.494  The tracking room 
collated, analyzed and disseminated intelligence gathered from observation, radio 
direction finding, and, when available, radio intercepts.  Bletchley Park would succeed in 
breaking the German code by the end of 1942, and would not face a challenge nearly as 
difficult as Triton for the remainder of the war.  While the tracking room’s efforts were 
critical, they were part of a larger system.  Air escorts were increasingly used resulting in 
a narrowing of the “wolf packs” area of operations.  Furthermore, technical innovations 
continued to reinforce the development of anti-submarine tactics.  Airplanes were 
equipped with Air to Surface Vessel radar, which could take them to within a mile of 
their target before the radar picture lost fidelity due to interference from the sea.495  
Recognizing the shortfall, airplanes were equipped with Leigh Lights, a powerful search 
light that allowed the airplane to maintain visual contact with an enemy submarine as 
they approached, an innovation that greatly limited German night-time attacks.496  
Forward-throwing depth charge launchers or “hedgehogs” were developed to avoid firing 
blind when asdic would lose fidelity during the final approach.  Also, centimetric radar 
was made possible by the cavity magnetron, an innovation developed from the 
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integration of academic scientist from Birmingham University into the war effort.497  
Centimetric radar provided more resolution, and was immune to the German Metox, a 
device that warned crews when their U-boat was being detected.498   
However the one critically effective tool—Very-Long-Range B24 Liberators—
remained notably absent through 1942 U-boat onslaught.  Again the inter-service rivalry 
between the independent RAF and the Royal Navy seems to have precluded clear 
thinking about how to most effectively techno-strategically integrate to win in the Battle 
of the Atlantic.  During 1942 Britain lost an average of 500,000 tons a month.  When the 
Liberators began closing what remained of the Atlantic gap in April and May of 1943 the 
effect on U-boat operations was almost immediate.  In May 1943, Dönitz’s force lost 43 
U-boats a number that represented twofold what could be replaced.499  The techno-
strategic integration of Liberators equipped with radar and Leigh Lights, and better escort 
procedures enhanced through the regained information advantage made possible through 
Bletchley Park’s efforts and fused through the Submarine Tracking Room in addition to 
the massive industrial capabilities of the United States to replace shipping loses proved 
insurmountable to the “wolf packs.”   
German “wolf pack” tactics at sea, like Blitzkrieg doctrine on land, relied heavily 
on radio communications.  The Germans made extraordinary use of radio 
communications in the synchronization of their battle plans, but their assuredness that 
their radio encryption was secure was unfounded—the incentive of knowing the enemy’s 
mind proved too powerful.  Furthermore, the concentration of submarines in to a wolf 
pack required time and also ensured plentiful targets when the Liberators finally arrived 
in force in 1943.  In this respect the American campaign of unrestricted warfare in the 
Pacific serves as a contrast.  Lockwood’s operationalization of submarine operations 
emphasized individual raiders—one of the main reasons why he dedicated his time to 
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selecting the right leaders for his subordinate commands.500  By decentralizing to 
competent commanders who were responsible for operating within his intent within their 
areas of operations, Lockwood was able to minimize communications thus providing 
additional security and extending his effectiveness.  It is reasonable to question whether 
this would have extended the operational effectiveness of Dönitz as well. 
 
Figure 6.   Figure showing the integration of battleships, submarines, and aircraft carriers 
from the interwar through WWII. 
Battleships, submarines, and aircraft carriers represented difficulty techno-
strategic choices during the interwar.  Battleships, (Point 7) were revealed to be 
somewhat disintegrated by the conclusion of the First World War but were maintained 
and evolutionarily enhanced in spite of their poor wartime performance and the growing 
indication of their vulnerability to air attack.  Both problems were discounted by the 
traditionalists at the top of the naval hierarchy.501  The maintenance of an evolutionary, 
disintegrated technology in this case was the result of organizational preferences 
interfering with objective analysis and testing.  Point 1 shows submarines’ forcible 
disintegration which occurred as they were subjugated to a battleship support role that did 
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not suit the inherent technological strengths of the form.  Point 2 shows the wartime 
integration of submarines during the war by U.S. and Germany.  The U.S. further 
integrated the submarine at (Point 3) by operating more decentralized and by better 
integration of radar.  The U.S. and Britain also integrated against submarines, however, 
had either navy been willing to experiment more with submarines during the interwar it is 
reasonable to question whether the defeat of the “wolf pack” would have taken so long 
during the war.  Aircraft carriers were the easiest to integrate from their fleet support role 
in the interwar represented at (Point 4) to their eventually ascendency in the naval 
hierarchy.  The U.S. and Japan both integrated the carrier (Point 5), but in some ways the 
attack on Pearl Harbor forced the U.S. to fully integrated (Point 6) in a way that the 
Japanese never did.  At Midway, Japan was still thinking within a Mahanian framework, 
while the U.S. had, by necessity, fully integrated carriers.  Naval success in the Second 
World War was partly a factor of how fast a navy could move away from its perceptions 
of integration in the interwar period to effectiveness in combat.  The U.S. was the most 
successful of the three not because its interwar techno-strategic position was closest the 
type of integration that could win naval battles but because they had maintained a diverse 
fleet, and had organizationally tolerated and promoted officers that thought outside of the 
organizational norms. 
B. ARMIES 
1. Achieving the Blitz  
Mobility had returned to the battlefield by the conclusion of the First World War.  
However, the same pressures that influenced navies exerted themselves on armies.  
Financial constraints, war weariness, and the difficulty of inferring the right lessons from 
the experiences of the First World War affected the process of techno-strategic 
integration leading into the Second.  Germany’s use of mechanized Panzer forces under 
cover of closely coordinated supporting aircraft was successful in the opening years of 
the Second World War.  The British showed successful use of tanks late in the First 
World War, but generally failed to capitalize on their early innovation in the Second, an 
astounding failure given that Germany was developing their doctrine while under the 
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severe military restrictions of the Versailles Treaty.  Meanwhile the French, who had 
more tanks than Germany in 1940, failed to develop an adequate doctrinal concept that 
made the best use of the tanks speed, and instead focused on highly centralized deliberate 
operations.502  The United States was, perhaps fortunately, prevented from attacking 
Germany head-on in 1942.  Eisenhower may have wanted “to go to Europe and fight,” 
but the U.S. Army was better served by gaining experience in North Africa—the 
exposure to German methods in that theater created a core of officers that would 
transform the army.503  America’s material production capacity uniquely suited its late 
adoption of wide-scale mechanization.  The U.S. Army would so more than merely 
imitate German tactics they would fully mechanize the army.504  The Soviet Union was 
also able to imitate German methods after being nearly defeated in 1941.  Imitation then, 
can explain a good portion of the adoption of German mechanized methods during the 
war, but what explains the initial German success during the interwar period? 
Limiting the discussion to Britain, France, and Germany is useful in this case 
because they represent the three main competitors of the western front—the birthplace of 
tanks during the First World War.  Between these countries two macro factors are 
apparent related to the adoption of mechanized doctrine during the interwar.  First, each 
army differed in its orientation to its strategic competition.  Second, there was significant 
difference in the organizational tolerance for critical analysis and intellectual discourse.  
The identification of strategic competition is directly a function of civil-military relations.  
Politicians must define the strategic environment for their nation’s militaries, and 
militaries must assist their political leaders in understanding the ramifications their 
decisions will have on national readiness.  In Britain during the interwar the politicians, 
allowing for some outliers, did not correctly identify the growing threat Germany  
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represented to their security.  The army also failed, within the context of limited funding 
and support, to adequately plan for contingencies that went beyond the relatively limited 
role the government defined for them.   
The decidedly anti-war British attitude during the interwar was a direct result of 
their casualties during the First World War.  A strategic approach developed, based 
largely on the result of Liddell Hart’s analysis, which emphasized naval action with 
limited army involvement at the fringe.505  The “limited liability” approach seemed to 
offer a way of avoiding large scale casualties in a continental conflict.506  By 1937 this 
position was essentially made policy under the newly elected Prime Minister Neville 
Chamberlain, who also cut the Army’s budget by £70 million.507  In response to the 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) Lord Gort’s assessment that the army was 
unprepared to fight first-class powers, the British government indicated their priorities for 
the army.508  Safeguarding the homeland, protecting trade, and maintaining a colonial 
presence were all listed before any discussion of entering into a coalition for the defense 
of allies.509  When the events in Czechoslovakia in the fall of 1938 finally started to force 
the issue of potential continental conflict it was too late.  
Magnifying the lack of direction on the political front was an army that was 
thoroughly anti-intellectual and dominated by traditionalists.510 Lord Milne, the first 
CIGS to seriously focus his staff’s attention to studying the last war, did not take office 
until 1926.  Milne was also, the only interwar CIGS to experiment with armor during 
maneuvers in 1927 and 1928.511  Ironically, the Germans would learn more from these 
maneuvers, which highlighted some of the difficulties with logistics and communications 
support, than the British.  Milne also organized the first staff study of the First World 
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War’s lessons in 1932; in hindsight this committee is more remarkable for its tardiness 
than its conclusions, which were critical of the army’s wartime performance.512  Milne’s 
successor Montgomery-Massingberd, in a move echoing the Royal Navy’s refusal to 
critically question its performance against submarines, redacted the report to limit its 
indictment of the army—the original was only seen by a few senior army leaders.513   
The development of Close Air Support (CAS) was significantly hampered by the 
creation of an independent RAF.  As already noted, the political position in Britain during 
the interwar was against employing the army in continental combat.  This position, which 
seemingly implied that CAS would not be needed, bolstered the RAFs arguments on 
developing their force around a concept of strategic bombing rather than around 
supporting ground forces.  Showing the same disregard for critical assessment as the 
Royal Navy and British Army, the RAF interpreted the history of CAS during the First 
World War as too costly for its effect.514  Meanwhile, the analysis of the impact of 
Germany’s bombing campaign on Britain were expounded upon in depth—a selection 
bias which supported the organizational predilection toward strategic bombing and away 
from CAS.  Throughout the interwar period, the RAF was guided away from CAS so that 
by November 1939 it remained an option only in extremis.515  Most egregious was the 
RAF’s disregard for its own experience in its colonial “small war” actions.  Indeed, the 
ability of the RAF to patrol and police large areas of Britain’s colonial holdings was very 
beneficial to the service in terms of justifying its independence.516  In these actions 
experience was gained employing air power in conjunction with ground forces; however, 
the exposure of these to a larger contingent of the force was low.  The thoroughly anti-
intellectual environment of the British services during the interwar period prevented the 
widespread dissemination of professional articles which could have increased familiarity.  
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Finally, there was a lack of imagination to reflect on the colonial experience and 
extrapolate a larger endeavor.  At the other end of the spectrum in both areas of 
identification of the competitive environment and encouragement of critical analysis was 
Germany. 
Germany’s public remained enamored of its military in a way that Britain’s did 
not.  Furthermore, Hitler’s rise to power in 1933 removed mast financial restrictions on 
rearmament.  The conditions of austerity the German army faced by the stipulations of 
the Versailles Treaty, which prevented the possession of tanks and restricted the size of 
the army to 100,000, may have actually benefited the conditions for innovation.  
Specifically, General Hans von Seeckt, during his duties as the chief of the general staff 
was able to select 4,000 officers for retention out of 15,000 available.517  This winnowing 
heavily favored officers that had previously served within the German General Staff, 
resulting in an officer corps of considerable intellectual talent, as selection for the general 
staff was based on merit, not predominated by traditionalists.518  Seeckt had the right 
intellectual foundation in place, and he subsequently set their minds to examining the 
lessons of the First World War.  Four hundred officers, representing 10 percent of the 
active officer force, participated in 57 committees and their finding were published in 
1921 and 1923 as Army Regulation 487, “Leadership and Battle with Combined 
Arms.”519  German doctrinal development, emphasizing maneuver, offense, 
decentralization, and initiative, was developed in light of these publications and before 
the re-emergence of tanks.520  Seeckt established the same intellectual foundation for the 
development and operationalization of CAS.  The Gruppe Luftstreitktäfte was created in 
the 1920s to systematically study the lessons of the First World War.521  Most 
importantly, the German military was not encouraged to think uniformly.  Separate 
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groups arrived at different conclusions and all were equally debated.522  The same culture 
of intellectualism and experimentation prompted German officers to study and draw 
conclusions from the limited British armored experiments carried out under Milne, and to 
send some of their officers to Russia to work with Soviet tankers and airmen.523  When 
Germany was able, under Hitler, to resume militarization their efforts were guided by the 
conclusions drawn from these interactions.  Doctrine developed through rigorous analysis 
preceded the massive rearmament that Hitler pursued.  The doctrinal concepts of 
operations guided the development of technology.  Furthermore, early combat experience 
could be compared against the expectations inherent in their doctrinal foundation.  
Experience could then be rapidly assimilated into doctrin to shape a cohesive system of 
mechanized maneuver warfare—Blitzkrieg.  French interwar development represented 
the metaphorical as well as the actual middle ground. 
France’s recognized early that Germany was the likely threat.  However, their 
analysis, which reflected their failed 1917 campaigns, mistakenly interpreted the 
relationship of offense to defense.  Therefore, the French molded their army to best 
refight the First World War against the technology that had existed, not as it would exist 
in the Second.  The Maginot Line epitomized the misreading of the techno-strategic 
situation.  French doctrine, stressing the power of artillery fires tied into a defensive belt, 
was methodical in its application, unlike Germany, which was stressing individual 
initiative and decentralized execution.  Later in the 1930s it became increasingly apparent 
to some of the lower echelons that mechanized forces presented new operational 
possibilities.  But by 1935 the Commander in Chief, General Gamelin, had instituted a 
policy that centralized the authority for all publications to the high command, effectively 
eliminating the freedom to explore new doctrinal avenues.524   
The French Air Force was no better off.  France’s numerous planes from the 
1920s were retained into the 1930s.525  As the growing threat from Germany mounted the 
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French tried to reenergize their air force, but these efforts were stymied by ineffectual 
civilian leadership.526  The French program to rebuild it air force proceeded slowly in 
1939 France was manufacturing 600 planes a year in contrast to the nearly 3,000 being 
produced in Germany.527  The gap in manufacturing and was further exacerbated by a 
lack of a concept of operations that conjoined CAS with ground maneuver.  France’s 
neglect of airpower during the interwar period created a capabilities gap, and their rapid 
capitulation prevented them from potentially making up for their deficiencies through late 
modernization once the war began 
The German techno-strategic integration of it planes and tanks in a concept of 
operations emphasizing maneuver, offense, and decentralized subordinate initiative laid 
the groundwork for early German successes.  However, the details were not fully worked 
out.  Further innovation in the techno-strategic integration of aerially supported 
mechanized combat continued, and may have even accelerated through the early 
experiences in the Spanish Civil War and in Poland.  Through these experiences the army 
was able to capitalize on its broad intellectual underpinning, to further adapt its 
burgeoning doctrine while fighting.  By the dramatic push through the Ardennes in May 
1940 the concept had advanced significantly.  While the forces in France were defeated 
so swiftly that they were unable to benefit from imitation, the United States and the 
Soviet Union both benefited from the exposure to the German’s advantages and were 
able to build up and surpass the original innovator.  Stalin himself noted in November 
1941 that “In modern warfare it is very difficult to fight without tanks and without 
adequate protection from the air.”528  The soviets had a decisive numerical advantage 
over the Germans in 1941, but a poor concept of operations.529  After the defeat the 
Soviet Union would turn its attention to the manufacture of both armor and airplanes in 
1942, and would adjust their concept of operations significantly.530  The United States 
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too was able, at a distance, to observe and innovate.  During the 1930s the U.S. Army had 
one Brigade of mechanized Cavalry consisting of 224 light tanks.531  Two divisions were 
established in an independent armored force in 1940 and another three divisions were 
created in 1941.532  America further benefited because it made the decision to fully 
motorize its entire supporting infantry, artillery, and logistical apparatuses.  Whereas a 
Panzer Division consisted of 328 supported by 97 other vehicles, an American Division 
had 375 tanks supported by 759 other vehicles.533  Material production in and of itself 
however was not solely responsible for the shifting for balance of fortunes.  Allied forces 
also further expanded the new techno-strategic paradigm into a broader strategic concept 
that included the Germans.  The Panzer groups were indeed formidable, but they 
represented a small portion of the force. 
C. AIR FORCES 
1. Strategic Bombing and its Defense 
As mentioned earlier, nations faced interesting questions in the techno-strategic 
integration of airpower during the interwar period.  Air power emerged from the First 
World War with seemingly endless potential.  Having performed a variety of missions, it 
was unclear where airpower would find the most utility in future wars.  In the aftermath 
of the First World War, air advocates such as Douhet, Mitchell, and Trenchard, offered a 
techno-strategic concept of operations that seemed to offer decisive results with minimal 
casualties.  By targeting the enemy’s centers of production, economic resources, and even 
the population itself, the effects of bombing on civilian morale promised to bring war to a 
swift conclusion.  After all, while other things may be in doubt, there was no doubting 
that “the bomber will always get through.”534  Although Britain had been bombed during 
the First World War, their experience seemed to disprove a number of the claims of 
bombing advocates.  During the Second World War, strategic bombing survived in spite 
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of its underwhelming record of effectiveness.  In Germany bombing, by and large, was 
effective not for the effects it had on the morale of the civilian population but because 
combating it pulled the Luftwaffe effort away from supporting the troops.  By the end of 
the war strategic bombing had render the Germany manufacturing base impotent, but the 
allied advances by that point indicate that the war in Europe was won before the bombing 
effort had accomplished its objective.  Japan too was on the brink well before the 
bombing campaign achieved its effect.  However, the addition of the atomic bomb to the 
bomber arsenal seemed to once again revive the notion that you could bomb an enemy 
into capitulation using air power alone.  Although the use of the bomb on Japan was 
questionable even at the time, it may have made strategic bombing techno-strategically 
viable, but at the cost of turning war into genocide.  Before the atomic bomb became a 
reality though a host of supporting technologies were developed and introduced to assist 
navigation, accuracy, and defense.  Although the effectiveness of bombing is 
questionable it was through these additions that the bombing paradigm came into its own 
as a form of warfare.  Strategic bombing became a tool of total war.  
The United States and Britain were the most taken with the concept of strategic 
bombing.  Germany, on the other hand, developed its capacity for bombing within a more 
inclusive aerial doctrine and not in opposition to other forms of air combat.  Geographic 
position, financial commitment, and air forces’ desire for organizational differentiation 
contributed to pursuing strategic bombing during the interwar.  During the course of the 
war scientific advances and production capability took the idea and transformed it to 
reality.  The idea that a nation could launch an air attack presented new strategic 
vulnerabilities to the United States and Britain.  The narrow seas and the oceans could no 
longer serve as a final barrier against direct attack.535  Germany’s central location on the 
other hand limited their conception of strategic bombing within a more local 
framework—of the three powers discussed they alone would not develop a four engine 
bomber.536   
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Financial constraint and a political climate of war aversion presented challenges 
to militaries in the interwar.  In Britain these challenges were increased to some degree 
by the creation of an independent RAF.  The RAF needed to compete against claims from 
the army that air was best used to support ground troops, and claims from the navy that 
air was best used in maritime operations.537  The RAF, playing to some degree on the 
fear that was generated politically by the overselling of the threat, embraced the one 
mission that set them apart—strategic bombing.538  The chief of staff of the RAF in the 
interwar period, Hugh Trenchard, was instrumental in advocating this mission, thus 
preserving the RAF as an independent force.  The political situation in Britain made 
strategic bombing an easy sell.  Bombing fit nicely into Britain’s overall strategy of 
avoiding “continental commitment” while still maintaining the ability to apply military 
pressure.  Bur it was a house of cards.  In the struggle for organizational autonomy the 
RAF sought and promoted historical examples that supported the concept of strategic 
bombing while glossing over other evidence.539  Bombing strategy, and it promises, had 
eclipsed technology.  Bombers had trouble navigating to target, trouble hitting targets, 
inadequate capacity, and limited range.540  Furthermore, the RAF had advanced a 
strategy of knocking out vital economic centers, but had done little to analyze what and 
where these targets were.541  Finally, the widespread belief that bombers would and could 
get to their target in spite of air defenses limited the development of both the strategy and 
the technology necessary to achieve air superiority before starting a bombing campaign.  
This last misunderstanding persisted to the end of 1943 in spite of the widespread losses 
suffered by British Bomber Command and the U.S. 8th Air Force.  Contributing to the 
disintegration between technology and strategy was Britain’s inadequate investment in 
the aircraft industry during the interwar.542  The Chamberlain government had bought  
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into the strategy, but their funding restrictions prevented it from being realized.  Both 
sides of the civil-military equation are at fault.  The RAF had oversold the capability, and 
the government failed to ask the hard questions to accurately assess the reality. 
In America the same struggle for autonomy manifested itself, but in this case the 
army’s aerial contingent argued for strategic bombing as a way to achieve independence 
not to preserve it.543  Initially air power theory in the U.S. was balanced between the 
roles experienced in the First World War.  Billy Mitchell advocated a force consisting of 
fighters, bombers, and observation aircraft.544  Furthermore, American debates advanced 
by Mitchell and de Seversky, considered that bombing would be best accomplished after 
control of the air was established.545  The Air Corps thus experimented with protecting its 
bombers with long-range escorts throughout the 1920s and 1930s, but the technological 
limitations at the time seemed to prevent the development of an acceptable escort that had 
the range to accompany bombers yet possessed the maneuverability to thwart enemy 
fighters.546  Over time the seemingly irresistible idea that the enemy could be bombed 
into submission rather than fought took hold of the Air Corps’ imagination.  The 
transformation to a bomber oriented force was completed when the difficulties inherent in 
dealing with enemy interceptors was “solved” by the doctrinal development of flying in 
dense formations of defensively armored bombers.  The assumption underpinning this 
doctrinal solution was that bombers could defend themselves—reality would be slow to 
change this assumption.547  America however, unlike Britain, complemented its strategic 
formulations with technological advances.  The expanse of America fueled advancements 
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made advances in all areas of aircraft performance and navigation during the interwar 
period, and established a manufacturing base that could turn its attention toward 
production of military aircraft when the situation demanded it.548   
Germany’s view of air power remained more holistic then either the United States 
or Britain.  Geographically, Germany’s position as a contiguous land mass may have 
limited their thinking of air power as a new strategic frontier; instead they saw air power 
in terms of its ability to operationally extend combat power in conjunction with the 
conventional land and sea forces.549  Although Seeckt supported and commissioned a 
thorough investigation of the uses of air forces in the First World War, other conditions in 
interwar Germany limited overall the development of strategic bombing.  Significantly, 
Germany was prevented from having an air force or even a civil airline industry by the 
Treaty of Versailles; by 1932 the German aircraft industry would be constituted by a 
meager 4,000 workers and was almost devoid of research and development 
capabilities.550  The lack of available airplanes also directly impacted the ability of the 
German military to conceive of a broader strategic role an air force could potentially 
play.  When Hitler came into power in 1933 he immediately began growing the entire 
military.  The Luftwaffe under Herman Göring began its expansion, but strategic 
bombing never emerged as a separate from the overarching doctrine of supporting land 
operations.  The long-term impact of the limitations on the Germans’ air industry also 
continued to impact their development of a long range four engine bomber, prototypes 
were developed but a solution to the power plant problems were never fully overcome.551  
In contrast Germany held an early advantage in supporting navigation and targeting 
technology, but this lead would eventually be overcome during the war.552  Finally 
German air forces gained experience in modern aerial combat during the Spanish Civil 
War from 1936 to 1939.  Britain and the United States went to war with some unrealistic 
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expectations regarding the implementation of a techno-strategic concept of strategic 
bombing, and a neglected doctrine of CAS.  While the German Condor Legion had made 
great strides in solving some of the problems between air-to-ground integration, and also 
through its experience with some of the operational difficulties in navigation and 
targeting a realistic conception of the efficacy of bombing.553   
Bombing at the start of the war was techno-strategically disintegrated; the strategy 
was unsupportable by the technology.  However, integration improved during the war.  
Churchill, an active supporter of air power during the interwar, almost immediately 
committed the RAF in a bombing campaign against Germany upon his appointment as 
Prime Minister.  Given the British defeat in Norway, the German onslaught in France, 
and the poor state of the British Army as a result of the interwar strategy of avoiding 
continental conflict, there was little else Churchill could do.  Bombing represented the 
only offensive option; it was an option based not on real capability but rather on 
exaggeration.  The initial attacks in May of 1940 quickly showed how hollow the concept 
was.  Early daytime losses necessitated night-time attacks, which magnified all of the 
problems in navigation and accuracy.  The techno-strategic choices made during the 
interwar period limited the flexibility of Britain’s response.  The Germans, however, did 
not develop a true strategic bombing force.  Rather their concept of airpower was more 
integrated in support of its army.  The bomber that proved so effective in a CAS role was 
a single engine dive bomber the JU 87.  Dive bombing greatly increased accuracy, but 
when dive bombing became a specification for a four engine variant the problems proved 
insurmountable and prevented alternative concepts.554  The Germans did have capable 
medium bombers, and their doctrine called for the employment of escort fighters.  
However, here again the German air armada showed limitations inherent by its being 
designed for an operational support role.  The medium bombers did not have the capacity 
or range of a heavy “strategic” bomber, and the escort fighters suffered seriously from 
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fuel constraints—the Messerschmitt 109’s range was 125 miles.555  Numerically 
however, Germany had the advantage and the Germans had also made progress in solving 
some of the difficulties in navigation and target identification through the use of radio 
beacons, and Lorenz beams.556   
The British countered with superior intelligence, and information management.  
These advantages and the absolutely heroic performance of the RAF’ Fighter Command 
would prove to be decisive in the Battle of Britain.  British decryption efforts were 
successful in May 1940 of cracking another Enigma cypher.557  The intercepts would 
play a role in revealing how the Germans were using radio navigation and targeting aids, 
which were subsequently jammed or manipulated to provide false information to the 
German aircrews.558  Britain furthermore, had not neglected its defense.  Revolutionary 
radar technology was deployed across the coast line in a series of 21 long range stations 
and 30 low level stations known as Chain Home and Chain Home Low respectively.559  
The radar network was connected by telephone line to Fighter Command, which also 
received additional information regarding enemy positions from the civilian Observer 
Corps.560  The Observer Corps proved to be the key element in the Battle of Britain.  The 
information from all sources was plotted and disseminated by Fighter Command, and 
enabled them to issue warnings and scramble fighter intercepts in a timely fashion.  
Through the superior intelligence and information management made possible by 
British’s techno-strategic integration of radar into a system of anti-aircraft defense the 
numeric discrepancy in the Battle of Britain may have been overcome.   
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Interestingly, Churchill and Britain in general did not evaluate their own 
experience on the receiving end of a bombing campaign.  Bombing had not seriously 
impacted production, and may have actually increased British commitment.561  The 
analysis had been done on Bomber Command’s effectiveness however.  The results were 
staggering in their indication that bombers simply could not hit targets—in good 
condition one bomber in three could get to within five miles in poor conditions that result 
fell to one in 15.562  Yet Churchill, still unable to open a second front in Europe in 1942, 
had offered a renewed bombing campaign against Germany as conciliation to Stalin when 
pressed to relieve the pressure the Soviet Union was facing from a renewed German 
onslaught.563  Stalin had no choice but to accept.  The Americans had also, joined the 
fray.  Roosevelt in contrast to his position during the interwar proved just as enamored as 
Churchill of the power of the strategic bomber, and had ordered the production of 500 
bombers a month in May of 1941.564  German air defenses also incorporated radar, 
intercept fighters, and the formidable 88—an air-defense artillery piece that duly served 
as an anti-tank gun—by 1941 British losses were reaching replacement thresholds.565  In 
1942 Arthur Harris assumed command of the British bombing campaign, and he would 
preside over the command as it transitioned to an area bombing offensive directly 
targeting the civil population’s morale.566  When faced with the operational reality that 
the bombers could not hit their intended targets, the Churchill government based on 
recommendations form Lord Trenchard adjusted the strategy to target what they could 
hit.  Broadly this included the entire industrial infrastructure to include workers 
housing.567  Moral questions aside, it was a strategic shift, and soon technology would 
emerge that complimented it.  The four-engine Lancaster with its greatly improved  
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capacity, and “Gee,” a radio navigation and targeting system, both became increasingly 
available.568  The American 8th Air Force would launch its first attacks in August of the 
same year.   
The Americans were committed to precision daylight bombing; a technique that 
they thought would be possible with their Norden bomb-sight.  As the number of raids 
increased the amount of men and material Germany committed to air-defense increased.  
In 1943, when Churchill and Roosevelt prioritized the bombing mission, the inevitable 
culmination had begun.  The Germans were able to defeat Gee, and German fighters were 
increasingly equipped with radar to assist finding their targets at night.  The British 
responded with two new navigational and targeting aids Oboe and H2S.  H2S was 
superior because it eliminated the necessity for ground control stations and soon 
pathfinder aircraft equipped with H2S would illuminate the target area for the follow on 
bombing.  The final development in the back-and-forth radar fight was the development 
of chaff code, named “Window.”  Chaff—strips of metal flung from a flying plane—
would blinded German radar by presenting overwhelming amounts of false information.  
The American practice of flying in dense self-protective formations was increasingly 
exposed as faulty.  In one raid launched against the Schweinfurt ball-bearing factory in 
August of 1943 the Americans lost 36 out of 229 bombers.569  However, the advances in 
radar targeting and radar jamming were paying off by the late summer of 1943.  In July, 
Hamburg would be bombed relentlessly with a mixture of high-explosive and 
incendiaries, the result was a fire maelstrom that killed 30,000 and left one million 
homeless, and it was not the last.570  The final obstacle to techno-strategic integration—a 
suitable long range escort fighter—was addressed by introduction of the P-51 Mustang in 
March of 1944.571  Capable of escorting bombers all the way to Berlin and back, the P-51 
made possible a wholesale bombing onslaught by January 1945 Albert Speer informed 
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Hitler that “The war is over in the area of heavy industry and armaments.”572  However, 
by this point in 1945 Germany had really already lost the war due to losses on the ground 
and at sea.  Strategic bombings path to integration cost 600,000 German civilian dead and 
800,000 wounded.573  Later in the year, and in another theater, strategic bombing would 
take on a whole new dimension in its ability to impact the enemy’s morale—the United 
States was nearing completion of the Atomic Bomb.   
2. Atomic Bombs 
Although much of the science underpinning the atomic bomb preceded WWII it is 
convenient, to start the timeline of the Manhattan Project in the summer of 1939.  During 
the summer of 1939 Léo Szilárd and Eugene Wigner approached Albert Einstein—the 
latter’s recommendation was considered essential if the project were to be taken 
seriously—and drafted a letter to President Roosevelt outlining the potential of nuclear 
physics to deliver a devastating new weapon.574  The seed that would become the 
Manhattan Project had been planted.  Meanwhile the war in Europe continued, with 
America anxiously watching from a position of relative safety.  Interestingly Roosevelt 
approved the atomic program in October 1941—two months before the fateful bombing 
at Pearl Harbor.  Shortly thereafter, at universities across the countryside, America’s 
leading physicists began meeting to make a determination regarding how to precede both 
theoretically and operationally.  Given that the enrichment of Uranium and production of 
Plutonium—critical components of a bomb—was cutting edge physics, and that literally 
the best minds from across the country were working on the problems it is not surprising 
that a consensus was not fully reached.  However, there was agreement that the creation 
of an atomic bomb was possible.  Furthermore, since the scientists felt as though they 
were racing against Germany; and, that therefore, there was no time to try one strategy at 
a time the scientist eventually recommended five different methods for uranium 
enrichment and plutonium production be pursued simultaneously.   
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These recommendations were accepted and in June of 1942 Roosevelt approved 
the budget and basic course of action put forward to develop a nuclear bomb.575 In the 
fall of 1942 Colonel Leslie Groves was selected to lead the Manhattan Engineering 
District, soon to be known simply as the Manhattan Project.  Groves an engineer by trade 
had recently completed the construction of the pentagon, and been promoted to brigadier 
general.  Groves would be characterized by his biographer Robert S. Norris as 
“indispensable”: 
Without Groves’s vision, drive, and administrative ability, it is highly 
unlikely that the atomic bomb would have been completed when it was.  
The Manhattan Project did not just happen.  It was put together and run in 
a certain way: Groves’s way.  He is a classic case of an individual making 
a difference. 576   
Groves, perhaps understanding both the scientific need for collaboration and the military 
need for secrecy directed that an offsite facility be procured for the scientist.  After some 
initial scouting, Dr. Robert Oppenheimer suggested the boy’s school known as Los 
Alamos.  The site was accepted in November 1942.577  Even at this early stage 
Oppenheimer’s influence on Groves and the project in general is apparent.  This 
influence would be critical over the next year as Oppenheimer essentially went on a 
recruiting tour throughout the country’s top physics departments to staff the compound of 
Los Alamos with talent.  The free exchange of ideas, which was critical to the scientist 
and considered dangerous by Groves was eventually accomplished by the removal of the 
scientist to an offsite location in the middle of the desert.  This was perhaps Groves’s 
boldest and best move.  At the facility itself the scientist organized themselves 
functionally by discipline, a style that was comfortable to them as many had been 
recruited out of university departments.578  Also, due to the offsite location the 
administrative and logistical support was supplied by the military.   
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Furthermore, there was international collaboration among some of the allies 
specifically England and Canada.  Edward Condon, who had been selected by 
Oppenheimer to be the associate director at Los Alamos stated that the mission “is to 
produce a practical military weapon in the form of a bomb in which the energy is 
released by a fast neutron chain reaction in one or more of the materials known to show 
nuclear fission.”579  Inherent in the mission is the specification of two outputs: fissionable 
material, and a vessel capable of containing the material and initiating the chain reaction.  
Both outputs were on the cutting edge of theoretical physics and engineering, but at least 
there was general agreement about what had to be done.  The method to produce 
fissionable material either in the form of weapons grade uranium, or plutonium had been 
reasonably solved.  However, since the requirements for a bomb were different than what 
was needed in a laboratory specifically in terms of quality and quantity there was still 
some uncertainty exactly how to proceed.  Given that “the unit of measurement for 
wasted hours was…[friendly] lives,” Groves and the scientists decided to industrialize the 
manufacturing process of fissionable material using all known techniques simultaneously 
a move only possible by the high level of support the project had both politically and 
financially.580   
Over the next two years two problems were tackled.  First the project needed to 
refine the process of uranium enrichment and plutonium production; secondly, the final 
design of the bomb had to be worked out.  Both problems were solved simultaneously 
and culminated in the Trinity test on 16 July 1945.  Following the successful test bomb 
production began.  Two bombs were readied for delivery on Japan in August of 1945 
resulting in the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  Soon thereafter, the Japanese 
surrendered.  “Before the end of the war, approximately 600,000 people had worked on 
the project, which at its peak employed more than 160,000.”581  Although the Manhattan 
Project is primarily remembered as a feat of science and military collaboration, the Los 
Alamos site only accounts for 10,000 of the total number involved in the project, and that 
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number, accounts for all the people at Los Alamos to include wives and children.582  
Where was everyone else?  The majority were involved in construction.  Sites across the 
country had to be constructed before any manufacturing work could be accomplished.  
However, it was the theoretical work at Los Alamos that was absolutely cutting edge.  
The Manhattan Project represented a nearly perfect union of civil-military effort.  The 
full weight on America’s industrial prowess, material wealth, and most importantly 
scientific talent was brought to bear for the purpose of developing an atomic weapon.   
The German atomic project in contrast was ultimately unable to produce.  The 
German scientists were making parallel discoveries throughout the war, but in the end it 
was the allied effort that yielded a bomb.  Germany had a commanding lead in the field 
of physics.  Otto Hahn whose original work in uranium fission in 1939 was the 
foundation for nuclear weapons projects in both countries was German.583  Indeed, the 
German scientists from the Nazi atomic bomb project were in captivity when the U.S. 
employed the first atomic bombs in Japan—having failed in their own attempt they were 
unwilling to concede that other scientist had solved the problems.584  German scientist 
had made good progress, up until 1942 their advancements were roughly parallel with the 
allies, however, the German effort never achieved the level of governmental support that 
the Manhattan project had.585  The German project in contrast to the Americans suffered 
from the lack of scientific direction and management.  The military ceased work on the 
project in 1942, and the scientist were brought under control of the Education 
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physicist, were more content theorizing rather than operationalizing the science through 
industrial and engineering advancements.587  Without a Groves figure the scientists were 
not pushed by the Nazi government towards production.  
German scientists were also at work in the cutting edge science of rocketry.  This 
field, unlike the atomic project, had the full support the German government.  By 1932 
the German Army had a secret rocket laboratory and a young pioneer in the field, 
Wernher Freiherr Von Braun, was working toward the first generation of German 
military rockets.588  This program would grow, and would be the foundation of the huge 
growth in missiles during the Cold War.  During the Second World War German made 
revolutionary progress toward the creation of a working missile.  The A4, later the V2, 
would be ready by June 1942, but would still be suffering from some problems in its 
guidance system.589  As the war continued the pressure from Hitler to devise new 
Wonderwaffe for retaliatory purposes increased.  In 1943 the Luftwaffe had developed 
what would become the V1, a similar device to the A4, but with a jet based propulsion 
system—the V1 would become the basis for cruise missiles following the war.590  The 
innovation that was taking place during war was extraordinary, but was it effort well 
spent?  Hitler increasingly looked to technology as a means to winning the war, but the 
V1 and V2 were still too revolutionary to be integrated decisively into a war winning 
strategy.  The time, money and effort spent on these projects could have been more 
effectively used to produce more of the technology being consumed in the everyday 
fighting.  Richard Overy for example points out that for the costs of the V-Weapons 
program an additional 24,000 planes could have been produced, and there is little doubt 
that the planes would have had a large impact than the rockets.591 
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Figure 7.   Figure showing the U.S. and British integration of strategic bombing (Points 
1–4), The Atomic Bomb (Point 5) and the German Wonderwaffe (Point 6) 
Point 1 shows the perceived position of strategic bombing during the interwar.  
Airpower advocates claimed more for the strategy than was warranted because it 
promoted organizational autonomy.  The technology was shown to be disintegrated from 
the strategy during its initial employment by Britain forcing night time attacks which 
increased the problems of navigation and targeting as shown in point 2.  With support 
from civilian leaders the strategy is transformed.  Bombers unable to hit precision targets 
are refocused on area targets, which were broadly enemy urban areas.  While this made 
the strategy more destructive it did not make it more effective resulting in further 
disintegration as shown in point 3.  Point 4 represent the development and use of radar 
navigation and countermeasure, and escort fighters both of which further enhanced the 
evolution of the strategy but did not make inroads to effective integration.  Nuclear 
weapons, a separate development from air power, are represented at point 5.  Point 6 
represents the German V-Program.  The technology was very revolutionary, but it was 
unable to be integrated because it had not achieved a sufficient level of viability.  The 
continued emphasis on the programs siphoned money, material, and labor away from 




The First World War presented difficult techno-strategic questions.  The scale of 
the conflict ensured wide exposure to new technologies, but nations faced difficulties 
determining what strategy would maximize the new technological capabilities most 
effectively.  The interwar period was one of financial constraint and deliberate 
moderation.  The victors of WWI were particularly prone to war weariness, and 
attempted to control the interwar arms race through diplomacy.  The naval armament 
conferences were partially successful, were limited successes.  By the 1930s as Hitler 
came to power and Japan started its expansion diplomacy was increasingly unsuccessful.  
Germany and Japan as “aggressor” nations had clearer strategic visions; they knew who 
they were going to fight.  The clarity of strategic vision drove their rearmament decisions 
and both countries enjoyed the early success that modernization conferred on their 
militaries.   
Navies in particular faced tough choices.  The high cost of ship building, and the 
long life span of a naval vessel exerted pressure on decision makers.  In the interwar 
period three broad forms presented themselves for consideration.  The battleship was 
familiar, but had not performed well in the most recent conflict.  The submarine was 
antithetical to the prevailing naval mores, but had shown itself usefulness as a commerce 
raider.  Finally, the aircraft carrier represented the unknown.  Maritime airpower was 
certainly useful for reconnaissance, but could planes really sink fleets of battleships?  No 
country fully anticipated the naval combat of the Second World War.  Japan and the U.S. 
did the best in the adoption of aircraft carriers, Germany and the U.S. did the best in the 
adoption of submarines.  Battleships, the dominant preference exhibited by all 
competitors during the interwar period, fared poorly across the board during the war.  The 
continued organizational preference for battleships during the interwar period was partly 
due to the entrenchment of Mahan’s strategy for control of the sea.  The failure of navies 
broadly was in their lack of recognition that control of the sea was no longer 
technologically conjoined with battleships.  The end had not changed but the means had.  
The navies of the U.S., Japan, Germany, and Britain differed not in their fundamental—
and ultimately flawed—organizational preferences, but rather in how well they tolerated 
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organizational diversity.  It was the diversity of U.S. naval thinking tolerated during the 
interwar and empowered by visionary leaders that created options when the techno-
strategic disintegration of battleships was reveled at Pearl Harbor.  Japan and Germany 
also showed some techno-strategic flexibility, but the Japanese battleship centric plan for 
Midway and the slow German build-up to Dönitz’s 300 submarines created allied 
opportunities. 
On land Britain and France were at a particular disadvantage due to their 
proximity to Germany.  France had misread the techno-strategic situation following the 
First World War and had developed a defensive doctrine based on the methodical 
application of artillery fires from an impregnable defensive position.  The German push 
through the Ardennes exposed the weakness, but by then France was occupied and could 
not reformulate its techno-strategy based on wartime experience.  Britain’s army was not 
in a position to contest Germany in a land engagement based on the interwar strategy of 
avoiding continental commitment.  Germany’s army had studied the last war in depth, 
and had made the necessary adjustments to their fighting doctrine to maximize their 
operational capabilities, but in the larger strategic arena Germany had failed.  The 
mechanized Panzer forces were formidable, but they represented a fraction of the force—
by 1944 the United States would produce 600,000 trucks to the German 88,000.592  When 
the German army was unable to cross the channel, and later denied rapid victory in the 
Soviet Union the limited nature of their motorization became apparent.  Both the United 
States and Soviet Union had failed to keep pace with the Germans interwar doctrinal 
developments.  However, both would benefit from late modernization and eventually 
field mechanized forces that would dwarf the Germans.  During the interwar period the 
Germans advanced the nascent combined arms doctrine of the First World War better 
than anyone, but strategically they blundered by dispersing their efforts over two fronts.  
The German synchronization of mechanized ground and air forces operating within a 
decentralized concept of operations based on maneuver and offensive was advanced.  
However, it was limited strategically.  As mentioned the mechanized component was 
small, the logistical apparatuses remained largely horse driven, and the air component, 
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which was thoroughly integrated into a ground support role lacked the range and capacity 
of a true strategic bombing force.  Germany’s operational integration was imitable.  
When the Germans flawed strategy found them competing on multiple fronts they were 
not able to produce to the degree they needed to avert their impending encirclement.   
Strategic air power, as advocated by strategic bombing advocates and separate 
from the more holistically integrated air doctrine of the Germans, was developed by the 
U.S. and Britain.  The promises of the strategy had outstripped the capabilities of 
technology.  In Britain, whose army was unprepared, the discrepancy between theory and 
capability presented a real vulnerability.  However, Britain’s belief in the capability may 
have also led them to best prepare against the threat.  Ironically Britain’s successful 
defense during the Battle of Britain, and the inability of the Blitz to destroy either their 
production or their will to fight did not affect their continued adherence to strategic 
bombing.  Britain’s forays into bombing quickly reveled the disintegration if the techno-
strategy of bombing.  The targets that would deliver the knockout blow were not readily 
identified, the planes had difficulty navigating to target, and once at a target their 
accuracy was deplorable.  Furthermore, the vulnerabilities to unescorted bombers were 
quickly reveled forcing them to fly at night, which compounded all of the problems in 
navigation and accuracy.  The continued support from the Churchill government in light 
of these problems helps explain how strategic bombing survived in spite of its early 
techno-strategic disintegration.  The Americans joined the British in a combined bombing 
campaign.  American efforts quickly revealed their own problems of integration, 
specifically, the doctrinal flaw of flying unescorted—tight formations and bristling 
machine guns were not enough to staunch a fighter onslaught.  Over time, strides were 
made in radar that facilitated bombing, but the real process of integration was less a 
matter of science and more a matter of morality.  Faced with the growing indication that 
bombers could not precisely target the economic and industrial centers well enough to 
deliver the knockout blow, the definition of what constituted an economic or industrial 
center was expanded.  “Economic center” became a euphemism for targeting civilian 
populations.  Moreover, the bombing campaign in Germany would not have worked in 
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the absence of a corresponding successful ground campaign.593 It is also questionable 
whether the moral balance will ever shift to the point where an unmitigated attack on 
civilians would still be tolerable.  Atomic bombs were also a direct result of a nearly 
complete overlap of civil-military function.  Without the government’s complete support 
of the Manhattan Project may have been prompted by the fear that Germany was 
developing a similar weapon.  German scientist were unable to garner the high level of 
government support that the atomic project needed to enrich uranium, and was oriented 
by the personality of its scientists toward theoretical rather than practical results.  In the 
revolutionary field of rockets Germany had a commanding lead, but failed to recognize 
that the V-weapons did not yet represent a viable technological solution. 
The integration of information and intelligence enabled by radar and other 
informational technologies profoundly contributed to the success of the allies.  Radar was 
an enabling technology that pushed the integration of other technology.  Submarines, 
airplanes, aircraft carriers, air defense artillery, all benefited from the informational 
advantage enabled by radar, and the decryption efforts of the various military intelligence 
agencies.   
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V. THE COLD WAR AND BEYOND  
The Second World War established the United States and the Soviet Union as 
superpowers.  These powers were opposed in their basic views on to social and political 
organization.  The stage was set for an enduring ideological struggle.  The Cold War, as it 
was eventually dubbed, would inform techno-strategic integration in the United States by 
creating demands for a military that was ready to fight the Soviet Union on the plains of 
Europe, but was also capable of fighting more limited engagements in various countries 
against communist expansion.  The balance of these requirements underwent a series of 
transformations that were informed more by techno-strategic preferences than techno-
strategic realities.  Indeed, the industrial age techno-strategic paradigm of the Second 
World War emphasizing an aircraft carrier-centric navy, strategic bombing (with or 
without nuclear bombs), and a large mechanized land army would prove extremely 
resilient to change.  Furthermore as indicated by Henry Kissinger “we added the atomic 
bomb to our arsenal without integrating its implications into our thinking.  Because we 
saw it merely as another tool in a concept of warfare which knew no goal, save total 
victory, and no mode of war except all-out war.”594  Techno-strategic integration in light 
of this assessment would prove to be a process of reconciliation between having the tools 
of total war, and enacting a strategy to fight limited wars.  This presented nearly two 
separate but interrelated paths of techno-strategic integration for the United States and 
eventually the other nuclear powers.   
On one hand you had to techno-strategically integrate to fight and win a nuclear 
war, on the other hand you had to prepare to fight and win wars less than nuclear.  Since 
the two seemed to be fundamentally different this represented a host of problems.  WWII 
had also changed the relationship between the military, science, and technology.595  The 
Manhattan Project was the start, but even in light of its transformation to full civilian 
control, under the auspices of the United States Atomic Energy Commission in 1947, the 
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relationship between science, technology, and the military continued to grow.  The 
United States dominance as the lone atomic power was soon challenged by the Soviet 
Union.  Further evolutionary development generated more powerful bombs through 
fusion over fission.  Nuclear weapons and their delivery would characterize much of the 
Cold War technological development.  However, as the implications became increasingly 
grim an uneasy but effective integration of sorts would occur as a doctrine of Mutually 
Assured Destruction (MAD).  The advances in the technology designed to support the 
impending showdown between the United States and the Soviet Union would also 
contribute to weapons development in general.  Revolutionary rocket technology 
emerging from the Nazi V2 program would diffuse and missiles would become the 
foundational projectile technology of modern war.  Computer technology and its impact 
on societies relationship with information represents another area of rapid growth that 
occurred during this time.  Information has always been advantageous; however, 
following the Second World War technology would rapidly develop to provide 
increasingly more specific and accurate information.  As the Cold War continued 
information gathering systems would improve.  Additionally, the “space race” would 
create new devices to gather information—satellites.  Computers became more and more 
sophisticated and were eventually interconnected yielding new capabilities for 
communication and data transference that would serve again to increase information 
gathering and transference.  “Smart” munitions also became technologically viable, 
increasing accuracy well beyond WWII levels.  The transformation following the Second 
World War has been characterized by Martin van Creveld as the invention of invention; 
certainly the sheer amount of new and constantly improving technology leads credence to 
his assessment.596    
Throughout the entire period there would be increasing strains on the emergent 
paradigm of the Second World War.  Soon after the Second World evidence presented in 
the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey War indicated that the effects attributed to strategic 
bombing were not based empirically.597 Enemy resiliency in Korea and Vietnam would 
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show the hollowness of strategic bombing, although, in both wars military professionals 
chalked up its failures to the quantitative restrictions imposed by politicians rather than 
investigate whether it was the concept that was flawed.  Ship-on-ship naval engagements 
in the Korean and Vietnam War were also limited enough to not raise serious questions 
about the ascendency of aircraft carriers to the top of the naval hierarchy.  However, the 
vulnerability of surface ships to aircraft was confirmed again in the Falklands leaving 
questions as to whether aircraft carriers truly represent the best techno-strategic choice 
for a capital ship since, as a surface ship, they are imminently vulnerable.  Submarines 
represented the alternative choice—a choice the Soviets made.  Land engagements also 
challenged the Second World War paradigm.  In Korea and Vietnam, advanced 
technology was not sufficient to win decisive victories.  The Arab-Israeli conflict, a 
prolonged struggle punctuated by periods of escalated violence between Israel and its 
surrounding Arab neighbors, provides a further perspective to the changing nature in 
ground combat.  During the Six Day War (June 5–10, 1967) Israel’s preemptive attack on 
Egyptian air power and a heavily armored attack into its Egypt’s countryside won a quick 
victory.  However, during the Yom Kippur War (October 6–25, 1973) the same heavily 
armored techno-strategy was made vulnerable by the Egyptians employment of dispersed 
teams armed with shoulder fired anti-tank missiles.  Israel’s victory in this go around was 
less clear.  Similarly in the First Gulf War America and it coalition allies dominated the 
Iraqi armed forces during a protracted air campaign and short ground war.  However, the 
sheer number of men and materials that were required seems to beg the question of 
whether we could have achieved the same results with less.   
A. IN THE SHADOW OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR: KOREA AND 
VIETNAM 
Shortly after the surrender of Japan, Truman announced the first round of post-
WWII military reductions.  The Army demobilized nearly 7,000,000 troops from 
September 1945 to July 1947.598  Of the remaining 1,070,000, 400,000 were slated to 
stand-up the Air Force, which became a separate service in September 1947.599  As in 
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Britain during the interwar period, the creation of a separate air component generated 
inter-service rivalry between the forces and created pressure for the younger service to 
define its mission in a way that preserved its autonomy.  Also, resulting ambiguity over 
Soviet expansionism in the aftermath of WWII, the U.S. developed a strategy of 
containment.  Containment would start to find its voice in the Truman Doctrine in March 
1947.600  Atomic weapons were central to the U.S. policy of containment, which, in 
general, sought to deter Soviet expansionism through a powerful (atomically capable) 
military force while at the same time avoiding the use of that force in actual war.601   
The U.S. believed that in maintaining an arsenal of atomic weapons it had found 
the means to support the ends of containing Soviet expansion.  It became apparent to 
senior military leaders was that if they wanted a portion of the limited resources going 
into defense, then they would need to tie their services’ capabilities to the employment of 
nuclear weapons.  Inter-service rivalry for primacy in the atomic age was particularly 
bitter between the newly independent Air Force and the Navy.  Both services began to 
couch their existing organizational preferences—bigger carriers or better bombers—in 
atomic terms.602  The Navy argued that larger carriers would support carrier-based 
aircraft that could deliver the bomb.  That assessment was countered in 1948 when the 
Air Force fielded the B-36, an inter-continental bomber with a range of 4,000 miles.603  
However, questions about the B-36’s survivability were soon raised when the Russians 
fielded the MIG-15 in 1949.604  These back-and-forth exchanges were a product of an 
environment limited in financial resources.  Both services felt compelled to make 
arguments on behalf of their organization that represented their core organizational 
preferences to get a share of the budget.   
Inter-service rivalry reached its apex in April 1949 when the Navy’s super-carrier 
was canceled, leading a group of high-ranking naval officers to openly attack the 
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distribution of resources in what would become known as the “revolt of the admirals.”605  
Among the charges leveled was the criticism that the Air Force was pursuing one strategy 
for airpower while ignoring the other roles that airpower could play, such as, close air 
support.  Specifically, the Navy indicted the Air Force for pursuing a concept of 
operations centered on what the Navy alleged, was a flawed strategy of atomic bombs 
and the bombers that carried them.606  The admirals also alleged that the tactical 
employment of air power had been more important to the WWII victory then the strategic 
bombing campaign.   
Notably however, this was really an indictment against the entire military’s 
nuclear-centric techno-strategy at the time.  Furthermore, when the Soviets developed 
their own nuclear capability in September 1949 the U.S. strategy of annihilation was no 
longer a one way proposition.607  The State Department headed by Dean Acheson, who 
perhaps recognized the implications of the current preferences at work in the military, 
called for a review of military and foreign policy.608  President Truman got involved and 
called upon the Secretaries of State and Defense to relook U.S. strategy in light of the 
evidence that the Soviets had atomic capability.609  The result of the inquiry was the 
issuance, in April 1950, of the National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68), which laid 
the groundwork for American Policy during the Cold War.  Key in this document was the 
recognition that defense spending and equipment procurement had been too narrowly 
focused in the atomic arena.610  In other words, the U.S. was unprepared to fight anything 
less than an atomic war. 
The tragedy of the Korean War shows some of the failure of integrating the 
Atomic Bomb into national strategy.  The techno-strategic disintegration of atomic 
weapons had resulted in dissonance between the objectives of the Korean War and the 
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means with which to achieve them; a disintegration that played out dramatically during 
the war as a contest between Truman and MacArthur.  The atomic bomb represented 
revolutionary technology, and allowed for an unprecedented pursuit of a strategy of 
annihilation.611  However, their revolutionary character presented integration challenges 
to a nation desiring to reduce military forces and expenditures following WWII.  
Furthermore, as the Korean War represented America’s first foray into armed conflict 
post-WWII, and, perhaps more importantly, in the post-nuclear era of limited wars, 
achieving techno-strategic integration was largely a product of trial and error.  United 
States policy and conduct in Korea represented a difficult education in the politics of the 
Cold War; one that would be paid in blood to the tune of roughly 40,000 dead and 
100,000 wounded.  General Maxwell Taylor as the commander of the Eighth Army 
would note in a letter to General Ridgway after the armistice that “An outstanding 
impression from the operations in Korea has been the ineffectiveness or inapplicability of 
many of our modern weapons to the requirements of the Korean type of limited war.”612 
Part of the disintegration of techno-strategy in Korea lay in the assumptions made 
about the reasons for, and the end game of, the communist foray into East Asia.  Were the 
Soviets, as conceived by the Truman administration, looking to distract the Americans by 
opening a front in Korea to gain an advantage in the “real” battleground of Europe?613  
Or, was the incursion into Korea, as MacArthur believed, a test of American fortitude to 
contain and prevent the spread of communism, and, as such, required an overwhelming 
response?614  Depending on how one characterized this conflict determined how one 
developed one’s ends.  Truman generally came to represent the first position and 
MacArthur the latter.  Meanwhile, to the military men engaged in the conduct of the 
brutally cold and bloody campaigns that characterized this “undeclared” war, it was 
business as usual—depravation, fear, and death.   
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One of the crucial factors for the Truman administration in determining the 
American response was the relationship between Russia and China.  The crux of the 
question was the degree to which they were willing to militarily support one another.  
Given that the United States had recently entered into NATO, and that the Sino-Soviet 
treaty followed roughly a year later it is reasonable to conclude that Korea may have been 
conceived as a testing ground for the implications of these treaties.  Furthermore, in light 
of these treaties, it was reasonable and prudent of the Truman administration to be 
cautious.  In contrast to Truman’s policy of keeping the Soviets out, MacArthur was 
focused on decisively winning the war.  The restraint that MacArthur was being asked to 
show fundamentally conflicted with his conception of how to win.615  Specifically, 
MacArthur wanted to employ airpower against troop staging areas in Manchuria, he 
wanted to blockade the coast of China, and he wanted to employ Chinese Nationalist 
troops in Korea and South China.616  Rather than simply “resisting aggression,” 
MacArthur wanted to “destroy the potentialities of the aggressor to continually hit 
you.”617  However, the ways listed above seem in contrast to the stated ends.  MacArthur, 
in his Senate hearing, echoed the themes of the Truman administration for a liberated and 
unified Korea.618  But the discordance between the ends expressed by Macarthur and the 
ways with which he proposed to accomplish them must be viewed critically given that 
during his Senate hearing he had recently been recalled from Korea.  Clearly, MacArthur 
wanted to expand the war; all three of his measures would have increased the pressure on 
China.  Furthermore, the idea of using Chinese Nationalist troops could have certainly 
been seen as an effort to incite a revolution in China, something that would have 
increased the likelihood of a Soviet response.  A Soviet response was exactly what the 
Truman administration wanted to avoid, and, therefore, the measures espoused by 
MacArthur directly contrasted with the administration’s policy.  This increasingly 
became obvious to Truman and ultimately the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  
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Truman, faced with the ramifications of his doctrine, which ultimately implied 
assistance to populations under threat of totalitarian oppression, found himself on the 
leading edge of history.619  Truman was faced with determining exactly how far he 
wanted to extend his doctrine.  Initially the goal of the campaign was to stop North 
Korean aggression and restore the border at the 38th parallel.  This became the UN’s 
policy as evidenced by resolutions on 25 and 27 June 1950.620  The Truman 
administration was pursuing a limited war for a limited objective.  Furthermore, given the 
situation in Korea at the time—U.S. and coalition forces on the ropes at Pusan—this 
objective surely must have seemed like a major undertaking.  However, as the coalition 
forces were successful, and specifically following MacArthur’s brilliant landing at 
Inchon, the aims were broadened.  The strategy was expanded first to include operations 
north of the 38th parallel and later to create a unified Korea with a free government.621  
Truman was talking about containment, but his actions were indicative of expansion.   
Ultimately, Truman and MacArthur differed in the willingness to pursue total 
war.622  For both figures total war may have implied the use of nuclear bombs.  The 
American army had been designed around the presumption that nuclear weapons would 
be utilized and therefore manning cuts and equipment neglect predisposed undue 
suffering in the early phases of the campaign.  However, after pushing out of the Pusan 
perimeter and brilliantly landing at Inchon, the tide of war had turned.  MacArthur 
smelled blood in the water.  He ignored the growing evidence that the Chinese were 
entering the war and ultimately failed to conceive what the ramifications of Chinese 
intervention would be.  When the Chinese did eventually infiltrate across the Yalu, and 
capitalized on the easy target the American army presented, MacArthur was ready to 
proceed to total war with its nuclear implications.   
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Truman, perhaps more presciently, and faced with the responsibility of the 
decision and with the knowledge that the Soviet’s nuclear program would eventually rival 
the United States’, decided on a more moderate course.623  Strategically this was the right 
decision.  The deterrent policy that would eventually characterize the cold war had been 
born.  At the time neither side knew how it would work, but the American restraint in 
Korea was the right first precedent to set. 
Following the entrance of the Chinese, MacArthur in his last flash of brilliance, 
magnificently fought a phased retreat, and then turned the tide once again with a 
counteroffensive that recaptured Seoul.624  However, by that time a new star was rising in 
the eyes of the administration—Lieutenant General (later General) Matthew Ridgway.625  
As the new commander of the Eighth Army, Ridgway was operationally responsible for 
the quick staunching of the Chinese thrust into Korea, and for getting the American army 
back on the offensive.  Ridgway was capable of producing results within the restrictions 
of the administration.626  With the new “old” policy of reestablishing the 38th parallel in 
mind, Truman selected Ridgway to replace MacArthur. 
With a new general in place in Tokyo, the end-game was afoot.  What followed 
was a complete bungling of negotiations.  Meanwhile, action on the ground continued 
through a series of offensives and counteroffensives resembling the First World War.627  
Operationally, America had the advantage; the Chinese had extended supply lines and 
were predominantly a light infantry force.  The United States in contrast was able to mass 
artillery and airpower.  However, “in spite of the overwhelming superiority of the United 
Nations in the air and on the sea, it was the infantry deployed along the rugged Korean 
hilltops which determined the issue of victory or defeat.”628  The Chinese and North 
Koreans successfully manipulated the peace talks to fortify their positions and to 
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consolidate and reorganize.  Having fettered away the advantages of strength, the war 
stagnated.  The election of Eisenhower and with it his promise to resume offensive 
action, and the death of Stalin was enough to break the stalemate.  With the guns 
silenced, an uneasy cease fire went into place, one that continues to this day.  
The Korean War illustrates the underlying tension of the dawning cold war.  The 
United States was grappling with its thrust into the center of world politics following its 
rise to power at the conclusion of WWII.  The Korean battlefields were the testing 
grounds of the United States post-nuclear techno-strategic integration.  Against the mass 
Asiatic armies, who were resistant to attrition, capable of making due with minimum 
logistical comforts, and employed field craft in the face of technology the American 
techno-strategic concept of operations was shown incapable of winning.  However, 
America’s first foray into the cold war integration of technology and strategy was not 
enough to expose the techno-strategic disintegration between preparing for nuclear war 
and then fighting in a limited war.  “The ultimate effect of the Korean experience, oddly 
enough, was not to weaken faith in atomic airpower but rather to strengthen it.”629 
Eisenhower’s administration would reformulate techno-strategy in his “new 
look.”  The central feature of this strategy was “massive retaliation,” a phrase coined by 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in January 1954.630  Earlier, in May of 1953, the 
NSC released a formulation of the central features of this strategy in NSC-162.631  The 
central feature of this document was the restatement of the commitment to the policy of 
containment; however, containment was now narrowly defined to the aerial delivery of 
atomic weapons.632  “[T]he New Look was little more than the old air power dogma set 
forth in Madison Avenue trappings and now formally buttressed upon Massive 
Retaliation as the central strategic concept.”633  Accordingly, all of the military services 
except the air force were cut.  The air force’s Strategic Air Command (SAC), whose 
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intercontinental bombing capability had been enhanced by the fielding of the B-52 
Bomber, grew while other elements of the organization such as troop transport were 
reduced.634  The lack of flexibility in a techno-strategy of “massive retaliation” was 
displayed by the American inability to assist the beleaguered French forces at Dien Bien 
Phu in the early months of 1954.635  Importantly, the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu 
did not need strategic bombing they needed close air support and logistical resupply.636  
The United States would not supply either, and it is questionable whether they could have 
had they wanted to so limiting was the techno-strategy of “massive retaliation.” 
“As a doctrine, ‘massive retaliation’ (or rather, the threat of it) was in decline 
almost from its enunciation in 1954.”637  “Massive Retaliation” was also further 
impugned by the Soviet’s successful imitation, in this case deliberately cultivated through 
the use of espionage, of the atomic bomb in 1953.  By 1955 the Soviets had developed a 
capable bombing force and were making significant progress in ballistic missile 
science.638  In 1957 the Soviets would demonstrate their lead in rocketry with the 
successful launch of Sputnik, leading to American fears expressed in the finding of the 
presidentially commissioned Gaither Committee of a missile gap.639  The fear that that 
the Soviets were bypassing the next generation of bombers in favor of a missile delivery 
system prompted American efforts to both develop its own missiles, its anti-missile 
missiles, and to harden SAC’s ability to survive an attack.640  However, Sputnik had 
another impact it prompted the formation of the Advanced Research Projects Agency in 
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February 1958.641  Eventually becoming the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA), the creation of an organization specifically committed to the 
development of technological innovation was a major milestone.  Since fully hardening 
against nuclear attack was unlikely, Oskar Morgenstern, a Princeton game theorist, 
argued for accelerating the development of the submarine launched Polaris missile 
because submarines would be harder for the enemy to target on an initial strike.642  Thus 
by the conclusion of the 1950s the groundwork for the development of the nuclear triad, 
and the theoretical foundation of mutual destruction was established.  
In light of Soviet advances the techno-strategy of massive retaliation was 
becoming a two-way proposition.  Furthermore, the doctrine was being increasingly 
questioned by concerned senior military officers.  The development of tactical nuclear 
weapons was espoused by their advocates, such as Henry Kissinger, as presenting options 
for limited nuclear engagements.  General Ridgway, upon his retirement in 1955, argued 
that tactical nuclear weapons would not solve the problems of superior Soviet and 
Chinese manpower and were more likely to just prompt a massive nuclear retaliatory 
response.643  Ridgway’s successor General Maxwell Taylor also voiced dissent upon 
retirement; advocating a shift away from massive retaliation to a new techno-strategy of 
flexible response.  “Flexible Response should contain at the outset an unqualified 
renunciation of reliance on the strategy of Massive Retaliation.  It should be made clear 
that the United States will prepare itself to respond anywhere, anytime, with weapons and 
forces appropriate to the situation.”644  Achieving flexible response necessitated 
“[i]mproved planning and training for limited war.”645   
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As the Kennedy administration took office in 1961 the techno-strategy of flexible 
response received political support.646  Soon after taking office, Kennedy endorsed the 
invasion of Cuba by a group of American trained and armed Cuban refugees.  The plan 
was not well worked out, and the refugees were quickly subdued by a superior Cuban 
military.  The U.S. was unwilling to escalate the conflict through overt participation and 
the majority of the invasion force was captured.  The failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion 
was sobering; it also significantly impacted civil-military relationships.  Although the 
plan was generated by the CIA, the Joint Chiefs had not provided sufficient oversight.647  
The Bay of Pigs mishandling, and the subsequent differences of opinion between the 
military and the administration over intervention in Laos, prompted Kennedy to replace 
all of the Joint Chiefs except for the Marine Corps.648  Furthermore, General Taylor, who 
had headed a committee on behalf of the president to investigate the Bay of Pigs, was 
brought out of retirement to assume the position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.649  
Kennedy was committed to a flexible response and his actions removed senior military 
leaders that were unable to transition to his new strategy.  The Cuban Missile crisis would 
further test Kennedy’s flexibility.  In this test Kennedy would rise to the challenge 
blending brinkmanship diplomacy, and limited military application to successfully avert 
the crisis.  Kennedy was also pushing the military to further expand its capabilities to 
wage unconventional wars.   
Techno-strategically, flexible response, at the broadest level, required three 
approaches to security: nuclear deterrence, fighting conventional wars short of nuclear 
engagement, and fighting unconventional wars.  The latter delineated from conventional 
wars by the increased presence of guerillas or insurgent factions.  While it easy to 
delineate a nuclear war the boundary between conventional and unconventional wars is 
not always clear, and many conflicts have included an admixture of both conventional 
forces and guerillas.  Eisenhower’s new look had set the techno-strategic architecture for 
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nuclear deterrence, based on mutually assured destruction, in place by narrowly defining 
U.S. strategy in terms of massive retaliation.650  However, in the other two areas 
preparedness was poor.  The U.S. Army, who had received very limited funding during 
the Eisenhower administration, in particular had recast its techno-strategy along 
organizational preferential lines emphasizing mechanization and offensive maneuver.  
The army’s notion of limited war was itself limited.  The object of war was unconditional 
surrender made possible by the defeat of the enemy’s field armies and means of 
production.651 Although Kennedy clearly saw war against guerrillas and insurgents as 
necessitating “a whole new kind of strategy, [and] a wholly different kind of force,” the 
opinion of senior army leaders was that a force equipped for conventional war would 
readily defeat an irregular force.652  The army would eventually test this techno-strategic 
assumption in Vietnam.  
American involvement in Vietnam had been going on since the establishment of 
the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in 1950.653  However, the effort was 
small, totaling just 342 individuals in 1954.654  As the French withdrew following Dein 
Bein Phu the American advisory effort increased.  Rather than working with the Army of 
the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) to develop the type of force needed to be successful 
fighting as counterinsurgents in the jungles, the U.S. Army advisory effort built the 
ARVN in its own image.  Accordingly it consisted of the techno-strategic preference for 
large scale maneuvers organized around heavy fire power and mobile armored forces.655  
Meanwhile, the insurgency continued to grow, by December of 1960 the insurgents were 
openly challenging the South Vietnamese government.  Kennedy was trying to 
implement a strategy that could continue to check communism by fighting a limited 
counterinsurgent war, but the army continued to resist the necessary techno-strategic 
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paradigm shift that would enable success.  Kennedy clearly identified the friction in civil-
military relations, and called a meeting with the army’s commanders in November 1961 
where he expressed his desire for the army to prepare itself more for 
counterinsurgency.656  However, the army may have been able to weather the criticism of 
its preparedness for counterinsurgency because of President Kennedy’s continuing 
support for Special Forces.   
Special Forces had existed formally since the stand-up of 10th Special Forces 
Group on 20 June 1952, and it could trace its lineage back to the Office of Strategic 
Services in WWII.657  Kennedy’s emphasis on counterinsurgency and guerrilla 
operations however, was critical to the amount of attention Special Forces received and 
he even recognized their distinctive headgear—the Green Beret.  Under Kennedy Special 
Forces grew and their role expanded.658  The army may have been content to slow roll 
the president’s larger exhortations for a counterinsurgent force because they could point 
to a subcomponent within the army that was specially tasked to perform that mission.659  
Meanwhile, the rest of the army could go on preparing to fight “real” wars.  Army 
doctrinal publications related to fighting a counterinsurgency, such as FM 31–21 U.S. 
Army Counterinsurgency Forces, were published through the Special Warfare Center and 
oriented toward Special Forces not the larger army.660  Training for counterinsurgency 
was also woefully lacking—an infantry lieutenant’s initial entry training devoted only 16 
percent of the available training time to counterinsurgency in 1965.661  Furthermore, even 
Special Forces failed to fully emphasize counterinsurgency over their organizationally 
preferred mission of unconventional warfare, which was designed to develop and employ 
guerillas in support of a larger conventional military campaign.662   
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Kennedy approved the MAAG’s counterinsurgency plan in January 1961, which 
under Lieutenant General McGarr represented a conventional approach stressing 
offensive action against the Viet Cong (VC).663  Shortly thereafter the request for more 
troops started coming—a trend that continued until after the Tet Offensive in 1968.  
Before committing to more troops, Kennedy sent General Taylor and Walt Rostow from 
the State Department to Vietnam to survey the conflict and provide their 
recommendations.664  Taylor supported increasing material assistance to the ARVN to 
enable their abilities to conduct search and destroy operations.  Taylor correctly identified 
that the communist insurgents were employing a style of warfare that employed a concept 
of operations that negated many of the U.S.’s conventional military advantages, 
nevertheless, his prescriptions for employment contained all of the major conventional 
features—firepower, mobility, and bombing.665   
Kennedy accepted Taylor’s recommendations in November 1962, that same 
month the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) was established, and placed 
under the command of Lieutenant General Paul Harkins.666  MACV was still focused on 
advising, however, the advising was in accordance with the favored techno-strategic 
paradigm of large offensive operations.  This emphasis may have exacerbated the 
insurgency in two ways.  First it was undoubtedly heavy handed, thereby generating 
resentment that could be used for VC recruiting efforts.  Second, it concentrated a large 
number of the militarized South away from their villages where they may have been able 
to insulate the population against the inroads of the insurgency.  Contrasting concepts of 
operations existed.  First, the Strategic Hamlet program, conceived in part by the British 
Advisory Mission under R.K.G. Thompson, advocated clearing areas of insurgents and 
then arming and training the local citizenry to prevent the VC from recapturing the  
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area.667  The concept is fundamental counterinsurgency, but it was undermanned as the 
ARVN forces necessary to secure the population were pulled to support large scale 
operations.668 
A second alternative concept the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) was 
orchestrated by the CIA and ran by U.S. Army Special Forces.  The CIDGs showed 
promise—the advisory effort when it was geared toward mentoring locals to defend 
themselves in their local area actually limited VC operations significantly.669  However, 
the control by the CIA eventually irked the army into taking over the program in July 
1963.  The CIDG corps of experienced counterinsurgent Special Forces advisors was 
soon re-tasked to conduct unconventional warfare tasks that were more complimentary to 
MACV’s strategy of offensive action.670   
The death of President Diem during a coup on November 1, 1963 strengthened 
the communist rhetoric—attacks would steadily increase through 1964 and 1965.671  
However, it was the assignation of President Kennedy 21 days later that may have had 
the bigger impact on the long term outcome of Vietnam.  Kennedy, perhaps due to 
reflection on the Bay of Pigs failure, was a forceful instrument of change in the military.  
Kennedy had a strategic vision for the military and he knew that it conflicted with the 
army’s accepted notion of how to fight; nevertheless, he drove them to change.  
Unfortunately, Kennedy’s influence was cut short—the techno-strategic paradigm of 
large scale offensive operations empowered by technologically enhanced firepower and 
mobility would survive him. 
Kennedy’s presidential successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, used an attack on the 
Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 2, 1964 to receive Congressional authorization 
to protect U.S. interests in Southeast Asia.672  Shortly thereafter, following the election in 
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1964, Johnson moved to make good on retaliating for the Gulf of Tonkin incident.  In 
March of 1965 Operation Rolling Thunder began.  Rolling Thunder, a protracted strategic 
bombing campaign against the North Vietnamese’s ability to wage war, would become 
one of the enduring features of the techno-strategic disintegration of the conflict.  A long 
term bombing campaign necessitated staging bases in South Vietnam, which in turn 
required forces to secure them.673  General William Westmorland, who replaced Harkins 
at MACV in June 1964, would request 44 battalions for operations in 1965.  This request 
in some ways represented the complete techno-strategic shift away from the potentially 
promising counterinsurgent concepts of Strategic Hamlets and CIDGs to the favored 
techno-strategic concept of search-and-destroy, firepower, and bombing. 
Central to the search-and-destroy mission was the UH-1 “Huey” helicopter—it 
would become the iconic technology of the Army’s techno-strategic approach to 
Vietnam.  Vietnam was not the first use of helicopters; they had seen limited use in the 
Second World War and again in Korea.  The helicopter proved capable for a variety of 
tasks in its early use, but medical evacuation proved to be its strong suit.674  Capable of 
vertical takeoff and descent, the helicopter was able to extract casualties and delivery 
supplies in terrain otherwise only accessible by foot or pack animal.  The helicopter’s 
transformation from niche medical evacuation platform to its enlarged role as a combat 
troop transport and CAS platform occurred during the lean years of the Eisenhower 
administration.  Lieutenant General James M. Gavin advocating along similar lines as 
Generals Ridgway and Taylor argued that the “new look’s” myopic view of war had had 
serious impacts on the army’s limited war capabilities.675  Gavin’s experience as the 
82nd Airborne Division commander during Operation Market Garden in the Second 
World War led him to stress the importance of aerial mobility—a role that helicopters 
could be expanded to perform.676  Central to the army’s development of its “airmobile” 
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techno-strategy was the framing of the capability in the context of preparation for the 
conventional showdown with the Soviet Union on the plains of central Europe.677  The 
enduring inter-service rivalry between the U.S. Army and Air Force also contributed to 
the problem.  The Air Force’s continuing organizational preference for bombers over 
transport and CAS air frames prompted the army to develop its own capabilities.  
Throughout the 1950s the army’s aerial capabilities grew, thus increasing pressure on the 
air force to retain CAS or risk losing some of it budgetary support.678   
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, again showing the Kennedy 
administration guiding hand in civil-military relations, forced the army to reevaluate 
airmobility after he determined that the army was ignoring it.679  Airmobility advocates, 
working in conjunction with Secretary McNamara, convened a board in 1962 on presided 
over by the XVIII Airborne Corps Commander General Howze680  The Howze board’s 
recommendation was to concentrate 316 helicopters, a little more than a third of which 
were to be attack helicopters, into an air cavalry brigade.681  The groundwork that would 
eventually become the 1st Air Cavalry Division—the first divisional organization sent to 
Vietnam in 1965—had been laid.  However, tension continued to increase with the air 
force.  The air force had convened a separate board which had, predictably, refuted the 
findings of the Howze board.682   
The continuing friction between the services led to variety of field testing.  The 
army’s air assault demonstration, which lacked testing conditions against insurgent or 
guerilla forces, decided the issue in the army’s favor.  The airmobility concept, conceived 
of as providing mobility on a conventional battlefield, was tested against conventional 
conditions.683  During testing the army only devoted one out of the eight total tests to a 
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lower intensity scenario, and that scenario used the airmobile force in a search-and-
destroy role.684  Still even then there were some indications of techno-strategic 
disintegration.  Finding insurgent forces and securing the aircraft staging bases posed 
difficulties.685  Both are particularly problematic from a counterinsurgency perspective 
because the insurgents generally look like everyone else, and troops used to secure a base 
are not available to secure the population.  However, helicopter enhanced airmobility had 
arrived.   
The two central techno-strategic features of Vietnam—airmobility and strategic 
bombing—were in place by 1965.  The requirement for troops to secure the air bases for 
the bombing campaign opened the door for a build-up of force that would reach 536,000 
Americans augmented by 670,000 South Vietnamese in 1968.686  Meanwhile a daily 
average of 800 tons of bombs would be dropped during operation Rolling Thunder, yet 
the impact to North Vietnam was negligible.687  So central was the techno-strategy of 
bombing enshrined that its failure was chalked up to political restrictions in target 
selection.  Upon returning home from his command of the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing 
based in Thailand, Colonel (later Brigadier General) Robin Olds, a WWII and Vietnam 
fighter ace, sat down with President Johnson to debrief him.  When asked what he 
thought should be done Olds replied, “‘mine the harbors, drop the road and rail bridges 
on the Chinese border, get the supply dumps in Cambodia, and most important, totally 
destroy the seat of government in Hanoi…the way to end this war is just to win the 
damned thing!’”688  The commitment to bombing from a career fighter pilot is itself 
indicative of the acceptance of the techno-strategic paradigm of strategic bombing.  
Fundamentally, the problem was a lack of understanding about what the most important 
target was in a counterinsurgency.  In the same conversation as above Olds, making his 
case for a less restrictive bombing campaign, explains to President Johnson that the North 
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Vietnamese effort needed “‘manpower, willpower, and industrial power.  They possess 
the first two requirements in abundance, but they have little industrial capacity and must 
rely on others for their material needs.’”689  There are two problems in this assessment.  
First, many of the people being relied upon by the North Vietnamese were in fact the 
South Vietnamese citizenry.  Second, Olds is implying that by more effectively targeting 
industrial capacity the U.S. would impact manpower and willpower.  This was unlikely, 
and is a reflection of part of the problem inherent in the Vietnam War of thinking about 
the enemy’s strategy in American terms.   
The adherence to large-scale land operations showed the same pattern.  Having 
designed the South Vietnamese force along American lines, Westmoreland was able to 
circumvent questioning strategy, and instead chalked up failure to the inferior soldiering 
of the South Vietnamese.690  But the problem was not the soldiers it was the strategy. 
Massing forces in large-scale operations to find, fix, and finish the enemy could not work 
if the enemy was able to disappear once the battle shifted unfavorably against him.  
Furthermore, the conventional approach affected troop ratios unfavorably—the majority 
of the deployed force were from the logistical, support and maintenance specialties.691  
Of the 550,000 only 80,000 represented the actual combat forces.692  The adherence to 
the organizationally preferred techno-strategy created a huge demand for forces but to no 
avail—the enemy, except in a few instances, would just not concentrate long enough to 
be destroyed.   
Both bombing and large-scale massed assaults played to the North Vietnamese’s 
strengths.  North Vietnam had been fighting a protracted insurgency since before the 
Second World War.  During the course of the WWII, Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap 
would meet and form an enduring relationship—their concepts of operations would 
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successively defeat both the French colonials and the Americans.693  Giap’s exposure to 
Mao Zedong’s conceptualization of a people’s war formed the basis of the strategy, but 
Giap extended it further to include blending urban and rural areas and also to include 
coordinated dispersed attacks if the conditions were right.694  As the Americans escalated 
their involvement during the early 1960s, Giap and Ho were busy expanding the North 
Vietnamese Army and continuing to build a base of support in the South for the Viet 
Cong.695   
Logistical and personnel movement from North Vietnam to South Vietnam along 
the Ho Chi Minh trail became a critical part of the conflict, a fact that Giap would readily 
acknowledge.696  The Ho Chi Minh trail was essentially a network of trails and 
supporting roads between Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.  The trail was resilient to 
bombing, if one area was discovered the trail would change, bypassing the current hot-
spot but always moving steadily southward.697  Trail conditions were austere.  Food was 
in constant shortage, single grains of rice were reclaimed if dropped.698  The trail like 
conditions and the incessant bombing made vehicle traffic difficult, so bicycles were 
modified to distribute supplies across the entire frame, and then the bike was pushed 
down the trial by replacing the seat and handle bars with a stick to better control the 
load—individual loads were generally between 100–150 kilograms.699  The manpower 
and willpower involved in this example of techno-strategic integration was more than 
enough to make up for the lack of industrial power.   
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Although the air assault tactics proved difficult to overcome, the helicopters rather 
loud approach, slow rate of flight, and vulnerability to small arms eventually led to it 
being countered in another example of Vietnamese field craft.700  Over the course of the 
war upwards of 3,000 helicopters were destroyed.701  The Cu Chi tunnel system is 
another example of the Vietnamese’s larger solution of avoiding battle on anything other 
than favorable terms.  In some ways it was like an underground version of the Ho Chi 
Minh trail in that the Cu Chi tunnels (one of the many underground fortifications) were a 
network of underground facilities tied into an above ground village network.702  
Construction of the Cu Chi tunnels began in 1946; by the time the U.S. started arriving in 
force in 1965 they had transformed into a formidable fortification.  The Cu Chi tunnels, 
and other tunnel networks, were used to support a concept of operations whereby U.S. 
forces would be engaged upon landing, as the U.S. force pursued the enemy, the guerilla 
fighter would simply disappear thwarting the success of the hammer and anvil style 
operations.703  Against a different concept of American employment however, the 
guerillas would find no such luck.   
In 1965, in a concept reminiscent of the Strategic Hamlets the U.S. Marine Corps 
began its Combined Action Program (CAPS).  The small size of the program—never 
more than 2,500 Marines—makes it difficult to evaluate CAPs against the conventional 
effort employed by Westmoreland.  This concept would pair between 12 to 15 marines 
with a village, where the marines would live amongst the population establishing a 
village militia to increase the security and taking part in the everyday activities of its 
inhabitants.704  It was dangerous duty, but over time in the areas where it was employed 
the CAPs achieved success.  It is fair to question whether if this concept had been 
employed on a larger scale in lieu of the search-and-destroy strategy what the outcome 
might have been.   
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In 1968 Giap would synchronize the Tet Offensive ultimately starting the end 
game of American involvement in Vietnam.  Tet, a series of attacks during the lunar New 
Year, broke a cease fire agreement, and the surprise worked initially.  However, the 
enemy’s mass presented the type of target that the U.S. was aptly designed to confront.  
But even as the balance of combat swung back in favor of the U.S., the balance of 
support from the U.S. waned.  Walter Cronkite would remark in a conclusion of his CBS 
nightly news segment that “It seems now more certain than ever that the bloody 
experience of Vietnam is to end in a stalemate.”705  Johnson would not seek reelection in 
1968.  Richard Nixon and Creighton Abrams would inherit the war from Johnson and 
Westmoreland, but by that time it was probably too late to reverse the course.   
Giap would unleash another synchronized offensive in 1972, another election 
year, dubbed the Easter Offensive.  By this time many of the American forces had 
departed.  The South Vietnamese Army supported by U.S. air support, however, proved 
up to the task of holding against the North.706  The check of the Easter offensive, and a 
renewed bombing campaign created some diplomatic bargaining room eventually leading 
to the Paris Peace Accord on 27 January 1973.707  This was not a victory for the North, 
but it soon would be.  The South had been trained in and had come to rely on the techno-
strategic paradigm of large conventional operations supported by a superior capacity for 
aerial support.  When the U.S. withdrew that support the South was imminently 
vulnerable.  During the next invasion in 1975 the North would achieve its goal of 
unifying the country. 
Vietnam had a profound effect on the U.S. Defeat at the hands of a decidedly 
technologically inferior foe had to be reconciled.  Unfortunately the reconciliation 
focused on how the American military had been restricted politically from doing its 
job.708  This analysis implied that if the military had only been able to invade the North 
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or to expand the bombing campaign against a wider set of targets it could have won it as 
a conventional war.  Problematically, this analysis perpetuated the notion that 
counterinsurgency did not require a different concept of operations only a commitment to 
fully apply the organizational preferred techno-strategy of total war.  Accordingly 
counterinsurgency would languish while the army consoled itself that it had “never 
[been] defeated…on the battlefield.”709  
B. THE CONTINUING COLD WAR, OTHER CONFLICTS, AND THEIR 
IMPLICATIONS 
1. The Arab-Israeli Conflict 
Roughly during the same time period that the U.S. was fighting in Vietnam, the 
Israelis were in continuing struggle to with their surrounding Arab neighbors: Jordan, 
Syria, and Egypt.  Essentially, starting at the conclusion of the Second World War the 
Arab-Israeli conflict escalated throughout 1947–1949.  In May 1948, upon the creation of 
an Independent Jewish state, the Arab-Israeli war—known in Israel as The War of 
Independence—began in earnest.  The eventual 1949 armistice did little to staunch the 
violence.  Widespread Jewish immigration to Israel following statehood, and an enduring 
ethnic tension created a security situation of continuing hostility.  Major flares ups would 
occur in 1956, 1967, 1969, and 1973.  In contrast to Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli conflict in 
this time period would consist of predominately armored and aerial combat, although 
there were limited naval engagements.  The security situation in Israel was clear in a way 
that the Cold War never was for the U.S.  America’s commitment to containing 
communism, although projected to take place in Europe, could occur anywhere.  Israel in 
contrast, could concentrate on defending its borders in open desert terrain.   
Israel’s preference for armor was established during the Suez Crisis in 1956.  
However, Israeli armor doctrine differed from what had emerged elsewhere following the 
conclusion of the Second World War.  The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) was 
predominately equipped with the larger Centurion tanks which had been built toward the 
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conclusion of the Second World War.710  The Centurion was more heavily armored and 
designed specifically to fight German heavy tanks.711  Rather than adopting the combined 
arms approach, which employed infantry, armor, and artillery in concert the IDF built 
homogenous tank units.712  Advocates of this approach, such as Yisrael Tal, argued that 
the visibility in the open terrain of Israel would favor the advantages of armored mobility 
and firepower.713  The Israeli Air Force (IAF) formed the other major component of the 
Israeli techno-strategy.  Rather than focus on developing a strategic bombing capability 
the IAF was organized and equipped to perform air-to-air and air-to-ground missions.  
Furthermore, and again highlighting the clarity of the strategic situation, the IAF knew 
the preliminary target of a war with Egypt would be the Egyptian airfields.714  
Tension rose as Israel made progress toward achieving nuclear status.  Egypt 
began posturing on the Syrian border in May 1967.  The IDF activated its reserves 
brining up its strength to nearly 275,000.715  Although Israel would face an Arab 
coalition, the lynchpin of that coalition was Egypt.  Egypt had a modernized military 
consisting of mostly soviet equipment.  Particularly threatening was its 385 aircraft to 
which, in contrast, Israel could muster only 200.716  However, Israeli intelligence knew 
the exact composition and disposition of the Egyptians, which largely negated their 
advantages in number.  On 5 June 1967 Israel launched a preemptive aerial assault 
against the Egyptian airfields destroying 286 planes before they were even airborne.717  
Israeli tanks also entered the fight, skillfully out gunning their adversaries and pushing  
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deep into the Sinai Peninsula.  Further gains were made in the Golan Height, the Gaza 
Strip, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem.  The war was swift and decisive, but Israel’s 
victory presented complications. 
The question about what to do with the acquired territory of Syria, Egypt, and 
Jordan was problematic, a situation made worse when the Arab league summit in 
Khartoum produced its “three no” resolution—no negotiation, no peace, and no 
recognition.  However no amount of avoidance could prevent the Arab coalition from 
recognizing that they had been thoroughly trounced.   
Israel would occupy the captured territory in the Gaza Strip, along the Sinai 
Peninsula, in the West Bank, and in the Golan Heights.  The occupation and rapid 
overwhelming victory would change Israel’s strategic situation. However, the 
technological choices for a predominantly heavy armor force complimented by a strong 
IAF would persist.  Israel’s new borders would be more defensible, which contrasted 
with the national techno-strategic focus on offense—embodied in the 1967 campaign.  
Defensive possibility would stretch the Israel’s techno-strategic paradigm in three ways.  
First it would siphon off some of the IDFs available manpower in fortifications.  Second, 
if and when the fortifications were attacked the fortifications would need to rely on IAF 
assistance to prevent them from being captured, potentially preventing the IAF from 
pursuing its offensive role of gaining air superiority.718  Finally the new territory 
extended Israel’s supply lines, thus potentially preventing rapid reinforcement of an 
armored breakthrough.  There were other difficulties with Israel’s techno-strategic 
paradigm that were not made clear due to the shortness of the 1967 “Six Day War.”  The 
weaknesses of employing armor without infantry support were obscured by the shortness 
of the war and the high operational tempo of the IAF—3,279 sorties over the 132 hours 
of the war—would not be sustainable in a protracted fight due to inevitable maintenance 
requirements.719  Civil-military relationships were also impacted by the dramatic victory 
as the prestige of the military increased so did their clout in military related decision 
making. 
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Conscription terms were increased to meet the demands of occupation, spending 
increased, and the number armor brigades increased from 21 to 26—in some cases 
infantry units were even reorganized as armor units.720  The Six Day War also increased 
the Cold War tension.  Although Israel’s alignment with America and the west, and 
Egypt’s alignment with the Soviet Union preceded the 1967 war, it was during the post 
war rebuilding that the alliances were solidified.  The Soviet support to Egypt included 
upwards of 20,000 advisors, as well as a robust equipment package that more than made 
up for its combat losses.721  Israel’s rearmament and modernization program was 
overwhelmingly directed toward its air and armored strength.  The War of Attrition, 
starting in March of 1969 and ending in August 1970, highlighted the continuing tension 
between Israel and Egypt. 
During the War of Attrition the violence on the ground and in the air escalated.  
Aerial combat was often short and decisive; however, the Soviets had provided the 
Egyptians with modern—electronically guided—antiaircraft missile defenses.722  The 
Israelis, flying U.S. F-4 Phantoms, were accordingly provided with the latest electronic 
countermeasures developed in Vietnam, where the Americans were frequently targeted 
by similar Soviet equipment.723  Meanwhile, on the ground the Egyptians were working 
to harden their Surface to Air Missile (SAM) sites.  Soviet intervention increased as 
Soviet pilots took to the air in the latest generation of MIG-21s.  Soviet intervention led 
to increased external pressure for a cease fire, which was enacted in August 1970.  The 
cease fire cooled the active hostilities, but almost immediately the Egyptians began 
improving, and consolidating their SAM sites—a sure indication that future Israeli 
aviators would have to contend with sophisticated missile defenses.  The War of Attrition 
however, was merely a preliminary for the next confrontation, which would prove to be 
the most violent yet.   
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The Yom Kippur War commenced on October 6, 1973.  Although the war was 
again fought against mainly Egyptian and Syrian forces, with broad Arab support the 
shifting techno-strategic situation is best highlighted in the actions of the Egyptian in the 
Sinai Peninsula.  In contrast to the 1967 intelligence that led to the preemptive attacks on 
the Egyptian airfields, the intelligence assessment in 1973 was not as clear.  Although 
there were indications that Egypt was marshaling, the chief of intelligence concluded that 
they were not going to attack.724  By October 4th however, it was generally clear that 
attack was imminent.  The Prime Minister, Golda Meir, was urged to launch a 
preliminary strike similar to the one that had devastated Egypt in 1967; however, she 
declined fearing that allies would not come to the aid of Israel if it was perceived to be 
the aggressor.725  The lack of preemptive airstrike was not the only difference between 
the two campaigns.  Egypt had developed a concept of operations to neutralize the 
advantages of Israeli armor that took advantage of dispersion in the face of armored 
mass.  The Egyptian plan involved the infiltration of 8,000 troops armed with the latest 
Antitank Guided Missiles (ATGM).726  Israel’s reliance on armor without infantry 
support made it especially vulnerable to a dispersed force, and the capabilities of ATGMs 
had shifted the technological balance.  ATGMs increased the amount of firepower 
accessible to an individual, thus making the tank vulnerable to infantry.  Tanks still have 
the advantage in mobility and protection, but ATGMs shifted the balance and when 
artfully employed they could prevent rapid unsupported armored movement.  The 
Egyptians showed good insight in the integration of ATGMs.  The Americans, through 
proxy, would use a similar dispersed force of men armed with anti-aircraft Stinger 
missiles against the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980s.  Furthermore, Egypt’s 
attention to SAMs greatly blunted Israeli IAF advantages, at least initially.  However, 
Egypt’s early successes would be short lived.  The IDF was able to adjust its tactics to a 
more combined arms doctrine where infantry and artillery were employed to clear areas 
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of potential ATGM gunners.727  Second, as the Egyptian front extended past the coverage 
of their SAMs the IAF was able to renew its onslaught unfettered.728  However, in spite 
of the eventual Egyptian losses, the shifting techno-strategic dynamic enabled by ATGMs 
and SAMs—both of which offer increased capability to dispersed forces should not be 
ignored.  Armor and airplanes both prevent large targets, the diffusion of man portable 
and increasingly capable shoulder fired missile systems suggest that their vulnerability to 
a dispersed force is increasing. 
2. Surface Ships Airplanes and Submarines: the Falklands War 
While Korea, Vietnam, and the Arab/Israeli conflict all had naval components 
they were primarily land and air campaigns.  However, in 1982 the first sustained major 
naval action since the Second World War took place off of the Falkland Islands between 
the United Kingdom and Argentina.  While the Falklands War, from April to June 1982, 
was also fought on the ground in the Falkland Islands, this discussion will be restricted to 
the naval action.  Given the shortness of the overall campaign the naval action in the 
Falklands was especially violent.  The British lost Sheffield, Coventry, Ardent, Antelope, 
Atlantic Conveyor, and Sir Galahad.729  Other ships were severely damaged, and more 
would have been lost had “the Args’ bombs…been properly fused for low-level air 
raids.”730  The British response to the Argentinian invasion of the Falklands was 
overwhelmingly naval, as such; the composition of the fleet reflected the techno-strategic 
preferences of the Royal Navy.  When the crisis erupted Admiral Henry Leach informed 
Prime Minister Margret Thatcher that a carrier task force consisting of the HMS Hermes 
and Invincible and their supporting destroyers and frigates could be ready to leave in two 
days.731   
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From the start of the conflict it was clear that the British, like their American 
allies, had techno-strategically built their navies around the aircraft carrier following the 
Second World War.  This choice was not a forgone conclusion, as the Soviet Union, in 
contrast, chose the submarine.732  Events in the Falklands would raise questions about 
which was the better choice, for while the majority of the fleet would consist of surface 
vessels, the British also deployed three submarines Spartan, Splendid and Conqueror.733  
On the 2 May Conqueror would sink the Argentinian General Belgrano—the fear of 
further submarine attacks would compel the Argentine Navy to return all of their ship to 
port for the remainder of the conflict.734  One submarine had, in some sense, defeated an 
entire naval task force.   
The British, having largely prepared their navy for countering the Soviet 
submarine threat, showcased an impressive array of submarine detection technology 
including networked system of electronic sensors, and including helicopters equipped 
with a sonar sensors that could be dangled in the ocean.735  Helicopters would also act as 
missile decoys, after the Sheffield was sunk by an Exocet—a radar-guided surface 
skimming anti-ship missile.  Also, in a return to their original functions in the Korean 
War, helicopters would provide logistical and medical evacuation, as well as facilitating 
ground mobility both on land and between ships.736   
The combat action that took place at sea was heavily carrier-centric.  However, 
since the Argentine navy had been thwarted by the submarine threat the fleet action 
primarily consisted of managing the air wings to ensure the maximum amount of offense 
and protective coverage.  The British opened with a bombing campaign on 1 May 1982 
directed against the airfield at Port Stanley—a feat which required a 7,800 mile round trip 
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flight from the Ascension Islands and required 17 inflight refuelings.737  Subsequent 
aviation raids would continue to target the air defense capabilities and runways at Port 
Stanley and Goose Green, an alternate Argentinian staging area.738  However, these raids 
would be conducted by the Sea Harriers of Hermes flight wing.  The British 
bombardment of the Falkland runways forced Argentina’s Air Force to fly its support 
from the mainland, which dramatically reduced its time on station.  Main land Argentina 
was just close enough that it could reach the British fleet, which had carefully positioned 
itself to be nearly out of range.739  However, on the opening day of the conflict the 
British fleet weathered a full on assault of 40 aircraft.740  Following the growing trend, 
the aerial combat was heavily missile based.   
Missiles, supported by an increasingly complex sensor array and onboard 
targeting assistance from radar or infrared homing, emerged as one of the defining 
features of the Falklands.  Admiral Woodward notes that the “Sidewinder was a better 
air-to-air missile than anything they [Argentinians] had.”741  The British Harriers armed 
with Sidewinders had achieved dominance in air-to-air combat, but many of their 
Argentine “kills” were fighter-bombers with dwindling fuel seeking to sink ships not to 
dog fight.742  Furthermore, the amount of airpower tasked for self-defense reduced the 
amount of available CAS.743  However, missile capabilities, especially those associated 
with ship based air-defenses, were exaggerated in the immediate aftermath of the conflict.  
In one after action report conducted by the Ministry of Defense (MoD) in 1982, the 
Rapier (a surface-to-air missile) was credited with a 49 percent kill ratio.744 Reports on 
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other missiles such as the Sea Dart, Sea Wolf, and Sea Cat showed signs of the same 
exaggeration.745  Later analysis which painstakingly accounted for all missile firings had 
different findings.  First, the total number of Argentine aircraft shot down was reduced 
from 72 to 41.746  Second, and partly as a result of the reduced total number of “kills,” 
the performance ratios of all surface-to-air missiles was much lower.  Only one known 
kill could be attributed to Rapier, potentially one to Sea Cat, and potentially two to 
Blowpipe.747 Other “kills” may have been made by these missile types but the data was 
inconclusive due to numerous munitions being launched against the same target. 
However, the true findings, which indicated that surface ships were still 
imminently vulnerable, were deliberately not publicized to maintain operational 
security.748  While this was a prudent move, it may have obscured the harder questions 
about the continued reliance on aircraft carriers.  The Falklands conflict was a limited 
test.  The carrier-centric task force was able to accomplish its mission; however, had it 
been asked to move closer to Argentina to support raids on the main land air bases the 
story may have been different.  Maintaining the carriers’ positions at the maximum range 
of the Argentine bombers and not advanced missile defense systems had been the key to 
the success.  In a combat scenario where that offset is not possible the carrier is the most 
attractive target at sea, inevitably a concentrated attack will at some point breach its 
defenses.  Submarine performance in the Falklands offers a different perspective on sea 
power.  The deployment of a mere three submarines was enough to keep the Argentine 
Navy in port—an effect in considerable disproportion to the numbers involved.   
3. The First Gulf War 
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 provided a convenient historic bookend on the 
Cold War, but the seeds that brought it down were sown in the unrelenting and costly 
arms race, which had decimated the Soviet economy.  The dust had barely settled from 
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the end of the Cold War when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990.  The American 
military was at its zenith, the techno-strategic foundations laid in the Second World War, 
nurtured, and maintained in spite of poor performance in Korea and Vietnam would be 
brought to bear in Iraq.  Furthermore, Iraq was the aggressor and Saddam Hussein was a 
known “bad guy” which eased the strain of confrontation by facilitating the creation of a 
large international coalition.  In November 1990 the UN Security Resolution 678 passed 
giving Saddam until January 15th to withdraw from Kuwait before “all necessary means” 
were used to enforce the resolution.749  The stage was set for the buildup to begin—the 
first ships loaded with VII Corps equipment would begin arriving in Saudi Arabia on 
December 6th.750   
Finally, the U.S. had found an enemy willing to go toe-to-toe in a conventional 
war, and the success of the coalition would be overwhelming—the U.S. had “licked the 
Vietnam syndrome once and for all.”751  During the war all of the familiar elements were 
present: large mechanized formations, carrier-centric naval deployments, and massive 
bombing campaigns.  While on the surface, the task force composition resembled the 
same techno-strategic combination favored since the Second World War the 
technological advances in capabilities were significant.  These familiar weapons systems 
had all been significantly enhanced by information age technology—computers, target 
acquisition system, satellite based navigation via Global Positioning Systems (GPS), 
secure resilient communications and precision “smart” munitions.  All of the 
technological might would be brought to bear on the Iraqi Army.  Intelligence estimates 
going into the war tended to grossly overestimated Iraqi strength.  By January 1991 the 
estimates projected an army of nearly 540,000.752  However, true strength was harder to 
qualify as many of the Iraqi soldiers—minus the elite Republican Guard—were poorly 
trained conscripts.  Saddam did have a fairly good-sized, mostly modern, Soviet-
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equipped air force and, as a result of the Iran conflict, robust air defenses.753  There were 
concerns however, about Iraq’s Scud missiles and about their potential willingness to use 
chemical weapons.  Both had been used during the prolonged war between Iraq and Iran 
during the 1980s, and Saddam had even resorted to using gas against the minority 
Kurdish population within his own borders.754  Still there was little doubt that the U.S. 
possessed a significant technological advantage.   
The movement of that heavy technological advantage would take months, and by 
the end of the war 9,000,000 tons of equipment had been moved.755  As noted earlier the 
first ships of VII Corps equipment began arriving in early December.  The last units 
would not arrive until February, and even at the start of the ground war VII Corps was 
only at 80 percent strength.756  The Iraqis used this time to strengthen their fortifications, 
but the delay of ground troops did not preclude offensive action from starting on the UN 
mandated deadline.  The plan called for an air campaign prior to the ground offensive—
given the decision to employ a heavily armored ground force it was the only offense 
available until VII Corps’s equipment arrived.   
The air campaign began on 16 January 1991 when a flight of B-52s—the strategic 
bastions of “massive retaliation”—took to the air on a round trip mission to Iraq.757  The 
planes designed to deliver nuclear warheads were now carrying the latest compliment of 
precision GPS guided cruise missiles and 1,000 pound warheads.758  Meanwhile, closer 
to the front, a massive aerial armada was taking to the sky.  Stealth fighters loaded with 
laser guided munitions, aerial refulers, carrier-based aircraft, and a little over 100 
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Tomahawk cruise missiles all began moving toward Iraq in hunt of their targets.759  In 
the first day of the air-war 1,300 mission were flown.760  Helicopters would also join the 
fray in a raid to knock out Iraqi radar capabilities making the job of the planes that much 
easier.  Significant attention was paid to Iraq’s aerial defense capabilities, as such, a full 
spectrum of electronic warfare measures were used to protect the armada, and to keep 
Saddam in the dark—losses to SAMs amounted to only 10 aircraft during the war.761  
The Iraqi Air Force was simply outclassed, engaging the coalition was akin to suicide 
that they even tried is a testament to their courage, however, they would not destroy a 
single coalition plane.762   
Technologically enhanced targeting, from various satellite and plane based 
intelligence collection assets, made accuracy percentages skyrocket in some cases 
nearing 90 percent.763  Monthly tonnage expenditures in the Gulf War rivaled those of 
the Second World War and Vietnam, but target selection and accuracy was far better, 
resulting in a greater effectiveness.764  As Richard Hallion notes the air campaign 
targeted five areas: “command and control, power generation, refined fuel and lubricants 
production, the transportation infrastructure, and the Iraqi air force.765  However, while 
the air campaign was formidable it was not decisive.  Saddam was not killed nor did he 
withdraw from Kuwait, and there was no indication that it was the air campaign had 
destroyed the population’s morale to the point of overthrowing Saddam.  Furthermore, air 
power met with limited success in the hunt for Scud missiles, a key component of 
Saddam’s strategy of provoking Israel to enter the war.   
Dispersed and highly mobile Scud Missile launchers proved up to the challenge of 
evading one of the most technologically enhanced targeting and intelligence collection 
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efforts of modern war.  Saddam had invested heavily in the Scud missile during the 
prolonged Iran-Iraq war.  Scud attacks became an enduring feature of the “battle of the 
cities” in which both Iran and Iraq fired Scuds into each other’s centers of population.766  
With no onboard targeting the Scud was primarily a terror weapon.  Saddam intended to 
use it precisely in that fashion.  Within 36 hours of the start of the air campaign the first 
Scuds began falling on Israel.767  It was a calculated move by Saddam to provoke Israel 
to retaliate, with the endgame being to fracture the coalition.  The Israelis were too savvy 
to take the bait.  However, had the Scud had been a more capable weapon system; the 
limitation of air power to destroy a dispersed mobile force might have had a larger 
impact.  Especially given that, in retrospect, the faith of the coalition in its missile 
defense provided by the Patriot (Anti-Ballistic Missile) ABMs was unfounded. 
Other approaches to hunting Scuds existed.  Major General (later General) Wayne 
Downing, an Army Ranger and commander of the Joint Special Operations Commander 
(JSOC), had a plan to insert the Army’s Delta Force in a ground-based Scud hunting 
role.768  The Special Air Service (SAS), a British Special Operations Forces (SOF), was 
already in Iraq doing precisely what Downing was proposing, but yet the administration 
hesitated to send in Delta.  General Norman Schwarzkopf was largely against SOF 
employment, and was resistant to any SOF proposal that may have interrupted the ground 
campaign.769  Nevertheless, when the Scuds kept falling JSOC was eventually sent to 
Iraq.  Commitment to their operations from Schwarzkopf was never high, but even with 
the limited allocation of resources the pressure that the combined efforts of the SAS and 
JSOC reduced Scud attacks from five a day to one a day.770   
Advancements in technology had not occurred solely in the realm of air power.  
Technological improvements abounded.  The U.S. main battle tank the M1A1 Abrams, 
named for the MACV commander that replaced Westmoreland, could reach speeds up to 
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45 MPH, had  Chobaham armor plating capable of surviving a hit from its Soviet 
competitors, and a 120mm main gun capable of firing a depleted uranium tank-killing 
round over two and half miles.771  The M1A1 other advantages included a stabilized 
main gun barrel which made accurate firing while moving a possibility, laser range 
finders, computerized targeting, and night vision thermal sights.772  The American Army, 
in its heavy divisions had maintained its commitment to full mechanization, a critical 
feature to logistically sustaining an armored offensive.  On the morning of February 24, 
1991 the ground offensive began—it would end four days later. 
One on the first assaults of the first day was a 93-mile, helicopter-borne assault 
into enemy territory to seize key terrain for future offensive staging conducted by the 
101st Airborne Division.773  The 101st was essentially the 1991 version of the Vietnam 
era airmobile concept; however, once again the process of evolutionary development had 
its effects.  Helicopters enhanced with information age, computer assisted avionics 
packages could fly low and fast over the terrain mitigating some of the vulnerability they 
had shown in Vietnam.  Furthermore, attack helicopters, such as the AH-64 Apache were 
moderately armored against small arms, and when equipped with the latest offensive 
weapons could perform suitable in both an anti-personnel or anti-tank role.  Still though 
helicopters present challenges for logisticians, they are difficult to maintain especially in 
a desert environment and unlike a mechanized formation cannot carry everything they 
need for a sustained offensive effort—eventually they have to return to base to refit and 
refuel.   
The U.S. Army’s enduring commitment to the heavily mechanized paradigm of 
massed fires and offensive maneuver was on full display as the coalition executed the 
famous “left hook” through the desert of southwest Iraq.  In an artillery barrage that 
rivaled the British preparatory fires on the Somme in 1916, the U.S. barrage of rockets 
and shells totaling 11,000 rained down on the Iraqis over the course of a half hour.774  
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The fear of taking casualties was replaced with the growing issue of what to do with all 
the prisoners.  Indeed the mass surrenders were one of the most memorable features of 
the war, and one that had potentially brought about by one of the cheapest “bombs” in the 
war—2,800,000 propaganda leaflets had flittered their way into Iraqi hands during the air 
war.775  The M1A1 Abrams superiority was decisively demonstrated in a battle between 
the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment and the Tawakalna Division—one of the vaunted 
Republican Guard units—during the battle of 73 Easting hundreds of Iraq’s vehicles 
would be destroyed in hours.776  The “left hook” was wildly successful; the ground war 
was over so quickly that it hardly seemed real.   
The victory resulting from the combination of a targeted air campaign in support 
of an eventual ground invasion showcased the technological might of the U.S. led 
coalition.  However, prowess in this war was not a result of technology alone.  Vietnam 
had impacted the army fundamentally, and the officers who stayed the course at its 
conclusion had rebuilt the army.  Besides cleaning up the rampant discipline problems the 
U.S. military in general had overhauled its training and doctrine.  The creation of large 
training area such as the National Training Center (NTC) in Fort Irwin CA and the 
Fighter Weapons School at Miramar Naval Air Station in San Diego CA provided a 
training environment that could replicate the conditions of war.777  Units scheduled to 
participate in a “rotation” at the NTC would train-up for the event at their home station, 
and then deploy to CA to participate in a structured war game that involved a dedicated 
U.S. Army unit to play to role of opposition force.  The ability to experience simulated 
war of this quality using the same technology it would use in actual war went a long way 
towards the development of doctrine.  AirLand Battle emerged as the overarching Army 
doctrinal framework in 1982.778  It was a doctrine designed for the plains of Europe.  
Accordingly, it exhibits the prevailing preferences of the time for mechanization and air 
power used in concert to destroy the enemy ground force through rapid offensive 
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maneuver and aerial attacks on their rear areas.  The familiarization of doctrine and 
technology provided through the realistic training environment at venues like the NTC 
went a long way towards the integration of technology and strategy.  Iraq’s rapid 
capitulation seemed to confirm the techno-strategic decisions made following the 
Vietnam War.  However, was that the correct inference to draw?   
Air power’s apparent prowess had once again captured the American imagination; 
the combination of informational technology had finally seemed to crack the code to 
make air power the decisive arm of American policy.  But airpower had not achieved all 
of it objectives in the Gulf.  It had not killed Saddam or generated enough angst to start a 
rebellion, it had not been able to destroy the mobile Scuds, and it had not destroyed the 
Iraqi Army.  Soon (1999) the all-air-power approach seemed to get further empirical 
support in Kosovo, but in that campaign too it was the combination of air power, 
diplomatic overtures from the Russians, and the credible threat of a ground invasion that 
forced Milosevic to surrender not solely air power.779   
The Gulf War had not been a naval war, however, as the only show in town it was 
supported with multiple carriers groups.  By and large the carriers only served to increase 
the amount of aircraft participating in the war, although the navy did enact an effective 
blockade. The fears of anti-ship missiles, and mining played a role in keeping the carriers 
well off the coast.  The mine sweeping ships needed for the larger job of supporting a 
Marine amphibious landing in Kuwait, known as Desert Saber, had been neglected by the 
U.S. during the cold war.780  As the planning for the assault continued the time table for 
its execution kept extending—eventually the amount of time to prepare the sea 
infiltration routs and beachhead plus the amount of destruction that preparation would 
inflict onto Kuwait was deemed untenable.781  Desert Saber was canceled although the  
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appearance of a potential amphibious landing was maintained as a feint to keep the 
Iraqis’ tied to their costal defenses.782  The battleship also made its last American combat 
appearance in the Gulf providing naval gunfire.   
The Army emerged from the desert as the apparent master of ground combat, but 
again there are tough questions to ask about this “test” of techno-strategy.  First, Saddam 
employed his forces in a conventionally modeled defense—the exact type of defense the 
American’s modeled their force to defeat.  Second, although seemingly large, Iraq’s army 
was a hollow shell.  Saddam’s soldiers simply did not want to defend to the last man.  
Third, the desert terrain was entirely favorable to the American’s technological suite of 
targeting, and navigation tools—had the war aims not remained so narrowly defined and 
the war had moved into the cities the victory may not have been so clean.  However in 
spite of all these advantages, the mobility of the Saddam’s Scud force proved elusive 
until the very end.  The generals had done a magnificent job during this war keeping the 
civilian objectives within the province of its advantages.  Having resolved to never fight 
another Vietnam the generals narrowly defined the conditions for the application of force, 
and then ensured that they had what they needed to accomplish their limited objectives.  
Had the Bush administration pushed for a more rapid response, or made the decision to 
pursue Saddam into the cities what would have happened?  Furthermore, the army took 
many months and required 9,000,000 tons of equipment and 550,000 troops to do the job 
the way they wanted—this approach may have gotten results, but it is too cumbersome 
and blunt to be effective across a broader range of circumstances.  If any lesson was to be 
learned from the Gulf War, it was that fighting the U.S. in a conventional manner was not 
tenable.  
C. SUMMARY 
The Second World War significantly impacted the national consciousness.  The 
allies emerged as the unqualified victors.  The U.S. military largely attributed the victory 
to bombing, carrier-centric naval battle, and fully mechanized land forces.  Furthermore, 
the creation and use of the atomic bomb seemed to offer a technological solution that 
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would radically alter the way war was fought.  The fight over who would deliver the 
atomic bomb, and the creation of an independent U.S. Air Force both exacerbated post-
war civil-military relationship and may have served to confuse analysis over the most 
effective techno-strategy.  As the World War receded and the ideological struggle against 
communism increased America was drawn into more limited wars to contain 
communism.  In Korea American got its first taste in fighting post-atomic limited wars.  
Many had assumed that atomic weapons would be used, when they were not the military 
was confronted with its inadequate preparedness.  MacArthur was able to turn the war 
around after successfully pushing for the landing at Inchon.  However, the victory at 
Inchon expanded the aims of the war.  In spite of evidence that the Chinese were about to 
intervene, MacArthur pushed north toward the Yalu River.  When the Chinese did enter 
the war the American’s were spread too thin to mount an adequate defense, and suffered 
accordingly.  The entrance of the Chinese expanded the scope of the war and MacArthur 
wanted the authorities to fight them in the way he knew best—a strategy of total war.  
Truman, however, did not agree with expanding the war and showed restraint as the lines 
entrenched along the 38th parallel.   
Eisenhower offered a “new look,” first in Korea where the implicit threat of 
nuclear war may have facilitated the armistice but also towards a techno-strategy of 
massive retaliation.  It was strategy without nuance or utility, but it did serve to further 
entrench organizational preferences.  Technologically the strategy of massive retaliation 
exerted evolutionary effects.  The technological archetypes used to deliver atomic 
weapons—planes, submarines, and missiles—all made steady performance gains. 
However, there is a second technological story that emerged from the Second World 
War.  Information technology became increasingly sophisticated and ubiquitous—
militaries enabled by information technology whether as a component of “smart” 
munitions, or underwriting a responsive architecture for command and control would 
operate a blinding combination of speed and lethality. 
As the Cold War continued in to the Kennedy administration the was the 
recognition of the need for a more “flexible response.”  Kennedy’s proactive involvement 
in civil-military affairs started to make inroads into changing the military; however, his 
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tragic death occurred too soon.  The continuing conflict in Vietnam, and the incremental 
increases of American involvement would soon accelerate under Johnson after the Gulf 
of Tonkin incident.  Westmoreland would prove a zealot of the World War industrial age 
paradigm of warfare.  His continued support for a duly focused strategy of strategic 
bombing and helicopter enabled search-and-destroy operations would bring 550,000 
troops to Vietnam in 1968 for little gain.  Fundamentally it was a failure of understanding 
that the war was not a completion for terrain or a battle of attrition but was instead a 
battle for the population.  Other contemporary strategies recognized this—the CAPs 
being one example.  One of the biggest failures of Vietnam was the failure to learn.  Of 
course, credit must also be given to the North Vietnamese.  Their strategy, which blended 
guerrilla insurgents and conventional forces, was skillfully employed to maximize the 
strengths of dispersion and anonymity.  Their success, against first the French and later 
the U.S., provided a powerful example of the limits of technological superiority.   
While Korea and Vietnam may have defined the hot aspects of the Cold War for 
America, the period following the conclusion of the Second World War saw numerous 
other conflicts.  Two conflicts in particular pose interesting questions for techno-strategic 
preferences of the West.  The continuing conflict (studied in this chapter from 1956–
1973) between Israel and its Arab neighbors provides a useful comparison to Vietnam 
since both occurred during roughly the same time.  Israel built its army along heavily 
armored lines, approaching at times an almost exclusively armor based force.  The 
armored land forces were complimented by a strong IAF that emphasized CAS.  When 
the indicators pointed to war in 1967 Israel executed a preemptive attack that destroyed 
the bulk of the Egyptian Air Force, and made rapid territorial gains.  Israel had won a 
significant victory, and the technologies associated with took on an ever larger centrality 
in Israeli military strategy.  But in defeat the Egyptians, with the support of their Soviet 
allies, reflected on their approach to countering Israeli armor.  By dispersing small teams 
armed with shoulder fired ATGMs in ambush positions along likely avenues of approach 
the Egyptians reasoned that they could neutralize some of the Israeli’s armored 
advantages.  This approach would ultimately not be enough to secure victory, but it did 
significantly change the perceptions of Israeli invulnerability. 
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The course of the combat in the Falklands War in 1982 is important to look at 
because of its potential implications for a carrier-centric navy.  Three things stand out in 
this conflict:   
1. The vulnerability of surface ships to aerial munitions. 
2. The relatively low success ratio of missile-based, anti-aircraft defense. 
3. The role of submarines in preventing the Argentine Navy from joining the     
     fight.   
The first two pose questions regarding the logic for the continuing emphasis of a 
carrier-centric force, while the latter provides the hint of an alternative approach. 
The final American adventures of the period—the First Gulf War and the NATO 
intervention in Kosovo conclude the period.  The advances in the weaponry that had 
occurred during the period since the conclusion of the Second World War were 
astounding.  Smart, informational enabled, munitions were used to good effect in a 
preliminary air campaign to attrite the Iraq military and logistical infrastructure in 
preparations for a ground offensive.  When it finally commenced the ground offensive, 
again showing the superiority of an informationally enabled military, was short and 
overwhelmingly lopsided.  However, under the surface of the victory there were some 
problems.  First, the response was neither timely nor efficient.  Second, Saddam, forced 
to hold the terrain in Kuwait, chose to array his forces in the conventional order of battle 
that the U.S. techno-strategy had been designed to fight—against the mobility and 
dispersion of the Scuds the results were more mixed.  Third, the military and political 
safeguards to prevent the expansion of the war could be viewed pessimistically as an 
admission that the military was not prepared to take the fighting into urban Iraq where its 
advantages would not be as clear.  But the First Gulf War is also interesting in that for all 
the advances in technology the fighting was in many respects reminiscent of the Second 
World War.783  Information technology clearly enhanced the capabilities of the U.S.  
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military in the application of the industrial age paradigm that emerged from the Second 
World War, but it is critical to ask whether information technology had reached the point 
where it could engender a new paradigm.  
  204
 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  205
VI. 9/11 AND BEYOND: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN 
INFORMATION AGE TECHNO-STRATEGY 
“‘The world has [changed]—and we have not yet changed sufficiently.  The 
clearest and most important transformation is from a bipolar Cold War world where 
threats were visible and predictable, to one in which they…are impossible to know 
today’”784  Over a decade into the twenty-first century what can we say about the current 
state of techno-strategic integration in the U.S. Military?  Before answering that, though, 
consideration must be given to an analysis of what the current threat environment entails.  
Although the events of 9/11 were certainly sobering, they are often overly emphasized.  
Terrorism as a tactic has existed for ages.  Indeed, suicide terrorism has been in the rise 
for at least two decades.785  However, the successes in the execution of suicide terrorism, 
as in the case of 9/11, almost certainly ensures that the technique will continue to be 
imitated.786  Information age technology has enabled the networking of enemy 
organizations, but it has also in some sense revitalized older organizational heritages, in 
the case of al-Qaeda, as noted by David Ronfeldt, it has facilitated “virulent tribalism.”787  
Terrorism, and suicide terrorism, however, is just a component of the larger adversarial 
techno-strategy of America’s recent enemies—one that plays on a familiar dichotomy of 
dispersion vs. mass that has been identified periodically as an undercurrent through this 
study.  Furthermore, looking back to Giap’s concept of operations in Vietnam where the 
paramilitary VC were capable of engaging in guerrilla style attacks or coalescing for 
more traditional military operations supported, in the case of Vietnam, by the NVA.  This 
concept of operations could be extended to support a three pronged strategy of, terrorism, 
guerrilla or insurgent operations, and when the conditions merit it, more conventionally 
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styled operations—none of which require a centralized standing military.  Hezbollah is a 
modern organization that may represent this strategy.  Furthermore, Hezbollah’s proxy 
relationship with Iran makes targeting even more difficult.  Iran has in some sense 
figured out how to fight non-attributable warfare.  The proliferation of weapons, some of 
which have been innovatively repurposed to better support a guerrilla techno-strategy, 
ensures that the access to weapons will continue for those willing to fight, especially as 
states look towards concepts of operations along proxy lines.  The networked 
organization, emphasizing lateral linkages to facilitate rapid, decentralized lateral 
decision making, has become and will continue to be central to a strategy that seeks to 
maximize dispersion.788   
The U.S. military’s dominance of the industrial age techno-strategic paradigm of 
warfare that emerged fully integrated at the conclusion of the Second World War, and 
was then significantly enhanced by the development of informational age technology, has 
forced our enemies to look to strategies that offset our advantages.  While it is true that 
our adversaries have proved to be the more adaptive to emerging networked 
organizational forms, there is no reason to conclude that innovations in information 
technology cannot be techno-strategically integrated into a reoriented U.S. military.  The 
major difference between the U.S. techno-strategic approaches to integrating information 
age technology is that it was overlaid on top of the existing organizational preferences, 
whereas elsewhere it enabled new or reimagined forms of warfare.  Looking at the recent 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan may provide an indication of how far the U.S. military has 
come and what remains to be done. 
A. INNOVATION UNDER FIRE 
Innovating under fire is a central theme of techno-strategic integration.  It is true 
that “you go to war with the Army you have,” but it is also true that the army you have 
will not be the same at the end of a conflict.789  Looking at some of the experiences from 
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the last decade of combat offers examples for consideration as the military moves toward 
an information age paradigm.  Summarizing and making sense of so much recent history 
is too broad a task, therefore, a more selective sampling will be used to highlight “the 
good,” “the bad,” and “the ugly.” 
1. The Good 
There have been numerous examples during the last 10 years of war that can be 
cited as “the good.”  Two will be quickly highlighted, the opening of Operation Enduring 
Freedom, and the innovated technological work being done in the field of drones and 
robotics.  The implications of “the good” features of the war must be carefully considered 
as offering a glimpse into techno-strategy as it may come to be. 
The opening phase of Operation Enduring Freedom offers one of the clearest 
examples of what a new concept of operations within the informational paradigm might 
entail.  Against significant organizational resistance from the Army, Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld was able to put boots on the ground in Afghanistan on 19 OCT 
2001.790  The Special Forces teams linked up with their Northern Alliance counterparts 
and devised a concept of operation that used the local knowledge of the friendly 
Afghani’s to help locate the Taliban positions.  From horseback the Special Forces called 
in the satellite guided bombs.  It was a juxtaposition of the agricultural and the 
informational—and it was effective.  It also showcased the best use of airpower. The 
bombing campaign, which had begun on 7 October, transformed from an ineffectual 
show of force to a lethal campaign against Taliban targets once boots were on the found 
to provide real time locally informed intelligence.791  Furthermore, this concept of 
operations indicates the possibilities of a techno-strategy that best maximizes the 
information advantages in communications and precision munitions while limiting the 
overt presence.  The military should look to this paradigm and try to operationalize it on a 
broader conceptual level.  This operation was conducted by Special Forces, but there is 
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no reason why a permutation of this style of operations could not be diffused throughout 
the military to support a “super-sized” version of the same concept of operations within 
the General Purpose Force (GPF).  Having the ability to employ a similar style of 
operations but with a larger force could be a way to unshackle ground operations from its 
current logistically intensive mechanized formula.   
Another example of “the good” is the innovation that has taken place in the 
development and employment of drones.  Like the helicopter in Vietnam the Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), may well emerge as the iconic technology of the “Global War 
on Terrorism.”  UAVs may also only be the tip of the iceberg in a larger robotic 
revolution.  The robot industry has made tremendous strides in improving robotics 
technology during the GWOT, and that has translated into increased demand792  UAVs 
and robotics represents the leading edge of technology.  However, it would be wrong to 
assume that the U.S. has monopoly on the technology.  China has a well-developed 
robotics industry, and a keen interest in developing technological solutions to countering 
perceived American advantages.793  The potential for diffusion is virtually unlimited, and 
the variations of the theme virtually limitless, in one case Hezbollah used a combination 
UAV and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) against Israel.794  However, as shown in 
this study, having the technology is only one side of the story.  It is the integration of the 
technology into a strategy that best makes best use of it that confers advantages.  Joint 
Special Operations Command (JSOC) in particular has done a good job of integrating 
drones, as one of many elements, into an overarching techno-strategy.  JSOC blends 
dispersion with mobility and the ability to concentrate forces to apply pressure on enemy 
network through leadership targeting.  Furthermore, JSOC has pushed the envelope 
within the military to flatten its organization and increase its decentralization.  JSOC may 
offer a model for imitation within the military to make use of some of its best 
organizational practices.   
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2. The Bad 
If the approach at the beginning of Afghanistan serves as an example of “the 
good” then the approach to the invasion of Iraq can be used as an example of “the bad.”  
For the purposes here the focus will be exclusively on the techno-strategy of the invasion 
in 2003, and will not focus on the dubious road to war.  The invasion of Iraq offers a 
differing interpretations depending if it is compared to either the First Gulf War or the 
Special Forces action in OEF.  Compared against the former, the invasion in Operation 
Iraqi Freedom (OIF) is a model of paucity.  There were no significant bombing 
preliminaries as compared to the First Gulf War.  The ground force for the invasion only 
totaled 145,000 troops, a significant reduction from the First Gulf War.795  However, 
compared to Afghanistan the numbers seem excessive.  Indeed, there was some 
consideration for an approach similar to the one employed in Afghanistan whereby 
between 25,000 and 50,000 troops would be employed with supporting air coverage, but 
this approach was discounted.796  However, the chosen strategy was too heavy to 
minimize the amount of gratuitous destruction, and too light to control the population.  
Saddam had learned from the First Gulf War, and the U.S. military was not going to be 
able to limit its objectives to the deserts of the southern Iraq.  Interestingly the majority of 
the debate inside the military focused on the need for more troops while Secretary 
Rumsfeld pushed for less.797  Furthermore the ensuing insurgency was cited as proof that 
the military had gone in too light—perhaps it is time to question whether they had gone 
in too heavy.  A smaller Afghanistan-styled operation, may have limited the amount of 
destruction done during the opening phases of the ground campaign, and it would have 
certainly reduced the visibility of the coalition—both might have reduced the growing 
Iraqi angst.   
The second element of “the bad” is in some ways related to the first, and 
importantly, is an unavoidable consequence of continuing to operate using the industrial 
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age techno-strategic paradigm.  Heavily mechanized land forces supported by a vast array 
of planes and helicopters require extensive logistical and support capabilities.  As in 
Vietnam, the support forces deployed compared to the forces actually involved in the 
fighting is skewed heavily in favor of support.  The requirement to feed and house the 
support personnel necessary to make the industrial age paradigm work is one of the 
biggest detractors of the approach.  The large, well-equipped bases that spring up 
inevitably draw attackers and cause resentment, making tighter security necessary.  A 
distributed information age approach will need a new approach to logistics, and the 
military needs to adjust to operating without the creature comforts found on the largest 
bases.  Not only will this save costs but it will facilitate appearances.  Reducing the total 
numbers living on the large bases would have reduced the number of incidents along the 
roadways, and together with an increased use of aerial logistics delivery may have gone a 
long way towards reducing target availability for IEDs.   
Information technology may give the military new tools to solve its “footprint” 
problem.  But it is also time to ask whether it is still necessary to deploy division and 
corps headquarters?  The tools of the information age have made it possible for command 
and control at the level of analysis represented by division and corps headquarters to be 
performed from the U.S.  Making this change will require no less than a transformation 
of military culture, which rightfully still emphasizes leadership from the front.  However 
the cost of supplying that leadership at the division and corps level has become too high.  
Certainly, attention must be given to preventing a new instantiation of château 
generalship, but information age technology is up to the tasks 
3. The Ugly  
What about “the ugly”?  How has information age technology made us 
vulnerable?  One area that has received growing attention, although not necessarily 
grounded in actual events, is cyberwarfare or cyberterrorism.  In either case the idea is 
that a technologically savvy adversary would, through surreptitious means, gain access to 
a vital computer system and then compromise it to either gain an advantage or to degrade 
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the victim’s capabilities.798  However, Gabriel Weimann points out that there has not yet 
been a successful cyberattack.799  Still capabilities and vulnerabilities are linked and this 
is an area that must be paid due diligence as the military transitions to the information age 
paradigm.   
The information age can also conflate the traditional rank-to-impact linkage.  The 
last decade has witnessed the impact of both the “strategic corporal” and the “tactical 
general.”800  Abu Ghraib quickly showed the impact of the strategic corporal.  But the 
overcrowding of the prison system in general was a direct result of the heavy-handed 
conventional approach the U.S. military employed.  Similar to “body counts” in Vietnam 
in Iraq the metric of success was captures “hundreds of raids were conducted and over 
ten thousand Iraqis were detained.”801  Prison systems across the country were holding 
well in excess of their capacity.  It was only a matter of time, at Abu Ghraib and in 
numerous other incidents prisoners started being abused.802  At Abu Ghraib, however, 
there were pictures of the humiliation, and when they hit the news the war changed.  The 
Iraqi insurgency had its rallying cry—one instance of the impact of the strategic corporal.  
The impact of the tactical general is no less insidious.  Information technology 
makes information rapidly available, but it is organizational structuring that determines 
who has access to it and is able to act on it.  The availability of real-time information 
combined with the ability to communicate across the battlefield allows the tactical 
general to centralize decision making and micromanage subordinates to unprecedented 
levels.803  This is clearly not an effective approach to information age operations.  The 
general has more access to information than ever before, but the amount of time in the 
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day has not increased.  Information age commanders will need to achieve a balance 
between staying connected and interjecting.804  The analysis of “the good,” “the bad,” 
and “the ugly” potentially illustrates some of the features of the current state of techno-
strategic integration.  However, these current examples do not offer any insight into the 
factors facilitating or inhibiting further techno-strategic integration.  
B. PARADIGM SHIFT: THE INFORMATION AGE TRANSITION TO A 
NEW PARADIGM 
Identifying a techno-strategic paradigm shift is difficult.  The few examples of 
military organizations getting it right speaks to the difficulty of integrating revolutionary 
technologies.  However, there are usually individuals or sub-groups who recognize the 
implications before the majority.  This study has shown some common impediments 
militaries have encountered when grappling with new technologically viable concepts of 
operations.  Foremost among these is organizational preference.  The military, at least for 
the foreseeable future, will remain hierarchical and bureaucratic.  This need not 
necessarily be viewed pejoratively, but it is also true that hierarchical organization 
contributes to the problems of organizational preference.  The leaders at the top of the 
organization may be too wedded to the techno-strategy that informed their experience and 
training as a younger officer to see the new techno-strategic possibilities.  The general 
worldwide failure to break with battleships following their uninspiring performance in 
the First World War stands out as one of the best examples of the deleterious impacts of 
organizational preference. 
Numerous examples of senior leaders that did not fall prey to this trap exist—
Nathan B. Forrest, Karl Dönitz, Charles Lockwood, William Moffett, and Maxwell 
Taylor—are a few examples of senior leaders who were able to identify the changing 
techno-strategic potentialities.  Significantly, none were able to enact a sweeping techno-
strategic reorganization; their role in some sense was more heraldic.  The example of 
interwar Germany also stands out.  The German military made significant strides toward 
techno-strategic integration in spite of the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles.  Central 
                                                 
804 Singer, Tactical Generals: Leaders, Technology, and the Perils of Battlefield Micromanagement*, 
83. 
  213
to that success was the distillation of talent due to military downsizing, and a rigorous 
examination the lessons of the First World War.  However, in light of the progress the 
Germans made it is in some ways more surprising to consider what they missed.  The 
German Navy did not emphasize the submarine despite their success with it in the First 
World War.  They did not appreciate the advantages of fully mechanizing their ground 
forces, and they failed to appreciate the capabilities of a four-engine bomber.  
Organizational preference is, and will continue to be, an obstacle to recognizing techno-
strategic possibilities.  Acknowledging that it exists is probably one of the most 
progressive steps towards alleviating its effects.  However, civil-military relations 
informed by active political participation are also essential.  Civilian leaders cannot 
abdicate responsibility for shaping the military; however, care must be taken by the 
military to ensure that politicians are adequately informed.  
Moreover, strong civilian leadership is necessary to prevent inter-service rivalry 
from corrupting objective service self-assessment.  Inter-service rivalry tends to reinforce 
existing organizational techno-strategic preference.  When a rival services questions the 
techno-strategy of its fellow services the tendency is for the impugned service to close 
ranks in support of its defining techno-strategic capabilities.  Inter-service rivalry also 
exerts its effects on techno-strategy by causing services to favor the approach that 
provides the most autonomy.  The creation of independent air forces and its relationship 
on the subsequent emphasis of the mission of strategic bombing is the example that best 
highlights this obstacle. 
One final obstacle to enacting a techno-strategic paradigm shift comes from 
industry.  Security represents and increasingly large field and private contracting has 
become one of features of modern war.  Support firms such as Brown & Root have 
become so central that large scale military operations have become that conjoined to their 
logistics support.805  Furthermore, private security firms recruit heavily from the ranks of 
retired senior officers and noncommissioned officers making collusion with former 
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colleagues a real potential.806  Problematically this may impede techno-strategic shifts.  
These firms represent one more interest that must be considered when identifying the 
resistance or acceptance of new techno-strategic possibilities. 
Identifying some of the obstacles is helpful.  But what can be said about 
facilitating techno-strategic shifts?  First the military needs to create an environment 
tolerant of experimentation and intellectual diversity.  During the interwar period the U.S. 
Navy conducted some true experiments with aircraft carriers during their fleet war 
games, while the question was not decisively decided in the favor of carriers it created 
alternative courses of action for the U.S. Navy after to loss of the battleship fleet during 
Pearl Harbor.  Also at the NTC following Vietnam, the Army was able to test its AirLand 
Battle doctrine in conditions approximating real combat.  The U.S. military should 
continue to seek out opportunities to test new techno-strategic concepts.  However, to 
create an environment where true experimentation with techno-strategic concepts is 
encouraged commanders will have to be able to “fail” without suffering major career 
setbacks.  Second, support to firms such as DARPA continues to represent a sound 
investment strategy.   
As the requirements of the GWOT recede and the defense budget is adjusted, the 
U.S. military is in good position to put greater emphasis on recasting its techno-strategy.  
There is a wealth of experience in the current military that must be oriented toward 
extrapolating lessons from its history and pushing new techno-strategic frontiers.  Enemy 
organizations will continue to adapt, but the deliberate cultivation of technological 
development coupled with an environment conducive to experimentation will greatly 
contribute to the integration of technology and strategy.  
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